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Abstract
Autoflight systems in the current generation of aircraft have been implicated in several recent
incidents and accidents. A contributory aspect to these incidents may be the manner in which
aircraft transition between differing behaviours or "modes." The current state of aircraft
automation was investigated and the incremental development of the autoflight system was
tracked through a set of aircraft to gain insight into how these systems developed. This process
appears to have resulted in a system without a consistent global representation.
In order to evaluate and examine autoflight systems, a "Hybrid Automation Representation" was
developed. This representation was used to examine several specific problems known to exist in
aircraft systems. Cyclomatic complexity is an analysis tool from computer science which counts
the number of linearly independent paths through a program graph. This approach was extended
to examine autoflight mode transitions modelled with the Hybrid Automation Representation. A
survey was conducted of pilots to identify those autoflight mode transitions which airline pilots
find difficult. The transitions identified in this survey were analyzed using cyclomatic complexity
to gain insight into the apparent complexity of the autoflight system from the perspective of the
pilot. Mode transitions which had been identified as complex by pilots were found to have a high
cyclomatic complexity.
Further examination was made into a set of specific problems identified in aircraft: the lack of a
consistent representation of automation, concern regarding appropriate feedback from the
automation, and the implications of physical limitations on the autoflight systems. Mode
transitions involved in changing to and leveling at a new altitude were identified across multiple
aircraft by numerous pilots. Where possible, evaluation and verification of the behaviour of these
autoflight mode transitions was investigated via aircraft-specific high fidelity simulators.
Three solution approaches to concerns regarding autoflight systems, and mode transitions in
particular, are presented in this thesis. The first is to use training to modify pilot behaviours, or
procedures to work around known problems. The second approach is to mitigate problems by
enhancing feedback. The third approach is to modify the process by which automation is
designed. The Operator Directed Process forces the consideration and creation of an automation
model early in the design process for use as the basis of the software specification and training.
Thesis Supervisor: R. John Hansman
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
Advances in computation, algorithmic, and sensor capabilities have driven a trend towards
more automation in dynamic systems. In particular, the commercial aircraft cockpit has been
augmented by automation, causing changes to the task of flying an aircraft. Current advanced
commercial transport aircraft, such as the Boeing B777/B747-400, the Airbus A320/A340, and
the McDonnell Douglas MD-11, rely on AutoFlight Systems (AFS) for flight management,
trajectory control, and interaction with control surfaces (Boeing 1986, 1989, 1997; Honeywell
1992, 1994). These systems have evolved from simple autopilots, such as the single axis
autopilots created by Sperry in 1912 (McRuer, 1973) to multiple processor systems capable of
sophisticated and interrelated tasks such as those that are used in the Boeing B777 cockpit. These
tasks span the range from high-level flight management to low-level control of individual
actuators.
Aircraft automation has been designed to improve performance and to increase flight safety.
Performance can be increased by allowing more accurate tracking of altitude and path targets,
cost can be reduced by flying algorithmically optimized fuel efficient paths, and sensors can be
used to warn pilots or deal directly with unsafe situations. Flight safety can be enhanced by
automatically performing critical maneuvers, by not allowing the aircraft to perform possibly
dangerous maneuvers, or by augmenting the control characteristics to make the aircraft easier to
fly. However, automation has also become a potential safety liability. The rapid evolutionary
development of autoflight systems in commercial transport aircraft is suspected as a contributory
factor in a number of incidents and accidents. Hull losses have occurred at France (Strasbourg,
1992), India (Bangalore, 1990), Japan (Nagoya, 1994), and Colombia (Cali, 1995). Numerous
autoflight-related incidents have also occurred, including a rapid pitch-up (Orly, 1994), multiple
incidents of overspeeds, and numerous large altitude deviations.
As automation systems become more capable, the human element may become a limiting
factor in system operation and design. If so, procedures and design processes may need to be
modified to acknowledge known limitations. This issue is likely to be particularly critical in
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future generations of aircraft automation. Work is currently underway on the next generation of
cockpits. Clearly stating the issues and solutions may improve safety and prevent costly fixes
once the next generation is flying.
Many modem dynamically controlled systems use humans in a supervisory manner by having
them monitor the automation which is performing the task rather than performing the task directly
(Sheridan, 1992). Nuclear power plants, process control plants, and air traffic control are
additional examples of supervisory systems. This thesis uses the commercial aviation
environment as a case study to identify and discuss issues which may be important in other fields
which use automation to support humans in supervisory systems.
1.1 Accidents and Incidents
One of the goals of aircraft autoflight systems was an increase in safety. Each successive
generation of aircraft has become safer, in aggregate, than the previous generations. Figure 1.1
shows data compiled by Boeing depicting hull loss accident rates in commercial fleets (Boeing
Data, 1998). This data is grouped by generation of aircraft airframes and shows a general
reduction in the accident rate between generations.
The generations are based on airframe as well as automation capability. The first generation
consists of early commercial jet transports, many of which have been retired from service. The
second generation is comprised of widebody jets and shows a marked reduction in accident rate.
The third generation consists of the first wave of "glass cockpit" aircraft, but does not include
those which are fly-by-wire. Finally, the fourth generation consists of most currently
manufactured narrow and widebody aircraft. Limited data exists for the most recent aircraft such
as the A330, A340, MD-90 (now B717), and the B777. It is important to note that this chart
documents "rare" events, and so the statistical relevance is minimal and care must be taken when
observing trends.
In spite of the overall reduction in accident rate, flight crew error still appears as the dominant
factor in hull loss accidents. The impact that pilots have on aircraft safety have been recognized
for some time. Figure 1.2 show a breakdown of data from 2032 incidents reported over 1959-
1997, also generated from Boeing data (Boeing Data, 1998). Over this time period, flight crew
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has remained the primary cause of aircraft hull loss accidents as determined by the investigative
authority. The second set of data on this graph shows that the accident causes from 1988-1997
have not changed significantly and that the fraction of accidents attributed to the flight crew has
remained largely stable at about 70%.
Within the set of errors attributed to flight crews, automation problems are emerging as a key
safety area. The incorporation of new flight automation has resulted in a new set of human factors
issues. Sufficient concerns have been raised to warrant government investigation in the form of
the 1996 FAA Report on the Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modem Flight Deck Systems.
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Figure 1.2: Primary Causes of Aircraft Accidents (Boeing Data, 1998)
This document also discusses human factors and interface issues, which include mode awareness
problems (Vakil, 1995), incomplete pilot understanding of automation (Sarter 1992; Weiner,
1988; Vakil 1996; Javaux 1998; others), and loss of automation situation awareness (Endsley,
1994, 1995). In contrast to mechanical aircraft failure, these problems appear to be based in
confusion between the pilots' expectations of the autoflight system and what the system is actually
doing.
Review of Aviation Safety Reporting System
Flight crew automation issues were examined through the use of the Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS), a volunteer mechanism for documenting problems in flight operations
with a degree of amnesty. A search was performed on the ASRS database by researchers at the
MIT Aeronautical Systems Laboratory (Vakil, Vaneck, and Midkiff, 1995) from the years 1990-
94 with a set of keywords designed to elicit problems related to mode awareness. The keywords
consisted of the following: annunciation, annunciator, FMC, flight management computer, FMS,
flight management system, CDU, mode, capture, arm, automatic flight system, vertical,
horizontal, and program. A total of three hundred ASRS reports were returned by the keyword
search. After analysis, 184 were categorized as appropriate to flight crew automation issues.
The most commonly reported errors were "Programming Errors," "Mode Transition
Problems," and "Insufficient Understanding of Automation." It can be argued that dominance of
22
90
80 1 Horizontal
1 Both
70
* Vertical/Speed
60
0
0.
50
0
S40
E
Z 30
20t
10
0L
Data Base Mode Insufficient Automation Programming Crew Unknown
Errors Transition Understanding System Failure Error Coordination Failure
Problems of Automation
Figure 1.3: Breakdown of ASRS reports into Perceived Causes and Flight Domain
the "Programming Errors" category may be overstated, since a single typographical error could
cause an ASRS filing. However, if a such a minor error can lead to a filing, it may be indicative of
an additional concern: the usage of automation can allow relatively minor errors on the part of the
human to have significant repercussions. While this is not a new phenomenon, automation may
have made these sorts of errors more likely to occur.
The dominant causal areas are of particular importance because they suggest there can be
confusion between the pilots' expectations of the automation and what it is actually doing. "Mode
Transition Problems" indicate that pilots may not realize when the automation changes its
behaviour or the implications of the new behaviour. "Insufficient Understanding of Automation"
is equally problematic since it suggests that the pilots may not be able to supervise the
automation: in order to effectively monitor automation, a pilot must understand what its intended
behaviour should be.
As shown in Figure 1.3, these reports were also categorized by the perceived cause of the
problem and by the flight path (vertical/speed, horizontal or both) that was impacted. Since the
vertical flight path and the speed are implicitly coupled, they were grouped together. In instances
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where the problems spanned multiple causal categories, the reports were counted in each
category. In Figure 1.3, it can be seen that vertical/speed problems dominate many of the
categories; of all categories 62.7% of the reports were of this type. In particular, the "Mode
Transition Problems" category is dominated by vertical/speed problems. The data classified into
the "Insufficient Understanding of Automation" also suggests a deficiency in knowledge of the
vertical domain automation.
It should be noted that there exists a potential for over-reporting vertical deviations. Air
Traffic Control (ATC) radar can measure altitude much more precisely than location. This may
result in pilots reporting vertical/speed incidents more often than lateral ones.
1.2 Introduction to Service Problems
As new, complex automation systems are introduced into operation, problems are discovered
early during operation and dealt with through training and procedural changes (Weiner, 1985).
This process of fixing issues as they appear results in incidents early in the aircraft lifetime,
typically after introduction. However, this does lead to a stable set of automation within which all
of the problems have been identified. These identified problems can then be dealt with through
training, procedural changes, or automation modification. Underlying this process is an implicit
higher failure rate early in operational usage, rather than later as mechanical failure appears.
Figure 1.4 shows hull losses or fatal accidents for aircraft from 1959-1997 organized by the
number of years since introduction of an aircraft type that the accident occurred. In a manner
consistent with Figure 1.1, the number of accidents has been decreasing with successive
generations. However, each generation shows a spike a short time after introduction. This
increase corresponds with problems that are found early in the operational life of the aircraft that
were not foreseen before they were put into active usage.
Figure 1.5 shows the Hull Loss Accident Rate of the worldwide commercial aircraft fleet
from 1988-1997 by individual aircraft. Multiple aircraft that have been introduced since 1981 are
shown with the accident rate per one million departures. While noting that the statistical
significance of the information in this chart is limited since hull loss accidents are rare events,
there is a significant difference between the introduction of the Airbus A319/320/321 series as
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compares to other aircraft. Part of the reason behind the anomalous nature of the A320 derivative
record is an early hull loss during operational usage at the Habsheim airshow on June 26th, 1988.
However, the accident rate of this aircraft also appears to be improving as pilots and airlines gain
more experience with its detailed behaviour, and as these details are disseminated. A hypothesis
for this improvement is that training material, procedures, and flight crews are becoming more
proficient with the aircraft. This is consistent with the nature of the A320, which was the first
fully digital commercial fly-by-wire aircraft. It also included numerous departures from previous
designs, such as a full authority envelope protection system, a side-stick controller, and non-
moving throttles. This experience also explains the lack of hull losses of the recently introduced
A330 and A340, which have very similar cockpit automation.
1.2.1 Questionnaire on Pilot Understanding of Boeing B757
Work has also been done to gauge pilot understanding of flight automation. This work looked
at pilots' understanding of the Boeing B757 early in its operational lifetime. The results indicate
that pilots did not feel that they completely understood the aircraft (Weiner, 1985). The research
consisted of a questionnaire ("Phase 1") designed to probe pilots' opinions, experience levels,
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specific information and viewpoints on the new "glass cockpit" technology that was distributed to
Boeing B757 pilots at a pair of carriers.
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A follow-up questionnaire ("Phase 2") was distributed a year later. The second questionnaire
is interesting in that it shows insight into the effect of familiarity, practice and experience with the
technology. Each questionnaire consisted of a large set of questions organized using the Likert
scale to assess the pilot attitude. In this study, five response levels were employed. The response
to the statement "In the B-757 automation, there are still things that happen that surprise me." is
shown in Figure 1.6. The particularly striking point of this graph is that after a year flying the
aircraft, over half of the pilots were still being surprised by the automation.
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While the distribution of responses changed between Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the study, even
after at least a year of experience, pilots were being surprised by the automation. The premise that
pilots have an incomplete understanding of the automation is further bolstered by Figure 1.7
which shows that pilots felt that there were modes and features of the FMS which they did not
understand.
The results of this survey seem to indicate that it may take more time to train pilot to maximal
proficiency in new aircraft. The time necessary for this training and the operational experience
required have not been determined by this survey. What is necessary is a longitudinal study
looking across pilots of varying operational experience to determine when individuals feel that
they have mastered the aircraft.
1.3 Motivation
The primary motivation for this research is to gain insight into the underlying causal basis for
the human factors issues which have been identified as appearing in new autoflight systems. By
understanding the reasons for these issues, mitigation approaches can be identified and suggested.
Flight automation systems in successive generations of aircraft have been gaining in capability.
This growth in capability has increased the size, and likely the complexity, of new generations of
automation. This growth may result in future generations of aircraft which are more susceptible to
interface and autoflight systems problems. It is expected that the issues which are identified
27
through this analysis are early indicators-the leading edge-of these automation problems in
future systems. As such, the intention of this work is to serve as a preemptive mechanism to
forestall this increase by providing guidance for the design of future generations.
1.3.1 Aircraft Automation as a Leading Indicator to Issues in Other Fields
Aircraft autoflight systems are an effective area in which to study the human factors issues.
They can serve as a leading indicator with automation interaction and complexity management
and problems in other domains. A number of additional fields may be served by the insights
suggested in this work. Nuclear power plants and process control plants represent areas in which
workers are trained specifically for their task, albeit not as rigorously as in aerospace. These
plants are highly automated in a manner similar to aircraft and in many cases have warning
systems and alerts to maximize safety. Air traffic control may also be served by these insights
since controllers are highly skilled individuals whose task involves them interacting with
automation.
Leading Indicator
Aircraft automation is thought to be an exploratory case study for the identification and
consideration of issues which may be important in many other human-automation systems. Pilots
are a homogeneously trained group of subjects to investigate, so that fundamental human-
automation issues can be seen with fewer confounding factors. The medical and currency
requirements on pilots are also stringent. The automation with which pilots interact has rigorous
performance requirements due to its life-critical nature.
As a population, commercial airline pilots are homogeneous, intelligent, and highly trained. In
the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration verifies that pilots are free of medical
disorders, and meet specified educational standards. In addition to initial flight training and check
out, commercial pilots are subject to yearly reviews, checkrides, and medical examinations
(Federal Aviation Administration 1998). These stipulations are imposed by governmental
certification organizations to ensure that the safety of the flying public is not jeopardized.
Individual airlines attempt to verify that their pilots do not suffer from drug or alcohol abuse
problems. Training is completed and documented on a recurring basis by the airlines. Medical
28
logs and histories are maintained for each pilot. Stiff competition tends to limit the population to
those who are well educated. In general, pilots are held to high standards medically, cognitively,
and from the standpoint of co-ordination. Problems in this highly trained and motivated
population are likely to indicate problems with other automation areas.
Other Fields
The medical arena is another in which highly skilled and trained practitioners work within a
proceduralized environment. In recent years, the drive towards managed medical care has resulted
in the adoption of additional proceduralization in order to standardize the care provided to
patients. Automation which is used in this field must be designed in a manner which is consistent
with a care-giver's model of the task, can be used by a task- rather than technology-oriented
audience, and must be able to exist within the procedural environment.
Another important class of operators is composed of those who are not highly trained to
specific automation or to the task. Luxury automobiles are an area in which rapid innovation is
leading to the adoption of some very interesting automation. Antilock brake systems place a
microprocessor between the pedal and the actuator for the brake shoe; one could argue that
modem systems provide "brake-by-wire" capabilities. There are other advanced being planned
(Port, 1998). "Road-following" is an advanced form of cruise control which allows the vehicle to
follow curves and maintain spacing within its lane; other systems can automate lane changes.
1.4 Thesis Argument Overview
The goal of this thesis is to gain insight into the underlying basis for the source of human
factors problems which are appearing in commercial autoflight systems and to consider
approaches for dealing with these problems. The next chapter will examine the incremental
development of these systems, which have been evolving for the past thirty years. Detailed
analyses of available aircraft operators manuals, inferred autoflight system behaviour, and
accident reports have enabled insight into the structure of autoflight systems and how to segment
and extend their behaviour.
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The results of autoflight system analysis are used to develop the Hybrid Automation
Representation, an abstraction of the autoflight system which captures both the continuous and
discrete behaviour of these systems. This abstraction bears strong resemblance to modem hybrid
models being researched in the control area. The Hybrid Automation Representation will be
compared to other similar modeling efforts underway. One of the strengths of this model is that it
can be used to measure the "cyclomatic complexity" of autoflight system behaviour. Cyclomatic
complexity is a rigorous measure from theoretical computer science of the number of linearly
independent paths through a system, which has been extended to allow the measure of an aspect
of automation complexity, namely the number of independent paths through which a transition
can occur.
Chapter 4 will present a survey designed to validate the applicability of cyclomatic
complexity by examining the cyclomatic complexity of autoflight system mode transitions of
those transitions identified as difficult by pilots. A survey was conducted on the World Wide Web
and made accessible via the Internet. Pilots were instructed to detail autoflight system mode
transitions which they found to be most complicated. A subset of these transitions was then
analyzed in order to characterize their cyclomatic complexity.
Chapter 5 will use hybrid automation representation to examine several types of underlying
causal factors that have been identified through focused interviews and accident/incident reports.
The use of the Hybrid Automation Representation in identifying some types of the accidents and
incidents a priori will be discussed. One of the results of the pilot survey was the identification of
the Altitude Capture mode transition as problematic. A case study will be presented of Altitude
Capture behaviour in which problems are identified via the hybrid automation representation and
were then verified through high fidelity simulator testing.
Chapter 6 will discuss mitigation techniques which have been identified to address aircraft
automation problems. The first is the use of procedures and changes in training as a means to
mitigate some automation problems resulting from complexity. Directed additional training may
be useful to allow pilots to build more robust mental representations of automation. Procedures
can be used to "work around" automation issues. The second approach is to enhance feedback to
change the nature of interaction with automation and allow more accurate mental representations
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when the existing displays are not sufficient or appropriate. Adding feedback in the aircraft may
allow a more accurate representation of automation state to be determined. The third approach is
to explicitly manage the complexity of the system so that it is more consistent with human
capabilities and limitations by modifying the process by which these systems are designed. An
Operator Directed Process will be presented as a development process which considers the human
pilot's limitations and capabilities early in the design process.
Conclusions and recommendations will be presented in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Evolution of Autoflight System Complexity
Autoflight systems have developed in an evolutionary manner over the past fifty years.
During this time, the complexity of these systems has increased as they have been made capable
of performing additional functions, enabled by advances in sensors, computational capability, and
new algorithms. This complexity is hypothesized to be a contributory factor in aircraft incidents,
as suggested in Section 1.1. The evolutionary growth of these systems is examined for a particular
family of aircraft to investigate the manner, and order, in which functions were added. Other
factors, such as the size of software in the autoflight system, and the number of controls with
which the pilot has to interact are discussed. The material for this analysis is based on public
information sources, such as aircraft manuals, focused interviews with pilots and airline check
pilots.
2.1 Modes and Transitions within Autoflight Systems
Autoflight systems have developed incrementally based on the adoption of new technologies.
One way to track the incremental growth is to examine the number of independent, quasi-steady-
state behaviours available to pilots as documented in the flight operations manuals. Control block
diagrams are an effective representation of closed loop control, where the system is typically
controlled to a target value. However, each controller is limited to a single behaviour. In order to
allow the multiple behaviours necessary during various stages of flight, autoflight systems include
multiple controllers for each flight domain, only one of which is active at any time.
Modes are a mechanism to allow disparate behaviours to coexist within a single system.
Disparate behaviours will appear when new functionality is added to system which cannot be
parsed as an extension to existing function, or cannot be constructed by combining existing
functions. In the case of autoflight systems, new modes were needed when necessary behaviours
could not be generated by existing closed loop controllers. New modes were added in the form of
new controllers. Dividing the system into separate controllers can allow selection among multiple
behaviours. The active mode defines the active controller to determine the behaviour of the
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system. Figure 2.1 shows this abstraction of the autoflight system graphically. Modes allow the
autoflight system to be decomposed into separate behaviours which can be selected. Only one
controller can be active at a time.
MODE A Disturbances
Error
Target Value A E- r Controller A
Measured Value A Sensor(s) A
Measurement Errors
MODE B Disturbances
Error4
Target Value B C re Actuator
Measured Value B Sensor(s) B
Measurement Errors
Figure 2.1: Abstraction of Autoflight System
Modes also allow the incremental adoption of the functions and behaviours into pre-existing
systems. They also allow a single system to be more capable by allowing it a larger set of
behaviours to deal with more environments, situations, procedures, and scenarios. Systems which
have evolved incrementally are more likely to require to take advantages of modes as a tool to
manage complexity, as seen in the previous section where new autoflight systems tended to carry
forward the majority of older modes. Incremental evolution is often characterized by the adoption
of new functions. If new functions need to be added which are not an extension to existing
function, or cannot be constructed by combining existing functions, a new mode must be created
to encapsulate this new behaviour.
In aircraft, a single mode is unable to allow all the various behaviours required in flight. As an
example, consider the recent additions to vertical aircraft automation. A Vertical Speed (V/S)
mode has been available since the B727, shown in Figure 2.5. This mode controls the vertical rate
of the aircraft, usually by referencing barometric pressree. As such, Vertical Speed is an "air-
referenced" control mode. An alternate vertical control strategy is to control to a particular flight
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path angle, which is fundamentally different in that it is an ground-referenced mode because it
measures the angle between the flight vector and the ground. In order to add this capability, a new
mode needed to added; more recent aircraft also have a Flight Path Angle (FPA) mode, seen in
Figure 2.9.
Modal Structure of Autoflight Systems
Aircraft automation has been parsed to consist of an irreducible set of base modes which are
used in quasi-steady-state conditions, have an invariant set of targets, and correspond to an
unambiguously defined automation behaviour. This definition is consistent with the manner in
which pilots model the system, and how engineers model the system-each base mode
corresponds to single controller, generally a state level controller (Vakil 1996). A macro mode
consists of a specific sequence of base modes where a specific order of transitions is expected
based on procedural or nominal usage. Each base mode in the macro mode sequence has its own
set of targets, so that the automation's set of targets varies over the course of the macro mode.
Transitions among the base modes are made based on the mode transition criteria, such as altitude
or indicated air speed. An example of a macro mode is the Autoland sequence, which transitions
(in the vertical channel) between Altitude Hold, Glide Slope Capture, Flare, and Rollout with a
different set of targets in each base mode. Other examples include Vertical Navigation or Profile,
Lateral Navigation, Flight Level Change and Autoland.
Transitions Between Modes
Each possible transition between modes consists of a starting mode, an ending mode,
conditional statements which must be satisfied in order to effect the transition, and the target
value of the new mode. Conditions determine whether the transition will occur. A transition will
only occur if all of the conditions are satisfied. Transitions among modes can be caused by
various factors, including intervention by the human operator (pressing a button), environmental
changes (winds), or due to specific conditions being met (reaching a waypoint or speed limit).
Each of these is one element in the set of conditions which must be satisfied before a transition
will occur from the starting mode to the ending mode. Individual conditional statements can be
combined in a Boolean manner to create more sophisticated interaction. In modem aircraft
automation, these statements can become quite complex.
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From the standpoint of the pilot, transitions can be further grouped into three categories. A
commanded transition is active as soon as the selection is made: the transition condition consists
solely of the selection itself. An example is moving the Altitude Hold switch to the on position,
thereby activating the Altitude Hold behaviour. An uncommanded transition is one that is not
directly activated by the pilot: the transition conditions consist of elements not under the control
of the pilot. These transitions are usually some type of envelope protection, or failure in the
automation. Another example is a transition caused by overspeed protection in more modem
aircraft. Finally, armed transitions occur when, after arming, a mode engagement occurs at some
further condition. At least two conditions are necessary: pilot selection and the occurrence of an
external condition. An example is the use of Glide Slope Capture to transition to a descent mode
after the aircraft intersects with the ILS glide slope signal.
Concerns with Modal Automation
As discussed in Section 1.1, automation problems have been identified as a key safety area.
Within this area it appears that modal automation, and mode transitions in particular, are of
particular concern. Figure 1.3 shows the that a number of ASRS reports were related to mode
transitions. In addition, it appears that pilots have suitable experience with continuous time
behaviour of aircraft automation and that is well understood. By contrast, numerous researchers
have raised concerns regarding the discrete modal behaviour is more modern aircraft (Sarter
1992, Weiner 1988, Vakil 1996, Javaux 1998, others).
There is also evidence that pilots model the system in a modal manner. If this is found to be a
widely adopted representation, it may be the appropriate form upon which to base the training
material. Focused interviews showed that pilots have adopted a modal representation of
automation behaviour, as described by mode transition diagrams (Javaux, 1999b). Note that this is
different from a detailed Finite State Machine type of representation of the underlying
automation, but rather an organization of the behaviour into separate modes. The differences
appear in the parsing of what constitutes a mode, a trigger event, or a conditional clause. These
differences acknowledge the operational viewpoint rather than the design viewpoint. This thesis is
going to focus on examining mode transitions in aircraft autoflight automation.
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2.2 Autoflight System Evolution
This section will examine the growth in number of modes to support the hypothesis of
incremental growth. Based on the open literature and training materials for each aircraft, an
estimate was made of the number of independent modes in a series of aircraft as shown in
Figure 2.2 (American Airlines 1997, American Airlines 1994, Boeing 1989, Honeywell 1992).
These diagrams shows that the number of modes available for use by the pilot has been increasing
in a linear manner. The data may be incomplete from the standpoint of system design, but is a
measure of the number of modes articulated to pilots. The number of modes may be
undercounted. In particular, the high level Airbus PROF and Boeing VNAV modes consist of a
set of submodes. These submodes are difficult to directly compare as the manufacturers have
parsed the submodes differently. Therefore these modes could not be counted separately. This
implies that the mode count in Figure 2.2 is conservative for these aircraft, since modes associated
with trajectory control are underrepresented.
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Figure 2.2: Horizontal and Vertical Mode Counts in Selected Aircraft
The following sections will show the growth of aircraft modes in a more detailed manner
organizing modes by the control level at which loop closure is accomplished. Four generations of
aircraft will be examined, consisting of the Boeing B727, B737, B757, and B777.
2.2.1 First Generation Automation: B727 (1964)
The Boeing B727 is the representative aircraft for the discussion of first generation of
transport jet automation (American 1997). It had limited ability to control its lateral and vertical
flight path, but did not have autothrottle capability. As shown in Figure 2.3, in this aircraft, the
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vertical modes are not coupled to the speed modes. The Turn/Pitch knob was used to control the
attitude of the aircraft. Altitude Hold was the available state control mode and Glide Slope Track
was used to control the trajectory during approach. Glide Slope Arm maintained the current
altitude (in an identical manner to Altitude Hold) until the glide slope was acquired. At that point,
the system transitioned to Glide Slope Track.
Stab Augmentation Attitude Control State Control Trajectory Control Envelope Protection
Turn/Pitch Knob Altitude Hold Glide Slope Track
Glide Slope Arm
Figure 2.3: Vertical Modes in the B727
Lateral modes are shown in Figure 2.4. The Boeing B727 included an automatic "yaw
damper," which acted as a stability augmentation system. This device counteracted the Dutch
Roll mode to which swept wing aircraft are susceptible. The Turn and Pitch knob was used to
control the roll of the aircraft. State control allowed the selection of a heading, maintenance of a
heading, and the ability to track a VOR signal. Trajectory control was used during approach to
follow a ILS localizer and Glide Slope signal.
Stab Augmentation Attitude Control State Control Trajectory Control Envelope Protection
Yaw Dampers Turn/Pitch Knob Heading Select Localizer
Heading Hold
VOR Track
Figure 2.4: Lateral Modes in the B727
2.2.2 Second Generation Automation: B747 (1973)
The Boeing B747-100/200 will be used as a representative aircraft for the discussion of
second generation autoflight systems (Boeing 1985). Figure 2.5 shows the vertical and speed
modes in this aircraft. Sections that are shaded existed in the previous generation.
In addition to those in the B727, the B747 had several new modes, some of which were
introduced by the inclusion of an autothrottle. The Turbulence mode was added to provide the
ability to hold altitude through turbulent weather conditions and functioned in a manner similar to
Altitude Hold. IAS Speed used the pitch of the aircraft to maintain a specified airspeed. Vertical
Speed allowed descents at a specified rate. The Speed mode controlled to a target velocity by
38
-4
Stab Augmentation Attitude Control State Control Trajectory Control Envelope Protection
Tum/Pitch Knob Altitude Hold Glide Slope Track
Glide Slope Arm Perf. Management Sys.
Turbulence
iAS Speed (pitch)
Vertical Speed
Speed etained from B727
Altitude Capture/Select Ew o747
Figure 2.5: Vertical/Speed Modes in the B747
closing the loop around the throttles and was typically used in conjunction with the Altitude Hold
and Vertical Speed modes. Altitude Capture or Select was used to smoothly transition to a level
flight path after a climb or descent.
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Figure 2.6: Lateral Modes in the B747
The more interesting new mode was the addition, on certain B747s, of the "Performance
Management System" (PMS) which provided trajectory control during the cruise segment of
flight. This is in contrast to the Glide Slope Track and Localizer modes which was only available
during approach. PMS was an early version of Area Navigation (RNAV). Synthesized
information from multiple ground-based navigation aids was fused with onboard Inertial
Navigation Systems (INS). This enabled the aircraft automation to know its location laterally and
vertically at any point in time to a much higher degree of accuracy than previously possible. The
RNAV capability increased the number of functions it was possible to have the aircraft perform,
including enabling it to automatically fly between waypoints defined laterally and vertically.
2.2.3 Third Generation Aircraft: B757 (1983)
The third generation of jet transport aircraft incorporated multiple radical changes from
previous generations, many driven by a Presidential Task Force which allowed widebody aircraft
to be flown by two person crews. In order to reduce the workload on the smaller crew, airline
manufacturers automated more aircraft systems and graphical displays were used rather than
analogue dials to allow more rapid retrieval of information. The Boeing 757/767 was the first of
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the breed of "glass cockpit" aircraft and will be used as the example in this section (Boeing,
1988). This cockpit design is also very similar to those used in successive Boeing aircraft.
Figure 2.7 shows the Vertical/Speed modes in the B757. Shaded modes are those from
previous generations, and those crossed out are modes which were not carried forward to the third
generation.
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Figure 2.7: Vertical/Speed Modes in the B757
The B757 exchanged the Turn/Pitch knob for Control Wheel Steering, which can allow direct
control over aircraft attitude. It is hypothesized that the Turbulence mode was removed because
its function could be handled by a more capable Altitude Hold mode. IAS Speed was replaced
with a more capable Flight Level Change mode, designed to allow efficient climbs and descents.
Additional modes, such as Thrust Hold, were added to allow more complete control over the
autothrottle. Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) mode was used to allow fuel efficient flight. Takeoff
and Go Around mode were used to control the thrust setting to predefined levels during critical
flight segments. The Flare mode was used during autoland maneuvers. The PMS was replaced
with a more capable Vertical Navigation mode consisting of Path, Speed, and Altitude submodes.
Automatic envelope protection also appeared in this generation. Stall protection automatically
added power when approached a stall condition. Overspeed conditions were dealt with by
reducing the throttle to an idle setting and controlling the aircraft to a maximum safe airspeed.
In the lateral domain, additional state level modes were added to assist during critical
maneuver near departure and approach. Rollout was added to assist in post-touchdown
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Figure 2.8: Lateral Modes in the B757
maneuvers. A Lateral Navigation (LNAV) mode replaced the PMS system in the B747. The
LNAV system was also augmented through the use of a "moving map" display which showed the
aircraft position graphically in the context of ground based navigations aids.
2.2.4 Fourth Generation Aircraft: B777 (1995)
The most modem generation of aircraft represent the fourth generation of automation and
have been introduced since 1988, starting with the A320 (Honeywell, 1992), and continuing with
the B777 (Boeing 1997). These aircraft differ from previous generations in that they are Fly-By-
Wire rather than cable-actuated: control signals are carried via electrical impulses rather than over
mechanical or hydraulic linkages. In practice the distinction to the pilot can be made to be
minimal, but a fundamental change is that the inputs from the pilot are now always processed by a
computer before the actuation occurs. Automation has become a necessity to fly these aircraft.
This capability has been enabled by the adoption of much higher bandwidth digital buses and by
placing additional computational power into the aircraft. The latter enables signal processing to
occur fast enough to allow interaction with low level flight control.
In the Vertical/Speed domain, Figure 2.9 shows that few additional modes have been added.
Shaded modes are those from previous generations, and those crossed out are modes which were
not carried forward to the fourth generation. Fly-by-wire (FBW) is used for stability augmentation
and serves to interpret any manual control from the pilot. Flight Path Angle mode is used to fly a
ground-referenced descent path. This is in contrast to Vertical Speed, which flies an air-
referenced descent.
The lateral modes have been augmented by the FBW system as well. A new attitude control
mode, ATT: Hold Engage, is used to maintain a roll immediately upon engaging the autopilot.
Track Select and Track Hold are the ground-referenced equivalents to Heading Select and
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Figure 2.9: Vertical/Speed Modes in the B777
Heading Hold. Finally, Envelope Protection has been extended to the lateral domain. AutoBank
Limiting limits the bank angle during aggressive high altitude turns to prevent loss of altitude.
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Figure 2.10: Lateral Modes in the B777
2.2.5 Technical Factors in Evolutionary Growth
Multiple technical factors have contributed to the evolutionary growth of aircraft. Advances in
control theory have resulted in a capability for more optimal control. Advances in multivariable
control have generated systems capable of smooth transitions utilizing blended control.
Servomechanism work has created control surfaces with better response, especially when coupled
with the switch from hydraulic to electrical actuation. Increases in computing power and memory
densities have enabled more complex flight paths to be calculated and flown and, when used in
conjunction with advanced display technology, have created moving map displays to increase
situational awareness. The move from analogue to digital flight controls has allow a large number
of changes, both in physical signal transmission, and in the interpretation of pilot inputs. For
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example, the A320 utilizes its fly-by-wire system to allow the aircraft to respond in a consistent
manner while it moves through its flight envelope.
Perhaps the most significant change, from the standpoint of number of modes available in the
aircraft, is the transition between beacon- and area-based navigation. A notional diagram of
beacon-based navigation is shown in Figure 2.11. Physically fixed waypoints, shown by the
VORTAC symbol are used to define the available paths of the aircraft. Typically, the radio
receivers in the aircraft were only capable of tuning into a single beacon. The single target of
these systems was a frequency and, perhaps, navigational radial to track. Once the aircraft crossed
a waypoint, the aircraft crew had to tune to a new frequency to track a new waypoint. This meant
that pilots were responsible for managing the trajectory of the aircraft.
Figure 2.11: Notional Diagram of Beacon-based Navigation
Area navigation significantly increased the number of types of targets to which autoflight
systems could be controlled and created a much richer set of conditions upon which transitions
could occur. Synthesized information from multiple ground-based or satellite navigation aids was
fused with onboard Inertial Navigation Systems (INS). This enabled the aircraft automation to
know its location laterally and vertically at any point in time to a much higher degree of accuracy
than previously possible. The RNAV capability increased the number of functions it was possible
to have the aircraft perform, including enabling it to automatically fly between waypoints defined
laterally and vertically.
Using the RNAV information, targets could be selected from a much broader set. The aircraft
behaviour could be made contingent on this much larger set of external elements. As a result of
this new sensing capability, the automation was capable of control during the entire trajectory of
the aircraft. The automation was also capable of automatically transitioning between modes.
These transitions were initiated based on specific condition criteria, such as an altitude, speed or
location measured by the sophisticated INS and RNAV systems.
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Figure 2.12: Notional Diagram of Area Navigation
Allowing the automation to make transitions between modes enabled higher level behaviour
from the system. As an example, without this capability, an aircraft in a climb mode would have
to be monitored until a target altitude was attained. If the system automatically transitions, the
pilot can engage the climb mode and enter both a target vertical rate and armed altitude. When
this altitude is attained, the aircraft will level off and transition to an Altitude Hold mode, using
the altitude as a target. Lateral navigation is similarly extended, since sequences of lateral
waypoints can be used to generate successive heading targets, allowing flight along a predefined
flight path. This can be very useful, especially if the pilot is able to enter such a flight path during
low workload situations.
2.3 Growth in Complexity
The complexity of autoflight systems has been cited as a concern by multiple researchers
(Sarter 1992, Hutchins 1996, Degani 1994, others). The term "complexity" has proven to be
difficult to define; it is not clear which measurable elements of the autoflight system are
appropriate to use as a metric of complexity. However, multiple measures of the size of autoflight
systems are consistent in demonstrating rapid growth in the number of controls, displays, and
computer software.
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2.3.1 Measures of Complexity
Though it is not obvious what metrics are appropriate to measure the complexity of these
systems, three metrics are presented in this section. The number of controls and switches is an
appropriate measure of the complexity as measured by the human to computer interaction. The
complement to this measure is the number of displays in the cockpit, providing computer to
human interaction. The size of the software aboard modem commercial transports is presented as
an indication of the size of the underlying automation which must be supervised by the pilot.
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Figure 2.13: Growth of Controls/Switches in Cockpits (Ostgaard, 1981)
Displays and Controls in Cockpit
The number of controls and switches needed in a cockpit provide some indication of the
growth of complexity in aircraft, since the number of functions which can be handled
autonomously is linked to the number of controls and displays necessary. Figure 2.13 (Ostgaard,
1981) shows the count of the number of control and switches in some representative military
aircraft. The solid trend line indicates the development rate where the number of controls and
switches double every 11 years. While not an exact fit to the small set of datapoints, the number
of controls is growing quickly in the military domain.
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Figure 2.14 (Weiner, 1988) shows a similar count of the number of displays in the cockpit.
What is interesting in this graph is that the number of displays increases and subsequently
decreases. In addition, the rate of increase is notably slower than that shown in Figure 2.13. The
diagram shows that the maximum number of displays was reached in about the early 1970s and is
now decreasing.
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Figure 2.14: Growth of Displays in Cockpits (Weiner, 1988)
It appears that simply measuring the number of displays is inadequate. Newer aircraft have
multifunction interfaces which display multiple pages. While the pages do not take up additional
space in the cockpit, they nonetheless increase the number of "displays," as defined by the
information shown to the pilot rather than by their physical attributes. Accessing this information
may, in fact, be more difficult, since appropriate data may require additional effort to view.
An alternate approach is to show more elements of information on a single page or display,
resulting in the use of multiple symbols. Primary Flight Displays (PFDs) have multiple
indications on the speed tape to indicate specific limits and targets for the aircraft. Figure 2.15
shows a partial list of the possible tags which can appear on a modem PFD. In order to utilize
these additional pieces of information, pilots must be trained to interpret them correctly. These
multi-function displays, which underlie the decrease in the number of physical displays, were
driven by the need to more effectively utilize the limited space in the cockpit.
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Figure 2.15: PFD Airspeed/Mach Display (Honeywell, 1992)
Size of Software
In order to support the development of additional functions and displays within the aircraft,
the software systems underlying the automation have grown rapidly. One of the indications used
by industry to ascertain the size of a project is to estimate the software lines of code (SLOC)
required. This metric is somewhat suspect since lines of code do not translate easily between
computer languages. Another metric is to look at the actual machine instructions which are
generated. This has a similar weakness in that the size may be dependent on the particular
computational architecture. However, the trends which appear in Figure 2.16 are based on a
single manufacturer's data and are more amenable to comparison (Weener, 1998).
As can be seen, avionics software is growing at an exponential rate. The left graph shows a
straight exponential extrapolation of growth in object code, with the size of code doubling every
1.5 years. It is important to note that the rate of growth is heavily influenced by the final datapoint
of the B777-200, which is a fly-by-wire aircraft (FBW) in contrast with the other aircraft, which
are cable-actuated. To account for this difference, the graph on the left shows two extrapolations
based on the hypothesis that the sudden increase in the size of the software reflects the influence
of the shift to a FBW system. The solid line is an extrapolation based on the cable-actuated
aircraft and doubles at a rate of 2.7 years. Based on the empirical data, the dotted line is the cable-
actuated curve translated upwards 42 MB. While this curve increases more gradually, it still
predicts that the next generation aircraft will have well over 100 MB of object code.
A corollary of this hypothesis is that the avionics systems in aircraft are presenting the pilot
with some subset of the fullest possible amount of information. In order to reduce the information
to a manageable form, software interprets and manipulates the raw data. In any sort of interpretive
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framework, some information will be hidden from the pilot. This concern of
its implications reappears in later in this thesis.
hidden variables and
Related to the quantity of software required to run a system are the number of control signals
which are distributed by the processing backbone. Figure 2.17 shows the growth of the number of
signals in the same group of aircraft. The left graph shows an extrapolation across both FBW and
cable-actuated aircraft and has a doubling rate of 2 years, comparable to the increase in software
size. The right graph the solid line shows an extrapolation based on the cable-actuated aircraft and
then translates this upwards by 7000 signals in order to take into account a single time cost
associated with the introduction of the FBW system (Weener, 1998). This curve doubles every 3
years. It likely that the number of signals in a digital system will increase at a faster rate than in a
cable-actuated system since the cost associated with each additional digital signal is much lower.
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Figure 2.17: Growth of Signals (Weener, 1998)
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Finally, it should be noted that this information is based on the small set of available data.
While basing an extrapolation on this set is potentially specious, the data does suggest a rapid and
exponential rate of growth.
Unconstrained Growth of Software Complexity
An advantage and disadvantage of software is that it is free of many of the physical
constraints in design. Conventional mechanical systems are limited in complexity by the necessity
to manufacture and maintain the designs. These factors exact a cost from overly complex design.
In addition, mechanical systems are constrained by physical attributes. Aircraft must be light
enough to fly, chairs must support a weight of 300 lbs, and film must work in standard lighting
conditions.
By contrast, software has few physically imposed constraints. Modem processors, software
systems, and sensor suites afford a great deal of the flexibility, capability, and the capability for
complexity. There is a high cost associated with the initial creation of complex software, and a
maintenance cost as the software needs to be upgraded, but the "manufacturing" cost is minimal.
The minimal limitations imposed by the physical systems, namely the computing power and
memory storage, have been increasing at exponential rates. In the absence of physical constraints,
software systems can become excessively complex with little apparent penalty during design.
However, the penalty from a complex design may appear during operational use rather than
during development.
2.3.2 Apparent Complexity of Autoflight Systems
Aspects of the growth of aircraft autoflight systems are captured in the metrics suggested
above. An additional element is the "apparent complexity" of the system: the complexity
perceived by the operator of the system. This is hypothesized to be a function of the number of
modes in the autoflight systems, the number of transitions among modes, and the nature of
transitions among modes: automatic versus manual and whether feedback is provided. These
three factors appear to be most critical to the complexity that is apparent to the operator. The
following quote from a flight manual demonstrates that the complexity may be a function of the
transitions among modes.
49
"Through the FCU, an immediate climb/descent is initiated by selecting the
desired altitude in the ALT SEL window and either pulling the set knob or
pressing the LVL/CH P/B to engage the LVL CHANGE mode. Pressing the
LVL/CH P/B also disengages PROFILE, however, if PROFILE is engaged,
pulling the set knob does not disengage it, rather it initiates an immediate
climb/descent to the altitude selected on the FCU. The exceptions are..." (US
Airways, 1998)
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has covered an analysis of modem flight automation systems, which consist of
two sets of behaviours. The first is the continuous behaviour of autoflight systems which can be
represented using control block diagrams. The need for multiple behaviours resulted in
independent continuous behaviours appearing incrementally in successive generations of aircraft
in an evolutionary manner. The second type of behaviour was discrete switching among
continuous behaviours. The need to utilize multiple behaviours drove the adoption of modes as a
mechanism to organize disparate behaviours. Mode transition matrices and diagrams were
developed as tool with which to analyze the modal (discrete) behaviour of automation. These
models are used in the next chapter to develop an automation representation which encompasses
these two types of behaviours.
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Chapter 3
Hybrid Automation Representation
In order to analyze flight automation, a Hybrid Automation Representation was developed
based on the publicly available documentation of current autoflight systems. The lack of a
consistent model explaining the behaviour of aircraft automation resulted in a "hybrid" model
being used to capture the detailed analysis of these systems.
Based on an analysis of numerous aircraft (Boeing MD-11, B727, B737, B757, and B777, the
Airbus A300-600, A310 and 320), autoflight systems appear to composed from two
fundamentally different types of behaviour. The first is a "quasi-steady-state" behaviour where
the automation controls the aircraft towards some target state in a continuous manner. This
behaviour can be completely modelled using control block diagrams at various levels of loop
closure. Each additional quasi-steady-state behaviour required an additional controller, modelled
by an addition control block diagram. Therefore, in order to support additional functionality
additional different controllers or target states were required, though each behaviour could still be
modelled by a single control block diagram. It became necessary to segment the automation to
organize aircraft capabilities by allowing selection among the active control loops. Each quasi-
steady-state behaviour is commonly termed a "mode."
The second type of behaviour requires a set of analytical tools to understand this discrete,
"modal" structure. A specific mode is defined by the target that has been set and the manner in
which the targets are to be acquired. Where control block diagrams are an effective representation
of a single mode, it was necessary to describe discrete transitions among the modes. These
transitions are typically initiated by events or when particular conditions are satisfied. The
discrete nature of these transitions makes them difficult to model within the continuous
representation of the control block diagram. Differing representations, mode transition diagrams
and matrices are used in the following sections to represent this level of behaviour. These
diagrams also provide the basis for measuring the complexity of these systems.
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This hybrid organization of the aircraft automation is similar to hybrid control models being
used in modem control theory. In order to allow a system to respond to a wider set of situations,
hybrid control systems utilize a set of continuous, but independent, control mechanisms. This
provides more flexibility than using a single control mechanism for all possible situations since
the appropriate control mechanism can be selected for each situation faced by the system. Hybrid
control systems are being researched for use in applications ranging from autonomous vehicle
control to process plant control (Godbole, date unknown).
The Hybrid Automation Representation which was developed integrates the continuous
representation of control block diagrams with mode transition matrices and diagrams (Vakil,
1998) for discrete representation. One of the goals of this representation was to create a
mechanism to evaluate the complexity of flight automation systems a priori, based on the
underlying structure of the automation. Figure 1.3 implies that a significant number of issues in
autoflight systems are related to transitions among modes. Cyclomatic complexity, a measure of
the number of linearly independent paths through a system, is presented as a means to
characterize the complexity of automation. This measure is directly applicable to the mode
transition diagram representation presented.
3.1 Analysis of Quasi-Steady-State Behaviour
Control block diagrams are a common representation of control loop mechanisms used by
automation designers and engineers. They are a useful representation of continuous processes
which consist of target values, mechanisms to measure the actual system state, and generated
error values. Control loops generally drive a system towards the target based on the difference
between the current state of the system and the desired target in the presence of disturbances as
well as other forces. As such, they are effective at capturing the quasi-steady-state behavior of
modes of automation, where specific target values are being attained (Vande Vegte, 1990).
Figure 3.1 shows a simple example of a control block diagram. On the left is shown the set
target value. This value is compared to the actual, measured value, as detected by some sensor.
The difference between these two is the error measurement and is used to generate a signal to the
actuator. This actuator then physically changes the state of the aircraft.
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Figure 3.1: Generic Control Block Diagram
Control block diagrams are a means by which the feedback controllers used in automation are
designed and documented. During design, the wealth of previous work done using control block
diagrams, especially with linearized processes, can be brought to bear. Using this knowledge, the
attributes of the closed system can be determined, in terms of how quickly acquisition will occur,
how large the overshoot will be and other characteristics. Since these diagrams are created during
system design they are already available and provide a consistent and comprehensible means to
depict this type of behaviour to the pilot.
To convey the behaviour of automation to the pilot, completely specifying a control block
diagram, in terms of gains, integrations, and control algorithms is unlikely to be necessary. The
most important elements to convey to the pilot are the type of target which the controller is using
(vertical speed, altitude etc.) and the value of the commanded target, such as the specific vertical
speed value. Both of these elements are important in order for a pilot to understand what the
system is doing. In the analysis framework being suggested, these two pieces of feedback are
associated with the control block diagram representation of the continuous behaviour of the
automation.
3.1.1 Attitude Control Loops
Figure 3.2 shows a highly simplified version of the attitude control loop for the roll axis of the
aircraft. Similar control loops exist in pitch, yaw, and thrust. In each case a target is specified by
some external source. The actual measurement of each axis is determined via gyroscopes, in the
case of roll and pitch, or via a more complicated indirect measure in the case of thrust. The
difference between these values is used to generate a signal to drive the actuators: ailerons,
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elevators, rudder, and throttle. Unlike other axes, which have a variable target value, yaw is
always driven to a target value of zero via the yaw damper.
Target Roll 10 - -1 controller -- ^*'*
Roll
Gyro_
Roll
Figure 3.2: Simplified Roll Attitude Control
In actual systems, maintaining a specified roll, or bank angle, can be much more complicated,
as it is dependent on the sensors which are available. Figure 3.3 shows a more realistic control
block diagram. In this case, the response of the bank sensor is too slow, and so a roll rate
gyroscope must be used for control, requiring the error to be converted into a commanded roll rate
actuated by the ailerons. The bank sensor is used for reference, but not used as the primary sensor.
Even this diagram is simplified: in the presence of coupling between multiple axes of flight, such
as roll-yaw coupling, the commands to the actuators will be include terms from these other axes.
As an example, there can be crossover coupling of a bank angle hold autopilot and the yaw
damper.
Commanded
Bank Roll Rate: Pc 8
Target Bank Ge Aileron
Angle
Roll Rate: P Rolat
L --FGyro -
Bank: k.
Figure 3.3: Bank Angle Hold Autopilot (McRuer, 1973)
3.1.2 Velocity Vector Control Loops
At the velocity vector level of control, shown in Figure 3.4, rather than controlling the attitude
of the aircraft, the automation controls the velocity vector of the aircraft. This is a level of control
as it allows the specification of targets which are more closely aligned with directives from air
traffic control. The heading, vertical rate, altitude, and speed of the aircraft can be controlled by
setting an appropriate target. The velocity vector controller uses the error between the target value
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and the actual value to generates a target for the attitude controller designed to zero the error. The
attitude controller then controls to the generated attitude target. Both velocity vector and attitude
controllers typically correspond to "base modes" in aircraft: controllers which are used in quasi-
steady-state conditions, have a single, scalar and invariant target, and correspond to an
unambiguously defined automation behaviour. The simplified block diagram for a specific
velocity vector level control mode, Vertical Speed, is shown in Figure 3.4.
Target Vertical veica Speed Target Pitch
Speed Controller Controller Elevator
Pitch
Pitch Gyro 
-
Barometric
Vertical Speed
Figure 3.4: Example of Velocity Vector Control: Vertical Speed
Coupled Modes
Multiple velocity vector controllers can be engaged simultaneously (e.g. vertical path may be
controlled by a pitch controller while speed is controlled by throttles and heading by elevators). If
multiple controllers are initiated by a single pilot input, these modes are considered "coupled."
Modes are coupled when their functions are linked together dynamically or operationally. As an
example, the Flight Level Change mode on Boeing aircraft engages both a pitch controller to
target the current airspeed and places the throttles into an IDLE or CLIMB setting which enables
the fastest possible descent or ascent. Figure 3.5 show the coupled control which occurs when the
Flight Level Change mode is selected to climb. This mode engages two controllers. The speed of
the aircraft is controlled by the its vertical speed through pitch. The vertical path is controlled by
placing the throttles into a "Max Continuous Climb" setting and climbing at the resultant rate.
In general with autoflight systems, if a vertical and lateral mode are coupled, the vertical
mode can only be initiated if the lateral mode has already been engaged. As an example, from the
Boeing B727, the elevator autopilot switch can only be switched if the aileron switch has already
been engaged. Similarly, the Glide Slope Capture mode will not become active until after the
aircraft is established on the localizer.
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Figure 3.5: Coupled Control in Flight Level Change Climb
Coupled modes are difficult to capture in this control block diagram representation.
Differentiating between a pair of coupled modes and each mode individually involves the manner
in which they are initiated rather than their continuous operation. Similarly, the "interlocks"
which prevent the engaging of a vertical mode until its lateral counterpart is engaged are difficult
to capture within a control block diagram.
Single Input-Single Output Control
In Figure 3.5, the speed controller is shown as a completely independent control loop from the
vertical controller. In control terms, this is a Single Input, Single Output (SISO) system, where
each output state is controlled by a single input. Typically a pair of thrust and vertical velocity
modes engage two independent SISO controllers: the aircraft's pitch controls the vertical speed
and the thrust controls the air speed, decoupling the speed and vertical path of the aircraft.
Either the elevators or the thrust can be used to control the vertical path or the speed: reducing
thrust while maintaining speed can be used to descend, and pitching the aircraft up while
maintaining the vertical path with thrust can be used to reduce speed. For a given mode the
control allocation is implicitly selected. Table 3.1 show a set of vertical/speed modes and their
associated control allocation for the MD-11. Note that this problem does not exist in the lateral
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domain, since only a single mechanism, rolling to a new heading, is available to track a lateral
target in co-ordinated flight.
Table 3.1: Representative Vertical and Speed Modes in the MD-11
Vertical and Speed Modes Speed Allocation Vertical Allocation
Altitude Hold Throttle Elevator
Vertical Speed Throttle Elevator
Flight Level Change Elevator IDLE or CLIMB Throttle
Glide Slope Tracking Throttle Elevator
Go Around Elevator CLIMB Throttle
Multiple Input-Multiple Output Control
A more complex system uses multiple controllers with multiple targets by mixing the
necessary control signals between multiple actuators. An extension of coupled modes, which can
be effectively captured using control block diagrams, are modes which "blend" control across
multiple channels. In this case, multiple input and multiple outputs are tied together by the
dynamics of the aircraft. Each of the outputs is blended together to control the trajectory. The
vertical and speed state of the aircraft correspond to the potential and kinetic energy of the
aircraft. In conjunction, both states determine the total energy of the aircraft. With this coupling,
speed can be traded for altitude and vice versa, leading to a number of mechanisms to maintain
altitude or control the climb/descent rate of the aircraft. This is a Multiple Input-Multiple Output
(MIMO) controller, where each output variable is controlled by more than one input. Figure 3.6
shows the MIMO Vertical/Speed control.
Target Tareet P"ch Pitch Elevator
Speed and Altitude Capture Target Thrust aTu
Vertical Controller Throttle
VelocityI
Pitch
Thrust
Speed/Vertical Velocity
Figure 3.6: Multiple Input, Multiple Output Velocity Vector Control
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Multiple Possible Targets
Velocity vector control is more complex than attitude control because more targets can be
commanded. In the vertical path, the target command can be one of many possible types: vertical
speed, altitude, defined vertical path (glide slope), pitch, angle of attack, flight path angle and
others. Each of these targets defines a different underlying controller, and therefore a different
automation mode. Each of these modes must be represented by a separate control block diagram.
Table 3.2 shows a selected set of possible modes in the Boeing B737 and the associated
controllers.
Table 3.2: Possible Targets in the Boeing B737
Target Controller/Mode Selection
Heading Heading Select
Localizer Signal Localizer Track
Speed Speed: IAS or Mach
EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) EPR
Glide Slope Glide Slope Track
Vertical Speed Vertical Speed
Altitude Altitude Hold
Altitude Flight Level Change
Multiple Possible Target Acquisition Means
Velocity vector control consists of multiple modes with which to complete a task. As an
example, consider commanding a lower altitude. This target could be attained by reducing the
thrust of the engines to decrease speed and therefore lift causing the aircraft to sink or by lowing
the nose of the aircraft to descent. Pilots who use velocity vector control must remain aware of the
implications of their choice of mode: in this example, the former will not cause the aircraft to gain
speed, whereas the later could cause an overspeed condition. Once again, the details of the
continuous nature of this mode are captured effectively in control block diagrams, where the
actual target can be identified.
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3.1.3 Trajectory Control Loops
At the trajectory level, shown in Figure 3.7, the automation controls the trajectory of the
aircraft. In the lateral channel, trajectory control functions by measuring the offset from the
desired target and generating a signal to correct the heading to reacquire the target trajectory. The
measurement can be based on a number of different sensors: an Inertial Navigation System, an
Area Navigation System, an en-route navigation aid signal or combinations thereof. In the vertical
and speed channels, a similar process has signals generated from a vertical course deviation and
thrust profile controlling the vertical speed and airspeed of the vehicle.
Target Heading Target RollTarget
Horizontal Trajectory Heading Roll Ailerons
Trajectory A
Roll
Heading
Horizontal Position Navigation
Figure 3.7: Lateral Trajectory Control
In Figure 3.7, a single lateral trajectory level loop encloses two other inner level loops. To
control the aircraft to a trajectory, corrections are made to maintain an appropriate heading to
intercept the signal. The heading controller specifies a target to the roll controller which actuates
the aileron.
As with velocity vector control, what is less apparent in control block diagrams is that
multiple possible controllers are available for each of the flight axes. At any time, only a single
trajectory controller is active, implying that the continuous behaviour of the aircraft in one axis
can be characterized by a single control block diagram.
3.1.4 Other Control Loops in Modem Aircraft
The newest commercial jet transports incorporate fly-by-wire controls. Rather than pilots or
automation providing control signals to the control surfaces via mechanical or hydraulic linkages,
the inputs are digitally encoded, transported via a databus, and then decoded at the actuator.
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Digitally encoded signals can be transported on much less massive wires than hydraulics or
mechanical systems, leading to weight savings.
Digital control also offers the ability to place an intermediary between the inputs from the
pilot and the control surface, even during manual control. This intermediary step interprets the
inputs of flight controls and then actuates control surfaces. As an example, consider the behaviour
of the Airbus A320 near stall. During normal flight, the input from the pilot side stick is
interpreted as a standard control law, mimicking the behaviour of conventional aircraft. As the
aircraft approaches the high lift region of flight, prior to stall, the input is interpreted in a manner
which generates increased positive stability. As shown in Figure 3.8, below a specified speed
limit (1. 13Vs), the relationship switches from a linear control mode to an angle of attack (a)
control mode. In this mode, stick deflection will not correspond to elevator deflection. Instead,
elevator deflection will be modulated to prevent stall. The X-control mode has been designed to
allow high lift while preventing stall and allowing control authority in other axes. Full stick
deflection results in maximal lift, but may not result in full elevator deflection.
1.06. 's, a PrtW u
1. V, PrOtection Ror
-' C Law
Figure 3.8: Changing Control Laws
3.1.5 Limitations of Control Block Diagrams
The previous sections have demonstrated how control block diagrams are an effective means
to represent a subset of the aircraft automation function. This subset consists of a quasi-steady-
state flight segments which are based on a target for each channel (lateral, vertical, and speed) of
flight. A single diagram can capture all of the information regarding the continuous behaviour of
the aircraft. Multiple diagrams can cover multiple possible behaviours. However, control block
diagrams do not effectively represent how aircraft switch between behaviours, deal with modified
targets, or respond in the face of performance changes.
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3.2 Analysis of Modal Behaviour
Autoflight systems have evolved from systems with few defined behaviours. New systems
have a much larger set of modes and large set of associated transitions. This level of the
automation cannot be effectively captured because they are fundamentally discrete changes in
operation whereas control block diagrams are designed for and largely limited to use in a
continuous space. Discrete transitions are necessary to allow aircraft to deal with more scenarios
in the flight environment and are necessary to include when describing automation. The next
section examines the evolution of autoflight systems as modes have been incrementally added.
Modes are a mechanism to allow disparate behaviours to coexist within a single system.
Disparate behaviours will appear when new functionality is added to system which cannot be
parsed as an extension to existing function, or cannot be constructed by combining existing
functions. In the case of autoflight systems, new modes were needed when necessary behaviours
could not be generated by existing closed loop controllers. New modes were added in the form of
new controllers. Dividing the system into separate controllers can allow selection between
multiple behaviours. The active mode defines the active controller to determine the behaviour of
the system.
The behaviour of modes has two large domains in its characterization, its continuous
behaviour and its discrete, transitional behaviour. The continuous behaviour of a mode is entirely
captured in the control block diagram. The discrete behaviour of a mode is the manner in which it
transitions to other modes. The feedback of this discrete behaviour to the pilot also needs to be
considered.
A formalism was developed to represent transitions between modes which is based on the
formalism of Finite State Machines (FSMs). Mode transition diagrams are used to represent
discrete elements of modal automation. FSMs are a standard tool used in the field of computer
science to describe and design complex systems, including flight automation. Unlike FSMs,
which are used by engineers during design and analysis, mode transition diagrams describe the
structure of the automation as experienced by the pilot. FSMs consist of a set of states, a set of
transitions between states and the criteria which cause transitions to occur. Modal automation
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systems can be represented using the same notation which is used for Finite State Machines. In
this nomenclature, the states correspond to the modes of the automation, transitions move
between modes, and the transition criteria consist of the conditions which must be satisfied. The
analogous diagrams are termed mode diagrams and the matrices which are derived are called
mode transition matrices.
Figure 3.9 shows the modal structure of a simple autopilot. The circles denote the possible
states, and the directed arcs represent the possible transitions. There are a total of six modes in this
diagram: Horizontal Autopilot Off (HOFF), Localizer Track (LOC), Vertical Autopilot off
(VOFF), Heading Track (HDG) Vertical Speed (VS), and Glideslope Track (GS). In this
example, HOFF can transition to LOC or HDG, but not to VOFF, GS or VS. VOFF can be
transitioned to from VS or GS, and so on.
ZOF 
LO 
VOF
VS HDG GS
Figure 3.9: Modal Structure of Simple Autoflight System
The equivalent mode transition matrix is shown in Table 3.3. This is an "allowable" mode
transition matrix, where matrix elements correspond to whether a transition is possible or allowed
between two different modes. Each row i is the set of transitions which leave mode i. The column
j in row i has an entry corresponding to whether a transition exists from mode i to state j. If the
mode transition matrix is some matrix T, then Ti1 is equal to one if a transition exists between
states i and j.
Multiple attributes of a modal system can be examined with a mode transition matrix or
diagram. The example given above is a straightforward identification of which transitions
between modes exist. Alternately, the feedback that was provided to a pilot during a transition
could be shown, or the conditions which precipitated the change of mode. In the next sections, the
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Table 3.3: Transition Matrix for Simple Autopilot System
Mode HOFF LOC VOFF HDG VS GS
HOFF 1 1
LOC I I
VOFF 1 1
HDG 1 1
VS 1
GS 1
generic mode transition diagram will be refined so as to be more useful in the analysis of
autoflight systems.
3.3 Hybrid Automation Representation
As part of this thesis, the Hybrid Automation Representation was developed. This
representation attempts to capture both the quasi-steady-state and the discrete behaviour of
aircraft automation systems. The representation integrates the continuous representation of
control block diagrams with mode transition matrices and diagrams (Vakil, 1998) for discrete
representation. Figure 3.10 shows the major elements of this model. To read this diagram, the
"From" modes are shown in the rows and then "To" modes are listed in the columns. The
transition from Mode A to B is shown to occur when the Elevator Autopilot Lever is in the ON
position under the condition that the Aileron Autopilot is also in the ON position. The feedback to
the pilot consists of the position of the lever itself.
3.3.1 Detailed Mode Transition Diagrams
The representation of modal automation can be represented in a more detailed form through a
diagram focussing on a single mode transition. This representation captures the important
elements of transitions in an autoflight system in a more understandable manner. These elements
consist of the conditions needed to satisfy a transition, and whether they are commanded or
automated, the feedback provided regarding the transition, and the manner in which the target
value is specified in the new mode. Figure 3.11 shows an example of a mode transition diagram
describing the transition from Mode c to Mode 1 which shows the major elements of the refined
Mode Transition Diagram. Each transition consists of a starting mode, an ending mode, a set of
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Mode A
TO
Mode B Mode C
Condition: Elevator A/P Lever -> ON AND
Aileron A/P Lever ON
Feedback: Elevator A/P Lever
Condition: Disconnect Condition: Rock Turn Knob Condition: Auto G/S Selected
Target: Knob Position Feedback: Selector Position
Feedback: A/C attitude
Condition: Disconnect Condition: Man Selected Condition: Rock Turn Knob
Feedback: Selector Position Target: Knob Position
OR Feedback: A/C attitude
Condition: Turn Knob Turned
Feedback: Selector Position
Feedback: Knob Position
Figure 3.10: Hybrid Automation Representation
conditions to satisfy, the feedback provided during the transition and the new target values for the
ending mode. Two types of conditions are shown. The first is a manual or commanded condition,
depicted by the pushbutton. The second is the automatic condition depicted by the switch.
Conditions Feedback Ending
Mode
IF~~
Manual / AutomaticCommanded
Figure 3.11:
New Target
Values
Mode Transition Diagram Abstraction
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FROM
Mode A
Mode B
Mode C
Starting
Mode
I I l I I I
In Figure 3.11 while in Mode ax, the target is Ta. One transition path to Mode P is to satisfy
Conditions A, B, and C. If these condition are satisfied, a chime will provide feedback, make
Mode 1 the active controller, and specify the target value of that controller to be T1 . Alternately,
if manual Condition D is satisfied in addition to automatic Condition E, a buzzer will sound, and
Mode P will become active with a target value of T2 -
3.3.2 Example Mode Transition Diagrams
The next several examples show the use of this abstraction to capture elements of the
autoflight system. Figure 3.12 shows one transition between Altitude Hold and Vertical Speed,
which occurs once the pilot selects the Vertical Speed button on the Mode Control Panel. After
this condition is met, the target vertical speed is set to zero feet per minute. Feedback of this
change is shown on the Flight Mode Annunciator.
Altitude Vertical
Hold Speed
V/S Switch Flight ModeAnnunciator0 SVria
Alt Speed
Figure 3.12: Transition between Altitude Hold and Vertical Speed
Figure 3.13 shows the use of the pitch wheel to change the vertical rate of the aircraft while
the Vertical Speed mode is engaged. When the condition of the pitch wheel moving is satisfied, a
transition occurs from Vertical Speed back to Vertical Speed with the target being updated to the
new value determined by the pitch wheel. The new target is shown on the Mode Control Panel.
Note that this example does not change the active mode of the automation, but only the target.
Vertical Vertical
Speed Speed
Pitch Mode
Wheel Control Pitch
Target Panel Wheel Target]
F3VpP
Figure 3.13: Changing Vertical Speed using Pitch Wheel
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Figure 3.14 shows an alternate notation for situations where only the target, and not the mode,
change. In this notation, the transition loops back into the same mode, with the value of the new
target being specified by the pitch wheel.
Mode
Control
Panel
Vertical Pitch
Speed Pitch Wheel
Wheel
Vertical
Speed
Figure 3.14: Changing Vertical Speed using Pitch Wheel, Alternate Notation
Figure 3.15 shows an example of an automatic transition to an envelope protection mode from
the Vertical Speed mode. If an overspeed condition is satisfied, this will be shown to the pilot on
the Flight Mode Annunciator. An automatic transition will occur to the Flight Level Change
mode which has both speed and thrust targets. The target speed will be set to Vmax and the target
thrust limited to Idle.
Vertical Flight Level
Speed Overspeed Flight Mode Change
Condition Annunciator
Vertical 09vmax Speed
Speed 'd* Thrust
Figure 3.15: Automatic Transition to Flight Level Change Mode
Each of these previous examples has shown a single transition between modes. Figure 3.16
shows a larger subset of the altitude capture modes from the Boeing B737 (Boeing 1985, 1989).
Three modes are shown in this diagram: Vertical Speed, Altitude Capture, and Altitude Hold.
Vertical Speed is changed through the use of the Vertical Speed thumbwheel, with the new target
vertical speed set based on the thumbwheel position and signal. Other transitions to Vertical
Speed can occur from the Altitude Capture mode if the Altitude Selector is moved more than
100 ft with the instantaneous vertical rate of the aircraft being used as the new target value. A
change in the Altitude Selector will result in a transition to Vertical Speed, but with a target value
of zero.
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" os econds Selector
Inactive IACive 2 seconds
Timer NO FEEDBACK 2 Seconds Timer
Change in
Altitude
Selector
Figure 3.16: B737 Altitude Capture Mode Transition Diagram
The transition from Vertical Speed to Altitude Capture consists of two conditions being met.
The criteria is the time to the selected altitude-the transition will occur when the altitude set in
the Mode Control Panel is approached. In addition, the "Linger" timer must be inactive. This
timer is shown in the bottom half of Figure 3.16 and is an example of an automatic and hidden
behaviour in the autoflight system of this aircraft. Much more detail will be presented regarding
this mechanism in the next chapter.
67
3.4 Relation to Other Modeling Efforts
The Hybrid Automation Representation is one example of the efforts underway to model
autoflight systems. Several other efforts exist with differing approaches, goals, and
representations. These efforts will be discussed to compare them with the approach presented in
this thesis.
3.4.1 OFAN
Asaf Degani (1994) has developed a modeling representation called "OFAN," which uses
StateCharts to represent the interaction between the different modules in automation. StateCharts
are an extension to Finite State Machines utilizing hierarchical structures to allow the modeling of
large systems, concurrency to enable the analysis of simultaneous processes, and a broadcast
mechanism to allow state changes across multiple concurrent systems. For these reasons,
StateCharts are particularly applicable for the modeling of large, complex, reactive systems.
Degani illustrates the use of StateCharts to model the environment of the automation, the user
task, the interface, the control mechanism and the physical plants.
StateCharts are a powerful tool for describing a complex system. One of the results of the
analysis in this thesis is that systems are being designed which are too complex for use by pilots.
The tools which allow the analysis of these systems during design do not serve to mitigate the
underlying issue related to complexity, though they do serve to allow exploration of complexity
concerns. The goal of the analysis done with Hybrid Automation Representations is both to
demonstrate the complexity of existing systems (and how this can result in incidents) and to
motivate the creation of new systems which are less complex.
3.4.2 Operator Function Model
The Operator Function Model (OFM) is focused on the interaction between an operator and
automation in a highly proceduralized environment, such as aviation (Callantine, 1994). The
OFM is a structured approach to specify the operator tasks and procedures in a task analysis
framework made up of modes and transitions. Using graphical notation, OFM attempts to graph
the high level goals into simpler behaviours to allow the supervision of the automation. The
power of OFM is based upon several important observations: the event-driven nature of
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automation, the proceduralized nature of high risk tasks, and the fact that many of the transitions
and decisions made during system operation are discrete in nature. These observations are
consistent with those used as the basis of the design of the Hybrid Automation Representation.
The Hybrid Automation Representation has similar goals to the Operator Function Model, but
is more focused on modeling the automation rather than the pilot or procedures. As such, the
graphical representation can be more straightforward. The HAR also treats continuous behaviour
in a manner which appears to be consistent with pilot's mental representations, by using a
hierarchy based on the relationship between the discrete and continuous layers of the automation.
This is in contrast to the functional decomposition used in OFM. Automatic, uncommanded
transitions were found to be an important element in the understanding of automation behaviour.
As such, they are highlighted within the HAR representation through the distinction between
manual and automatically specified conditional statements on transitions.
3.4.3 Operator Procedure Model
Work has been underway at Honeywell (Shery, 1999) on the Operator Procedure Model, a
methodology for the design and verification of "knowledge-based" systems as necessary for
elements of the flight task. The goal of this model is to decompose flight missions into subtasks
which are meaningful to pilots as determined by the pilots' representation of the tasks.
Operational procedures are defined by scenarios, the conditions, context, and situation of the
system, and an associated behaviour, which is the response of the system to a given scenario.
These scenarios and behaviours are designed through a participatory process with senior pilots,
flight tests, and avionics engineers. Operational procedures are captured in tables linking the
scenarios (as described by a set of conditions) to behaviours.
The Operator Procedure Model has a great deal of promise in attempting to engage relevant
participants early in design. In addition, it does not attempt to coerce the language use in
describing system behaviour from that of the pilot to that of the engineer. Unfortunately, for the
systems which have been modelled to date using this process, the tables generated are large,
complex, and are difficult to examination for errors, inconsistencies, or design weaknesses.
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3.4.4 SpecTRM
Work is underway on the development of an analytical tool designed to identify mode
problems early in design (Leveson 1997, 1998). SpecTRM (Specification Tools and
Requirements Methodology) is a toolkit, including a requirements specification language, for
modeling safety critical systems. After casting a design into this model, it can be examined, both
by human and by automated processes, for a set of known mode problems. The advantage of
allowing automated checking is that it may catch errors, or sections susceptible to errors, not
discernible by a human checker. The automated checker uses some fifty completeness criteria to
determine whether the system is fully specified. These criteria are based both on a underlying
formal mathematical completeness model and on the experience base of a designer of large
systems.
SpecTRM has a great deal of promise in automated checking of requirements documents and
design verification. What may be even more useful is the gradual adoption of the completeness
criteria into use by the designers of systems, and the use of automated testing as a verification
process. One of the goals of the Hybrid Automation Representation is to make apparent to
designers the design choices that may result in confusion. It does not appear that this goal can be
met through the use of SpecTRM.
3.4.5 Simplification Modeling
Denis Javaux (1998) has developed and applied a model of the mechanisms by which humans
understand and interact with automation based on the frequential and inferential simplification
that occurs over repeated usage. Unlike the other models presented, Javaux's work is designed to
provide a theoretical basis, built upon psychological principles, for the manner in which pilots
appear to simplify the automation. As such, it provides a basis for some of the predictive
statements in the usage of the Hybrid Automation Representation.
Frequential simplification is related to the number of experiences pilots have with a given
transition or mode. The more often a particular transition is seen, the more tightly tied it will
become to the apparent initiating factors. Other factors which may influence the transition, will be
ignored if not experientially reinforced, until the transition is not expected in the presence of these
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conditions. The simplification which occurs is based on a lack of experiential interaction.
Inferential simplicities are related to inappropriate extrapolation of behaviours: if a change in a
particular switch results in a transition in almost all modes, it will be inferentially simplified to
result in that transition in all modes.
3.5 Measuring Autoflight Mode Transition Complexity Using Cyclomatic
Complexity
Transitions among modes have been identified as an area of complexity in the aircraft
autoflight system in Section 1.1. This category of problems was highlighted in the ASRS review
presented in Figure 1.3, in focused interviews with pilots and in an examination of the system
documentation. The current section presents a technique with which to analyze transitions
between autoflight modes at a detailed level. Cyclomatic complexity is an approach originally
developed in structured programming and graph theory.
3.5.1 Cyclomatic Complexity
Cyclomatic complexity is an analysis technique originally used to examine the complexity of
structured software written on mainframe computers (McCabe, 1976). In the analysis, cyclomatic
complexity determines the number of linearly independent paths through the system. The original
goal was to examine the complexity associated with multiple branching code modules or states to
gain insight into the impact of structure programming. Part of the contribution of this work is to
extend the approach to examine the complexity of any system which can be shown as a linked set
of edges and nodes. A node is some type of state or decision point within a system, and an edge is
a mechanism to connect nodes. A further contribution is to extend the analysis to be used in the
examination of an autoflight mode transition. This is based on the premise that determining
whether a transition will occur is dependent on the evaluation of a set of predicating conditions
and is analogous to how a structured program is dependent on branching decisions to determine
its flow of control.
Further, cyclomatic complexity appears to be a useful analysis tool to examine transition
characteristics which are hypothesized to impact the apparent or perceived complexity of
autoflight automation. In order to monitor an autoflight system, a pilot needs to be able to track
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the evolution of the state of the automation in addition to the state of the aircraft dynamics. Since
automation can directly control the behaviour of the aircraft, the state of the automation needs to
be understood in order to predict the future aircraft state and to detect when it is inconsistent with
what was intended or expected. In order to do this, a pilot must have a representation of the
automation itself in order to monitor conformance.
Cyclomatic complexity is a rationale approach to analyzing autoflight mode transitions which
counts the number of linearly independent paths. Each path corresponds to a set of evaluations
which must be made by a pilot in order to ascertain the future state of the system. Cyclomatic
complexity is dependent on the number and structure of the conditional elements in the transitions
and is hypothesized to be useful in the analysis of the apparent or perceived complexity of a
system. In particular, autoflight mode transitions are thought to have their apparent complexity
impacted by the number and structure of conditional elements (Javaux, 1998). These
characteristics correspond to those which are identified in the Mode Transition Diagram
(discussed in Section 3.3.1), and which are hypothesized to have an impact on the apparent
complexity. Figure 3.17 shows these elements. The starting and ending mode are necessary to
identify the transition and the total number of modes is hypothesized to impact the system
complexity and can be analyzed from the size of the Mode Transition Matrix.
Starting Conditions Feedback Ending
Mode Mode
Condition A Condition BMode o -T Chime Mode
Condition C Target T1
Taj "TI6 P Ts
Condition D Condition E Buzzer Target 12
Manual / Automatic New Target
Commanded Values
Figure 3.17: Mode Transition Diagram Abstraction
Another hypothesized factor is the number of transitions between modes and the number of
different new target values which can be specified by the transition. Recall that the behaviour of a
system is defined both by the active mode and its target value. As such, each transition path which
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results in a new target value is considered independently. As an example, in Figure 3.17, there are
two transitions paths, corresponding to the new target values T, and T2.This also allows the
representation, as shown in Figure 3.13, to stay in one mode while changing target values.
Finally, the number and structure of the conditions are identified, as they can suppress transitions.
Feedback that is provided for the transition is a tool to allow the human operator to monitor the
transitions as they occur-it is a mechanism to mitigate the effects of complexity, and is not
thought to directly impact the implicit or structural complexity of the transition at a given level of
abstraction.
Rasmussen (1986) and others (Norman, 1988) discuss the necessity to effectively interact at a
knowledge-based level. At this level of understanding, the pilot must have a model of the
automation which can be cognitively "run" in order to predict future aircraft states. Multiple
possible outcomes are generated based on this predictive analysis and the most likely of these
outcomes is selected. The complexity of this model has an impact on the perceived complexity of
the automation. Cyclomatic complexity is a tool to analyze the structure of the model utilized by
the pilot in the process of monitoring the automation. Each linearly independent path through the
autoflight systems corresponds to a set of evaluations in the process of monitoring.
3.5.2 Analysis Using Cyclomatic Complexity
Cyclomatic complexity is a measure of the number of linearly independent paths through a
system of edges and nodes. This is straightforward for a "strongly connected" system, where
every mode can reach every other mode through some path. In a strongly connected system, the
number of independent paths has been shown to be Equation 3.1 where v is the number of
independent paths through the system, e is the number of edges, and n is the number of nodes.
Equation 3.1 allows the rapid assessment of the linearly independent paths but is only applicable
for strongly connected systems.
v = e-n+1 Equation 3.1
If each node only has a single edge, only one path will exist through the system, as shown in
Figure 3.18. The single path through the system is from node 1 to 2 to 3 to 4.
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Figure 3.18: Simple Strongly Connected System: v = 1
If an additional edge is added the new set of linearly independent complete set of paths must
include the new edge. This results in an increase in cyclomatic complexity corresponding to the
number of edges in excess of the number of nodes. Figure 3.19 has two independent paths,
corresponding to the original circuit shown in Figure 3.18 and the added edge, creating the direct
path from node I to 3. This is consistent with Equation 3.1.
2
1-3
0
Figure 3.19: Simple Strongly Connected System with Additional Edges: v = 2
Linearly Independent Paths in Program Control Graphs
The original target of cyclomatic complexity was structured programs described by program
control graphs (McCabe, 1976). These graphs have a single entry node and a single exit node.
Each node can be reached by the entry node and each node can reach the exit node though some
set of edges. Program control graphs do not need to be strongly connected, and typically are not,
since the exit node does not connect to other nodes. This is apparent if we reverse the direction of
the arrows in Figure 3.18 between nodes I and 4 and nodes 3 and 4. This is shown in Figure 3.20.
Note that there is no path connecting nodes 2 to 4 or nodes 1 to 3. Node 3 in Figure 3.20 is a
"terminal node," defined to be the node at the exit of a program graph.
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Figure 3.20: Non-strongly Connected System
Virtual edges must be added in order to make the system strongly connected, thereby allowing
the use of Equation 3.1 to count the number of paths. The dotted line from node 3 to I in
Figure 3.21 indicates the virtual edge between these two nodes which has been added in order to
convert it into a strongly connected form. These edges add to the complexity of the system. All
nodes now have a path to all other nodes: node 2 can connect to node 4 through nodes 3 and 1.
Node 3 is directly connected to node 1.
2
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Figure 3.21: Strongly Connected System through Additional Virtual Edges: v = 2
More generally, each terminal node will require a virtual edge in order to make the system
strongly connected. Using this generalization, Equation 3.1 can be refined to utilize virtual edges,
resulting in Equation 3.2, where v is the number of independent paths through the system, e is the
number of edges (transitions), n is the number of nodes (modes), and t is the number of terminal
nodes. For Figure 3.21, there are four edges, four nodes, and one terminal node, so the cyclomatic
complexity is 2.
v = e-n+(t+1) Equation 3.2
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An edge and node diagram with multiple terminal nodes is shown in Figure 3.22. The
terminal nodes have been shown as squares to differentiate them from the other nodes and the
virtual edges have been shown as dashed. The total number of linearly independent paths in this
diagram using Equation 3.1 with 5 edges and 4 nodes, is 2 paths. Using Equation 3.2, the virtual
paths need not be counted, but the result of 3 edges, four nodes and two terminal nodes is also 2
paths.
Figure 3.22: Edge and Node diagram with Multiple Terminal Nodes (squares are terminal
nodes)
Extending Cyclomatic Complexity to Mode Transition Diagrams
By mapping Mode Transition Diagrams to the edge and node diagrams used to determine
cyclomatic complexity, a measure can be made of the number of the cyclomatic complexity of
transitions between modes. This measure corresponds to the number of possible manners in which
such a transition could occur-the number of linearly independent paths in the transition.
Mode c
L ccI
Condition A
U
Figure 3.23: Simple Conditional Transition
To measure the cyclomatic complexity of a mode transition, the starting mode and each
combination of ending mode and new target value is considered to be a distinct node. Each
condition is also a node: each condition node is a check as to whether that condition has been
76
Mode B
Target T1
satisfied. Reducing Figure 3.23 into this set of edges and nodes results in an edge and node
diagram such as the example shown in Figure 3.24. A node in this representation can either be a
mode or a condition, however, that the starting and terminal nodes correspond to modes rather
than conditions. The distinction between these is that a mode will correspond to a quasi-steady-
state behaviour of the system to be modelled using control block diagrams as discussed in
Section 3.1. In contrast, conditions do not have an associated behaviour.
Mode$
Mode (- Condition A
Target T1
Figure 3.24: Edge and Node Diagram of Simple Conditional Transition: v = 2
The system initiates in Mode a, and branches to Mode B if Condition A is true, or back to
Mode x if Condition A is false. The cyclomatic complexity of Figure 3.24 is calculated to be 2
using Equation 3.2 based on three nodes, three edges, and one terminal node.
3.5.3 Measuring the Cyclomatic Complexity of Transitions
In order to be useful, the cyclomatic complexity must be able to analyze the impact of
Boolean additions to transitions between modes. Conditions can be combined by ANDs and ORs,
and each has an impact on the cyclomatic complexity. This section will examine the impact on
cyclomatic complexity of each combination. Cyclomatic complexity must also be sensitive to the
use of multiple target values.
Multiple Conditions
Figure 3.23 shows the simplest possible transition, predicated on a single condition and with a
single ending mode and new target value. Multiple conditions can be combined by using Boolean
operations (ANDing or ORing) in the transition. Figure 3.25 shows a transition in which two
conditions, A and B, must be satisfied.
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Figure 3.25: Multiple Conditional Transitions
The equivalent edge and node diagram is shown in Figure 3.26. In this diagram, Condition A
must be satisfied in order for control to pass to Condition B and then on to Mode P. If either
Condition A or Condition B is false, the system remains in Mode a. The cyclomatic complexity
of this system results from 5 edges, four nodes, and a single terminal mode: v = 3. Each additional
conditional element will increase the cyclomatic complexity by one.
Mode (X Condition A Condition B Md
Target T1
Figure 3.26: Edge and Node Diagrams of Conditional Transition with an AND: v = 3
ORing Multiple Conditions
Figure 3.27 shows a mode transition in which either Condition A or B must be satisfied in
order for the transition to occur. The transition will occur if either path is completed by Condition
A or B being satisfied.
Mode U Mode p
Condition A
T 
Tol Target Ti T
Condition B
Figure 3.27: Conditional Transition with an OR: v = 4
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The equivalent edge and node diagram is shown in Figure 3.28. In this diagram, either
Condition A or Condition B can be satisfied. Once satisfied, the transition to Mode P will occur.
The cyclomatic complexity of this system results from 6 edges, 4 nodes, and 1 terminal node:
v = 4. Each additional conditional element which is connected by an OR, rather than by an AND,
will increase the cyclomatic complexity by 2-the cyclomatic complexity of this example is two
greater than Figure 3.25. This is consistent at an intuitive level since the cyclomatic complexity is
a measure of the number of linearly independent paths. Each additional path which is added,
without a corresponding node, will increase the cyclomatic complexity by one. In the case of an
additional condition being added by an OR, the cyclomatic complexity increases by one for the
condition, and one for the additional path created by the branching OR.
Condition A
Mode 0X Mode$
Target T1
Condition B
Figure 3.28: Edge and Node Diagrams of Conditional Transition with an OR: v = 4
Multiple Target Values
An additional extension was required to consider mode transitions with multiple new target
values. An example of a mode transition diagram with multiple possible target values is shown in
Figure 3.29. In this diagram, if Condition A is satisfied, transition to Mode P will occur with a
new target value of T1. If Condition B is satisfied, transition to Mode P will occur with a new
target value of T 2-
The edge and node diagram for this mode transition matrix is shown in Figure 3.30. In order
to accurately analyze the two distinct new target values used by Mode B, two terminal nodes are
created. As defined earlier, the behaviour of the automation is defined by the active mode and its
target value. In an identical manner, when measuring cyclomatic complexity a terminal node is
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Figure 3.29: Conditional Transitions with Multiple New Target Values
defined by the active mode and its target value. This also results in needing two virtual edges for
the two terminal states to satisfy the "strongly connected" criterion. These are the edge connecting
Mode f/Ti back to Mode x, and connecting Mode 1/T 2 back to Mode a. The cyclomatic
complexity of this diagram is calculated from the 6 edges, 5 nodes, and 2 terminal modes so v = 4.
Figure 3.30: Edge and Node Diagram of Multiple New Target Values: v = 4
Combining each of these elements allows the creation of the edge and node diagram for the
more complicated mode transition diagram shown in Figure 3.31. The associated edge and node
diagram is shown in Figure 3.32. The cyclomatic complexity of this mode transition matrix is
based on 13 edges, 8 nodes, and 2 terminal modes: v = 8.
Cyclomatic Complexity and Repeated Sets of Conditions
Sets of conditions may appear multiple times within an autoflight system. Each instance of a
set of conditions which appear multiple times should not be counted towards the cyclomatic
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Figure 3.31: Complex Mode Transition Diagram.
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Mode B
Target Ti
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Figure 3.32: Complex Edge and Node Diagram: v = 8
complexity of the overall system. Instead, this commonality should be captured explicitly as a
subset and used to effect a reduction in cyclomatic complexity.
Figure 3.33 shows a mode transition diagram which has a pair of repeated condition sets.
Conditions C and D are arranged in an identical manner in each of the transition paths between
these two modes.
A straightforward conversion into an edge and node diagram is shown in Figure 3.34. The
cyclomatic complexity of this diagram is very large-10-since it is based on 16 edges, 9 nodes,
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Figure 3.33: Mode Transition Diagram with Common Conditions
and 2 terminating nodes. This conversion does not attempt to take the commonality between the
condition sets into account.
Figure 3.34: Straightforward Conversion of Common Conditions into Edge and Node Diagram
v= 10
Figure 3.35 shows another conversion to an edge and node diagram. In this figure, the
common conditions, namely C and D have been placed into a element labelled "Set CD." This
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element contains the OR transition, an entry node and two exit nodes, depending on if the
Boolean conditions are found to be true or false. In Figure 3.35, the TRUE exit node will lead to
Mode $ and the FALSE exit node will return to Mode a. Note that the set does not have terminal
nodes since it is a "sub element" in the system. As discussed earlier, the only terminal nodes
correspond to actual autoflight modes. Since each of the elements within a set is a condition, there
are no terminal nodes in a set.
The cyclomatic complexity of the network can then be computed as before, treating any
repeated condition sets as single nodes and then adding the contributions of the common
conditions (the details within set CD). However, each repeated set need only be counted one time,
since it represents a common factor. This corresponds to the program graph approach of capturing
subroutines as independents set of edges and nodes.
Figure 3.35: Conversion of Common Conditions into Edge and Node Diagram: v = 8
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For Figure 3.35, the total cyclomatic complexity includes of the portion associated with the
top diagram (10 edges, 7 nodes, and 2 terminal nodes), v = 6. Since this is a subset of a strongly
connected system Equation 3.1 should be used to calculate the incremental addition of the set.
Measuring Set CD results in (6 edges, 5 nodes) v = 2. The cyclomatic complexity of the entire
system is 8. Note that this is lower than the cyclomatic complexity of Figure 3.34, which was 10.
This lower cyclomatic complexity is contingent on the Set CD being used twice in the system.
If the cyclomatic complexity of the transition from Mode a to the Mode P/Target T1 end state is
measured independent of the transition from Mode a to the Mode @/Target T2 , this reduction will
not be realized. The cyclomatic complexity of the top transition is (5 edges, 4 nodes, and 1
terminal nodes), v = 3, and including Set CD (v = 2) totals to v = 5. Similarly, counting only
Mode a to the Mode B/Target T2 results in v = 5, for a total cyclomatic complexity of 10 as seen
earlier in Figure 3.34. By utilizing sets to capture common elements, the sum of cyclomatic
complexity of each transition measured independently may not be the total cyclomatic complexity
of the set of transitions. Instead, care must be taken to only count common subsets once and to use
these common subsets to accurately analyze the cyclomatic complexity of the system. Also, note
that the recasting of the system into sets of conditions does not change the level of details of the
system; sets simply capture repeated groups of transitions.
Simplified Cyclomatic Complexity Counting
Nodes which have more than one exit edge increase cyclomatic complexity. Conditions
increase cyclomatic complexity because they are a decision point with two exits, one when the
condition is true and one when it is false. Two edges can also exit a node when two paths are
possible to the next nodes, as in a OR condition. Again, each additional edge will increase the
cyclomatic complexity by one. In the general case, if n edges exit a single node, the cyclomatic
complexity will increase by (n-1).
Using this information and by examining the incremental impact of additional conditions, a
simpler analysis can be made of the cyclomatic complexity autoflight systems. The most basic
transition diagram, consisting of a single conditional predicate, is shown in Figure 3.23, and has a
cyclomatic complexity of 2. The mode transition diagram shown in Figure 3.25 and its associated
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edge and node diagrams show that each additional conditional element increases the cyclomatic
complexity by one. Each additional path through the system, introduced by the branch in an OR
construct also increases the cyclomatic complexity by one. For example, Figure 3.27 shows that
allowing two edges to exit a single node, a Boolean OR, also results in a cyclomatic complexity
increase of two, one for the branch and one for the additional condition. In a mode transition
diagram, each OR will increase the cyclomatic complexity in a similar manner.
Using this information, a simpler measure of the cyclomatic complexity of a mode transition,
after consistent elements have been captured in sets of transitions, is shown in Equation 3.3. C is
the number of conditions in the transition, B is the number of branches associated with each OR,
and t is the number of terminal modes.
Vtransition = C + B + t Equation 3.3
As an example, Figure 3.36 shows a transition with three branches. The cyclomatic
complexity of this transition is calculated based on 4 conditions, one terminal state and the three
branches, for a total of 8.
Condition A
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TL-- -
Condition D
-JTL--
Figure 3.36: Four-way Conditions Connected by ORs: v = 8
The cyclomatic complexity of repeated sets of conditions can be analyzed in a related manner
with the difference that each common set is already encapsulated in a single condition, and that
these sets do not have any terminal nodes. As an example, Set CD in Figure 3.35 is encapsulated
in a single condition in the upper diagram. Therefore, the effect of a each set, regardless of the
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internal details, is to increase the cyclomatic complexity as a single condition. In order to
acknowledge the single condition represented by each set, the cyclomatic complexity of each set
is measured by Equation 3.4. This bookkeeping allows the consolidation of conditions into a set
to have the appropriate impact on the cyclomatic complexity.
Vset = C + B - 1 Equation 3.4
As an example, consider the set of 4-way conditions in Figure 3.36. If these conditions were
captured in a common set, the mode transition diagram would be reduced to the one shown in
Figure 3.37. The cyclomatic complexity of this system consists of a contribution of 2 from the
transitions encapsulating Set ABCD and a contribution of 6 from Set ABCD (based upon 4
conditions, and 3 branches). As shown earlier using Equation 3.3, cyclomatic complexity is also
8, based upon 4 conditions and 3 branches.
Figure 3.37: Cyclomatic Complexity Measurement of Common Sets: v = 8
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3.5.4 Level of Abstraction and Apparent Complexity
A characteristic of cyclomatic complexity is that it is sensitive to, and a function of, differing
levels of system abstraction. A complex system can be modelled at multiple levels. At a low level
of abstraction it becomes difficult to mentally model the system; there are too many variables
which must be evaluated. In the extreme case, it would be impossible for a pilot to evaluate the
state of the aircraft utilizing the machine code running the autoflight system. At a high level of
abstraction, sufficient detail may not be available to accurately predict the future state of the
aircraft. As an example, if the abstraction does not take the state of the flaps into account, it may
not be sufficiently accurate for monitoring the system.
Note that the repeated set of conditions discussed earlier are not a direct means to change the
abstraction level of the system. Breaking a system up into sets prevents the overcounting of the
number of linear paths through the system, while maintaining a constant level of detail and
abstraction. However, if the conditions in a set are related in an operational manner, they may
become abstracted and modelled by the pilot as a single conditions. In this situation, the details
within the set are not modelled or considered, thereby reducing the apparent complexity of the
systems. The cyclomatic complexity is also lower since fewer conditions are modelled. However,
a system abstracted at a higher level necessarily has fewer details and may be less able to be
accurately monitored. As discussed in Section 3.5.1, the accuracy of the model used to represent
the system will impact the ability to monitor the system. A more consistent representation may be
able to be abstracted a a higher level with less loss of relevant underlying detail.
This supports the concern regarding the lack of a consistent global model of automation.
Without such a model, it is not possible to exploit consistencies in order to allow reductions in
system complexity. Further, the lack of such a model implies that abstractions that are created will
be more likely to be unable to capture relevant operational detail. If autoflight systems are
reaching a limit from the standpoint of the pilot being able to monitor the complex system, then a
notional conservative quantity of "apparent complexity" can be hypothesized. When more of this
conservative quantity needs to be used to broadly model the inconsistent elements of automation,
less is left to deeply model specific modes. In addition, abstractions which need to be made to
manage complexity will be less able to capture specific transition details. The lack of such a
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consistent, abstractable model may result in the complexity management techniques affecting a
loss of understanding of the system. As such, it is felt that the unconstrained growth of these
systems may be contributing to the autoflight system safety concerns in modern aircraft.
Abstraction Level Impacting Cyclomatic Complexity
Cyclomatic complexity can be applied at varying levels of abstraction. The level of
abstraction will impact cyclomatic complexity and care must be taken to apply this method in a
consistent manner. The approach that was used in the course of this research was to analyze based
solely on the material available in the Flight Crew Operators' Manual. This information is
presented in a manner designed for operational usage and is an appropriate level at which to
evaluate these systems because it is likely to be related to the training material and representations
which were used to build the pilots' mental models.
Cyclomatic complexity is dependent on some of the details of the representation. This is not
only the level of abstraction, but also the particular Boolean operations which are used to
construct conditions. Earlier, it was discussed that an additional OR added 2 to the cyclomatic
complexity whereas an additional AND only added 1. However, it is possible to use Boolean
equalities to convert ANDs to ORs: X AND B = A OR B. As such, the particulars of the
representation will have an impact on the measured cyclomatic complexity.
The appropriate representation is at an abstraction level which is both fully accessible and
useful to the pilot. This is both a pilot and environmental/contextual issue: the determination of
appropriate abstraction level is dependent on the skills, training and aptitude of the intended
audience and on the operational requirements of the system. As a basic premise, elements and
conditions which have an operational impact must be captured in the appropriate representation.
In addition, a system which has an invariant operating regime may be able to be abstracted at a
very high level by allowing assumptions to be made by designers. A more dynamic system may
require abstraction at a low level in order to provide the flexibility to deal with a changing
operating environment. The flexibility required by the operation environment must considered
during abstraction level specification.
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3.5.5 Complexity Management
As discussed in Section 3.5.4, abstraction of a system at a higher level is one approach to
reducing the apparent complexity of the system. The cyclomatic complexity of a system
abstracted at a higher level will also be reduced. If pilots abstract systems in some manner in
order to manage the apparent complexity it may be possible to pro-actively incorporate these
technique into training and design. In order to reduce the operational complexity of flight
automation systems, pilots are thought to use techniques to allow modeling a simpler, more
tractable, system (Morris 1987, Johnson-Laird 1983). Through discussions with pilots and
anecdotal conversations, several techniques have been tentatively identified. It is important to
note that these techniques may limit system functionality as pilots attempt to reduce the system to
a tractable state.
Reduce Size of System
One broad approach to reduce the apparent complexity is to not utilize portions of the
autoflight systems. At the broadest level, entire sets of modes can be ignored-not using VNAV
is an example. It may also be possible to avoid the use of particular individual modes. Between
modes, particular paths may be used exclusively. By only using a well understood subset, pilots
can effectively fly with a simpler system, but lose access to some of the advanced capabilities.
This approach reduces the apparent and cyclomatic complexity of the autoflight system by
limiting capabilities. Unnecessary modes are effectively removed or ignored. The richness of the
automation behaviour is pared down to the operationally relevant subset.
One of the issues hypothesized in the autoflight system is the number of conditional elements
which determine when a mode transition will occur. Reducing the number of conditions decreases
the cyclomatic complexity. Specifically, in some of instances, there are conditional clauses which
are fulfilled the vast majority of the time a transition is commanded to occur. Conditions which
are rarely require evaluation will become ignored. This has been termed "frequential
simplification" (Javaux 1998). Note that this technique, which is reinforced by learning though
repetition, is a serious concern. In many cases, emergency modes or transitions associated with
non-nominal transitions have differing responses and behaviours. If these differences are ignored
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by the pilots, the effectiveness of these modes in emergency situations may be seriously
undermined.
Reduce Possible Paths Through Autoflight System
Another approach is to segment the operation of the automation into less flexible, but well-
understood sequences in order to reduce the possible behaviours which must be monitored. Rather
than only changing the altitude target of the aircraft, a pilot may choose to change the altitude,
reset the speed mode, and then select the vertical mode. This sequence of events always has a
known outcome, whereas using the individual modes which make up the chain may not be
individually modelled or have a known outcome. Completing such sequence may allow more
predictable behaviour out of the system by avoiding rarely used states by constantly resetting the
system to a known configuration. By doing so, only particular paths through the overall system
may be used. This effectively reduces the number of branches which exist in a mode transition
diagram. If entire transitions are removed completely, even more reductions can be realized.
In a similar manner to the previous approach, explicitly using a subset of paths through the
automation can reduce the capabilities of the system. In this case, pilots are proactively taking
actions to remain within the subset of automation with which they are familiar and comfortable.
Difference Approach
The premise of this technique is to take advantage of known and perceived consistencies
within and across aircraft generated by the incremental growth of automation. The fact that
successive generations of aircraft automation are largely supersets of previous versions (see
Section 2.2) implies that the differences between generations may be limited. Essentially, rather
than modeling a new automation system in its entirety, the pilot will make note of the differences
between the new system and a known system. Statements such as "This FLCH mode works just
like it does in the 737, except..." are typical examples of this technique. Within an aircraft, modes
which appear to have consistent behaviours and transitions are considered equivalent, with only
the differences noted. The Difference Approach can be used for transitioning pilots, between their
current and new aircraft. If a group of pilots is moving from a B737 to an A320, the
commonalities between the aircraft can be exploited. In common cockpit designs, such as the
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A320/330/340 or B757/767 families, the differences between systems are easily identified. This
approach can be related to the measure of cyclomatic complexity by examining the additional
complexity of the new system over the old.
While this difference approach can be an effective tool during transitional training, it may be a
liability in understanding the fundamental structure of the new system. Extending a known,
simple model to explain a more sophisticated system may become overly intricate. If the new
system was designed around a new paradigm, such difference modeling may not be appropriate.
Systems which are largely similar, but have minor differences are most accessible to this types of
complexity management approach. If, however, these differences are in rarely used modes or
transitions and do not have experiential reinforcement, the differences may be marginalized, and
not distinguishable to pilots when necessary.
Implications of Operational Complexity Management Techniques
By examining the manners in which it is possible to manage the complexity of automation in
an operational setting, insight can be gained into how to modify, update, and design such systems.
Each of the approaches suggest a manner in which the apparent overall complexity of the system
is reduced either through organizing or explicitly ignoring portions of the automation. If it is
possible to gain insight into the manner in which pilots select to maintain subsets of functions and
mental model, it may be possible to assist in shaping future systems through the creation of more
appropriate models. If the manner in which this management is done can be characterized, the
complexity management techniques could be adopted to pre-emptively reduce complexity during
design stages. Rather than leaving the simplification of the system to individual pilots, it could be
handled in a more structured manner through training, the initiation of procedures, more effective
feedback, and through the use of modified design techniques.
It is important to note that the approaches suggested to manage complexity are all based, at
some level, on making assumptions based on a consistent set of behaviours. In the absence of a
consistent model, these techniques will result in a less complete understanding of the system as
information about the system is ignored to make it more tractable. Unfortunately, it does not
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appear that there is a consistent global model of automation to exploit in order to allow reductions
in system complexity.
There are also some concerns about individual pilots reducing the complexity of the system,
especially though the use of techniques which ignore parts of the system, conditional elements, or
alternate paths through the automation. The learning which occurs during operation necessarily
reinforces the modes, behaviour, and conditional elements which are seen most often (Johnson-
Laird, 1983). Those which are experienced less often will be the ones which are removed from
pilots' representations. A serious issue is that non-nominal or emergency modes are unlikely to be
experienced directly with regularity. As such, these modes may become marginalized as a pilot
has to deal with the burgeoning complexity of a system. Many automation behaviours exist with
which pilots need to have a detailed understanding but will not occur regularly. As such, if poorly
implemented these complexity management techniques have the capability of undermining flight
safety.
3.5.6 Cyclomatic Complexity Mode Transition Matrices
Cyclomatic complexity can be used to populate a Cyclomatic Complexity Mode Transition
Matrix to analyze specific sets of modes. The resulting matrix can be viewed at a detailed level to
determine cyclomatically complex transitions, or in an aggregate manner of the overall set of
transitions.
Figure 3.38 shows the mode transition diagram for a set of modes involved in altitude capture
in the MID-11. The level of abstraction that was used was to model the system based on the
contents of the Flight Crew Operators' Manual (Honeywell, 1992). The cyclomatic complexity of
each transition is calculated using Equation 3.3. The Vertical Speed to Vertical Speed transition
has a cyclomatic complexity of 2, from its single condition and terminal state. The Vertical Speed
to ALTCAP transition has a cyclomatic complexity of 5 from 3 conditions and 2 terminal states.
The ALTCAP to Vertical Speed transition is more complicated. It consists of 7 conditions, one
OR branch and two terminal states, for a cyclomatic complexity of 10. The ALTCAP to Altitude
Hold transition has a cyclomatic complexity of 2. Finally, Altitude Hold can transition back to
92
Push Vertical
Sped Knob
Figure 3.38: Mode Transition Diagram of MD-il Altitude Change
Vertical Speed manually, with a cyclomatic complexity of 2. The independent transitions which
populate the 3x3 Cyclomatic Complexity Mode Transition Matrix are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Cyclomatic Complexity Mode Transition Matrix
Vertical ALTCAP Altitude
Speed Hold
Vertical Speed 2 5 --
ALTCAP 10 -- 2
Altitude Hold 2 -- --
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter documented an analysis framework for aircraft automation which captured both
the "quasi-steady-state" behaviour and the discrete behaviour to switch among multiple quasi-
steady-state controllers. The former can be completely modelled using control block diagrams at
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various levels of loop closure. The discrete behaviour is modelled using mode transition diagrams
and matrices. Cyclomatic complexity was presented as a rationale basis to analyze mode
transitions within the discrete portions of automation which is dependent on the representation
and abstraction level of the system being measured.
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Chapter 4
Web-based Pilot Automation Complexity Survey
In Section 2.3, numerous measures of complexity were discussed. The appropriateness of
measures of complexity is one that needs to be examined carefully in order to determine the
contributory elements to pilots perception of complex systems. Cyclomatic complexity was
discussed in Section 3.5.1 as an analysis tool for autoflight mode transitions that captured the
number of linearly independent paths through a transition. However, it has not been shown
previously that there is a relationship between cyclomatic complexity and the apparent
complexity from the viewpoint of the pilot. A survey was conducted to identify those modes
which pilots found to be most complicated and to analyze them using cyclomatic complexity.
4.1 Survey on Automation Complexity
The previous discussions in Section 1.1 examined autoflight systems from an engineering
viewpoint and accident and incident reports from a statistical viewpoint. A survey was conducted
of line pilots with the goal of gaining insight into the "apparent complexity" of the automation,
and into mode transitions in particular. The apparent complexity is an indication of the viewpoint
of the end operator-in this case the viewpoint of the line pilot. While this measure is directly
affected by biasing factors, including the experience and training of the pilot, it provides an
indication of which transitions and modes are most difficult in practice.
Based on a review of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), we found
situations where the autoflight system caught the pilot unaware or had some sort of
unexpected behaviour. Many of these situations involved mode transitions. A
mode transition occurs any time that the aircraft switches from one mode to
another, such as between Vertical Speed mode and Altitude Hold mode.
(Appendix D)
The survey was conducted via the World Wide Web, which enabled a broad population of
pilots to take part anonymously. The focus of the survey was on the viewpoints of the pilots
regarding transitions between modes. To start, pilots were presented with a background
explanation of transitions. One of the explanation pages is shown in Figure 4.1. Pilots were asked
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Types of Transitions
* Manual transition: caused by a pilot pressing a switch.
Example: Boeing B777 in a Vertical Speed descent. When the HOLD button is pressed, the aircraft immediately
switches to the Altitude Hold mode and holds the current altitude.
Wrcal Seed Descent Press HOLD button Transiton to ALT HOLD at current allkde
0 Automatic transition: occurs when the aircraft switches modes without direct pilot intervention
Example: Transition to Altitude Hold when an aircraft intercepts the altitude shown in the altitude window. During a
Vertical Speed manuever in a B737, the aircraft will transition to Altitude Hold mode when this interception occurs
UrScal Seed Descent Approach Alstude in Atilude Window TInsillon to ALT MOLD atAlude Undow~lde
* Armed transition: occurs when the autoflight system has been authorized or armed to make a transition.
Example of this is the transition from a Glide Slope Armed mode to a Glide Slope Tracking mode. The autoflight
system will not switch directly into the tracking mode unless it was previously armed by the pilot.
Gde Slope is Armed for capure GIlde Slope captne Occurs Glide Slope Mode becomes Acive
Web-based Survey, Page 3Figure 4.1:
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to identify the three most complex transitions, characterize and describe the transitions (shown in
Figure 4.2), and complete a set of pairwise comparisons between sets of transitions (Figure 4.3).
First Mode Transition
Transition from Mode A
Type of transition (check all that apply):
Manual U
to: Mode B
Automatic F1 Armed E
Estimate the number of different paths possible in this transition:|I Select estimated number of Paths
Describe the transition in as much detail as possible.
Think about explaining this to another crew member.
If possible, include the necessary conditions, possible paths, and outcomes for the transition:
Enter transition description here.
What makes this transition difficult?
Enter what makes the transition difficult here.
Review Transition Types Review Multiple Paths
Web-based Survey, Page 8-10Figure 4.2:
Review Conditions Continue
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Comparing Mode Transistions
We are interested in how complicated you feel difficult transitions are. In this final section, you will be asked to
compare the mode transitions that you listed previously against each other. Please rate the following 10
comparisons between pairs of mode transitions.
Mode A to Mode Much Less Less Equally More Much More
B is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated
0 0 0 0 0
than Mode C to
Mode D
Mode A to Mode Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode E to
B is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode F
LVL CHG or Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode A to
HOLD is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode B
o i s 0 0
LNAV to Heading Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode A toSelect is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode B
0 0 0 0 0
Mode C to Mode Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode E toD is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode F
o 0 0 0 0
Mode C to Mode Much Less Less Equally More Much More than LVL CHG or
D is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated FLCH to ALT
LNAV to Heading Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode C toSelect is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode D
Mode E to Much Less Less Equally More Much More than LNAV toMode F is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Heading Select
FLC Cto Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode E to
HOLD is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode F
LNAV to Heading Much Less Less Equally More Much More than LVL CHG
Select is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated or FLCH to ALT
Web-based Survey, Page 11
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Figure 4.3:
4.2 Demographic Results
A total of ninety-three responses were generated from pilots flying multiple aircraft types, as
listed in Table 4.1. Military pilots constituted four of the responses, with the remaining eighty-
nine being commercial air transport pilots. As shown in Table 4.1, the majority of the results were
from modem "glass-cockpit" aircraft and from transitional aircraft, such as the more recent
variants of B737. Five female pilots and eighty-four male pilots responded; four responses did not
fill out the gender field. The average age of respondents was forty-three.
Table 4.1: Breakdown of Responses by Aircraft Type (total n=93)
Aircraft Type
Boeing B727
Boeing B737-1001-200
Boeing B737-300/-400/-500
Boeing B737-600/-700/-800
Boeing B747-400
Boeing B757/B767
Boeing B777
Airbus A300
Airbus A310
Airbus A320/330/340
Boeing MD- I
Other
Number of Responses
1
3
6
4
6
17
2
2
1
12
2
37
Data regarding the flight hours is shown in Table 4.2, and identifies the majority of
respondents being experienced aviators.
Table 4.2: Flight Hours of Respondents (total n=93)
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Standard Deviation
Total Flight Hours
10250
27 500
150
5 750
Hours in Current Type
2 039
10000
26
2 064
Hours in 1999
584
2 500
0
310
Hours in 1998
629
1 850
50
248
Forty-seven respondents identified themselves as having the rank of captain; thirty-three were
first officers. Four identified themselves as "Pilot In Command" (PIC). Eleven respondents
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identified themselves as instructors. Note that these numbers do not total the number of
respondents, since individuals could have multiple positions.
4.3 Pilot Characterization of Complex Transitions
Many mode transitions were identified by multiple pilots in this survey. Table 4.3 show those
modes which appeared most often. Note that these involve highly automatic behaviour of the
aircraft.
Table 4.3: Transitions Identified by Respondents
Transition From Transition To Number of Times Identified
Flight Level Change Altitude Capture 12
Heading Hold LNAV 10
Vertical Speed Altitude Capture 7
Altitude Capture Vertical Speed 6
Approach Go Around 6
VNAV Path VNAV Path Descent 5
Another manner in which to examine the data is to identify which modes appear most often as
the starting mode in a transition. This is an indication of which modes are most complex to leave,
but is biased towards those modes which are most commonly used. As shown in Table 4.4,
vertical modes dominated the starting modes.
Table 4.4: Starting Modes Identified by Respondents
Starting Mode Number of Times Identified
Flight Level Change 20
Vertical Speed 18
Altitude Hold 17
Heading Hold 17
VNAV Path 13
Approach 11
Conversely, Table 4.5 shows those modes in which transitions end. Not surprisingly, Altitude
Capture is identified the most often, since it is the mode through which one typically leaves Flight
Level Change or Vertical Speed before transitioning to Altitude Hold.
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Table 4.5: Ending Modes Identified by Respondents
Starting Mode Number of Times Identified
Altitude Capture 25
LNAV 15
Vertical Speed 15
Approach 9
Flight Level Change 9
VNAV Path Descent 9
Examining which modes were identified most often (regardless of whether as a starting or
ending mode)-results in Table 4.6. Once again this table is dominated by vertical modes which
made up 70% of the identified transitions.
Table 4.6:
Starting Mode
Vertical Speed
Altitude Capture
Flight Level Chang
Altitude Hold
Heading Hold
LNAV
Approach
Most Commonly Identified Modes
Number of Times Identified
33
31
e 29
24
22
22
20
Another portion of the survey asked pilots whether the mode transitions which had been
identified could be characterized as manual, automatic or armed transitions. The results of this
question are shown in Figure 4.4. A total of 139 mode transitions were characterized by pilots.
This represents approximately 50% of the total possible responses from the 93 respondents. Many
pilots only detailed a single transition. Note that a single transition could be characterized by a
pilot as part of multiple types. For example, the transition between Vertical Speed and Altitude
Hold is characterized as both automatic (if a target altitude is intercepted) or manual (if the HOLD
button is pressed). The results are shown in Table 4.4 and are consistent with the hypothesis that
the automatic behaviour of aircraft leads to complexity. What was not anticipated is that nearly
50% of the most difficult transitions were identified as manual in nature and only 28% were
armed.
101
60% 56-8%
50% 46.0%-
40% -
Fraction of281
Transitions 30% 28.1
20% -
10% -LIL
0%
Armed Automatic Manual
Type of Transition
Figure 4.4: Types of Transitions (n=139)
Pilots were also asked to identify the number of possible paths that could be taken to effect the
transition, where a path was described as multiple ways in which a transition could occur. As an
example, the transition between Vertical Speed and Altitude Hold can occur along two different
paths. Either the Altitude Hold button can be pressed by the pilot, resulting in an immediate
leveloff, or the aircraft can approach and leveloff at the altitude in the altitude window. In most
cases, each path also has different final states. In this example, the automatic transition captures
the value in the altitude window whereas pressing the Altitude Hold button results in the aircraft
leveling off at a different altitude than the one shown in the altitude window. The number of paths
in each transition is shown in Figure 4.5. The number of paths ranged from 1 to 7, with an average
of 2.3 and a standard deviation of 1.2.
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Figure 4.5: Number of Paths per Transition (n= 139)
102
4.4 Cyclomatic Complexity of Identified Complex Transitions
In order to analyze the cyclomatic complexity of the modes identified by pilots in the survey,
it was necessary to identify a subset of responses for which detailed information, in the form of
Flight Crew Operators' Manuals, was available. For the sake of consistency, only the information
from the Operators' Manual was used; the Flight Crew Operators' Manuals specified the model
and level of abstraction used to characterize the system. Additional information which could be
brought to bear based on simulator testing was not considered. Each transition was characterized
by its components of cyclomatic complexity based on an analysis of the transition as described in
the training material and documentation. A total of twenty-nine transitions were analyzed in
detail, for those cases which had sufficient autoflight documentation to characterize cyclomatic
complexity factors. These were results from B737, B757, and A320 aircraft.
4.4.1 Comparison of Cyclomatic Complexity
Figure 4.6 shows the cyclomatic complexity of the analyzed transitions. The mean value of
cyclomatic complexity is 6.45, with a standard deviation of 2.00. For comparison, the cyclomatic
complexity of a representative set of non-emergency mode transitions from the B737-300 and
B757 were calculated. This set was created by analyzing those all non-emergency modes which
explicitly appear in the AutoFlight section of the respective Flight Crew Operators' Manuals.
Figure 4.7 shows the cyclomatic complexity of these "typical" transitions along with the pilot-
identified complex transitions in the same aircraft. This chart shows that the average cyclomatic
complexity of the typical transitions is 3.91, with a standard deviation of 2.30. At a 95%
confidence level the typical modes statistically have a cyclomatic complexity 1.4 lower than those
transitions identified by pilots in the survey for the same aircraft.
This implies that there is a correlation between the cyclomatic complexity of a mode
transition and whether it was considered complex from the perspective of the pilot. It appears that
analyzing the cyclomatic complexity of autoflight mode transitions can provide insight into
whether these transitions will prove to be operationally problematic for pilots.
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4.4.2 Number of Conditions
Figure 4.8 shows the number of conditions which appeared in analyzed transitions. The mean
number of conditions in the transitions was 3.03, with a standard deviation of 1.09.
For comparison, Figure 4.9 shows the distribution of conditions for the typical transitions
from the B737-300 and B757 discussed in Section 4.4.1. For the typical transitions, the mean
number of conditions in the transitions was 2.00, with a standard deviation of 1.06. Statistically,
there were 0.5 fewer conditions in typical mode transitions as compared to the identified complex
transitions in these aircraft. Based on this data, there appears to be an indication that number of
conditions has an impact in apparent mode complexity.
104
Figure 4.8:
16
12 ---
12
Number of
Repondents 8
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number of Conditions
Number of Conditions in Identified Complex Transitions (n=29)
14
12
10
Number of
Typical
Transitions
(737-300
and 757)
Figure 4.9:
8
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
*Typical Mode Transitions Conditions
"Complex Mode Transitions
Number of Conditions in Typical Mode Transitions (n=3 1)
4.4.3 Number of Branches
Figure 4.10 shows the number of branches which appeared in analyzed transitions. The mean
number of branches was 1.62, with a standard deviation of 1.01. It is also interesting that the mean
value of the number of branches identified directly by pilots in Figure 4.5 is statistically similar to
the number of paths (where paths are defined as branches + 1) identified via cyclomatic
complexity in Figure 4.10, though the distribution is different.
Figure 4.11 shows the distribution of number of branches in B737-300/B757 typical
transitions. The mean value is 0.67 and the standard deviation is 0.96. There are statistically 0.4
fewer branches in typical transitions than in those identified as complex by pilots.
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4.4.4 Number of Terminal States
Figure 4.12 shows the distribution of terminal states which appeared in analyzed transitions.
The mean number of terminal states was 1.79, with a standard deviation of 0.56.
The distribution of the number of Terminal States in B737-300 and B757 typical modes is
shown in Figure 4.13. The mean value is 1.24 and the standard deviation is 0.56. There are
statistically 0.1 fewer terminal states in typical transitions than in those identified as complex by
pilots.
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4.4.5 Pilot Ratings of Identified Complex Transitions
Pilots were also asked to rate the complexity of the identified mode transitions against two
common mode transitions with low cyclomatic complexity: Flight Level Change to Altitude Hold
and LNAV to Heading Select.
Figure 4.14 shows that the majority of pilots felt that the mode transitions that they identified
were more complicated than the transition from Flight Level Change to Altitude Hold. The latter
transition has a cyclomatic complexity of 5. Figure 4.15 shows that pilots also felt that the mode
transitions that they identified were more complicated than the transition from LNAV to Heading
Select. This transition is predicated on a single switch and has a cyclomatic complexity of 2. In
addition, the responses to this rating were found to be statistically different that the results shown
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Figure 4.14: Pilot Ratings of Identified Complex Transitions versus Flight Level Change to
Altitude Hold (v = 5)
in Figure 4.14; pilots rated the identified transition as having a greater difference in complexity
from the LNAV to Heading Select than from the Flight Level Change to Altitude Hold.
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Figure 4.15: Pilot Ratings of Identified Complex Transitions versus LNAV to Heading Select
(v = 2)
These results were examined in further detail to examine the differences of those transitions
which pilots identified as "Equally Complicated" versus "More Complicated" versus "Much
More Complicated." Figure 4.16 shows the results of the comparison of the identified complex
transition to the Flight Level Change to Altitude Hold transition for both the aggregate cyclomatic
complexity and each constituent component: the number of conditions, branches and terminal
modes. Figure 4.17 shows the same results for the comparison between the identified complex
transition to the LNAV to Heading Select.
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Both of the charts and the related statistical analysis do not show a relationship between the
cyclomatic complexity of the identified complex modes and the subjective ratings of the pilots. It
is hypothesized that this is due to the cyclomatic complexity measures being based (for
consistency) on the contents of the Operators' Manual rather than of the pilots' own
representations of the transitions. The survey was not designed to gain insight into the models of
the automation being used by individual pilots. Instead, the Operators' Manual was used as an
surrogate for the models being used by all pilots. For the aggregate results shown in Figure 4.14
and Figure 4.15 this was sufficient, but the inconclusive nature of the detailed analysis in
Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 may be based on differences in pilots' models (further discussed in
Section 3.5.5). It may be possible to investigate this level of detail through focused interviews
rather than through a broad survey.
4.5 Chapter Summary
A survey was performed to analyze the cyclomatic complexity of those transitions which
pilots characterize as complex. While not exhaustive or conclusive, the results from the survey
shows two relevant relationships. The first is that mode transitions which were identified by pilots
had a higher mean cyclomatic complexity than a typical set of modes from the B737-300 and the
B757. In addition, pairwise comparison results demonstrated that pilots found that mode
transitions with higher cyclomatic complexity were more complicated that those with lower
cyclomatic complexity.
These results suggest that there may be correlation between the cyclomatic complexity of a
mode transition and whether it will be considered complex from the perspective of the pilot. It
appears that measuring the cyclomatic complexity of autoflight mode transitions can provide
insight into whether these transitions will prove to be operationally problematic for pilots.
Detailed pairwise comparisons did not show statistical differences between modes which were
compared.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Autoflight System Issues
An examination was made of a cross-section of current autoflight systems with the goal of
identifying and analyzing automation problems. This analysis included the ASRS review shown
in Figure 1.3, focused interviews with pilot and designers, and an examination of accident
reviews. A detailed examination was also done of operators' manuals from multiple aircraft
which provided the basis for an analysis of inferred autoflight system behaviour and structure.
This inferred structure became the basis of abstractions of the autoflight system, including the
Hybrid Automation Representation discussed in the previous chapter. Where applicable, high
fidelity simulator tests were run to verify behaviour predicted by the abstractions. Based on this
analysis, this chapter will examine problems which have been identified in contemporary
autoflight systems, and scrutinize those issues, where appropriate, using the Hybrid Automation
Representation.
The examples used in this section are based on transitions to and from the Altitude Capture
mode: transitioning from a climb or a descent into level flight. This transition is difficult because
reconfigures the aircraft in a short amount of time, typically using Multi-Input, Multi-Output
control for a smooth, low acceleration transition. As such, it appeared most frequently as a mode
transition perceived as complex by pilots in the survey discussed in Chapter 4. This Altitude
Capture Mode was also identified by pilots as complex across a broad set of aircraft: B737, B747-
400, B757/767, B777, Lear 3X/6X, ATR-72, A300-600, A320, MD-80/88. For a subset of aircraft
(B737-300-800, B757/767, Airbus A320) the behaviour of this mode was further probed through
simulator testing. The final section in this chapter will be an examination of transitions to and
from Altitude Capture Mode.
5.1 Limitations of Physical Systems
During the design of an aircraft system, physical limitations on the electrical, mechanical, and
hydraulic systems may have become apparent. Many of these limitations were related to the
dynamics of the system: spool up times for the engines, the motion of control surfaces, and the
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finite durations required for physical changes to be made to the aircraft configuration. Control
algorithms were limited by the finite bandwidth of the physical system and mechanisms were put
in place to prevent unusual behaviours which could lead to instability. Aircraft utilizing the first
and second generation of autoflight system have mechanical interlocks and relays to prevent
actions which conflicted with these physical limitations. Newer aircraft tend to capture these
limitations in their avionics.
5.1.1 Windshear Alert Suppression
An example of this is the suppression of windshear alerts while flaps are in motion in some
windshear detection and warning avionics systems. Airflow over the wings during flap
reconfiguration is liable to generate false alarm. The response to this condition was to suppress
any alerts during this time, under the implicit assumption that alerts would be false. After the flaps
have been reconfigured, the detection system would once again become active. The delay
introduced by this design decision was identified as a contributory factor in the crash of a DC-9-
31 at the Charlotte/Douglas airport on July 2, 1994 (Phillips, 1994). In this accident, the flaps
were being deployed from 15" to 400, which requires 10-12 seconds. Severe windshear was
experienced at 275 feet, but the alerting system suppressed the warning for 7 seconds.
5.1.2 Altitude Capture "Linger Timer"
Timing issues are particularly susceptible to physical limitations, and these issues are
hypothesized to appear in the interface between digital systems and dynamics. As such, some
elements of interface design may be constrained by the limitation on timing. In the Boeing B737-
300/400, a mechanism has been put in place to prevent immediate altitude changes. When an
altitude change is made, a timer is started which runs for 2 seconds. After the timer has expired,
the new altitude target becomes active. This is hypothesized to be in place to prevent the aircraft
from chasing transients and functions essentially as a low pass filter, removing high frequency
input spikes. This filter serves to match the input from the pilot and autoflight system to the
physical mechanics to prevent the autoflight equivalent of a pilot induced oscillation.
Figure 5.1 shows a representation of the behaviour of the B737 during descent or climb while
in Vertical Speed mode. The lower section of the figure shows a representation of the "Linger
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Figure 5.1: B737 Altitude Capture Mode Transition Diagram
Timer" mechanism described above. When an altitude change is made ("Change in Altitude
Selector"), the linger timer becomes active for 2 seconds. After the 2 second duration has expired,
the system reverts to the Linger Timer Inactive mode. The timer is reset for another 2 second
duration if an altitude change is made while the timer is active.
At the top of Figure 5.1, the transition between Vertical Speed mode and Altitude Capture is
predicated on the Linger Timer being inactive: while the Linger Timer is active, an Altitude
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Capture cannot occur. This implies that the Altitude Selector must remain static ("Linger") for 2
seconds in order for capture to occur.
This Linger Timer appears to be consistent across the altitude capture autoflight system
segments across multiple aircraft and has been verified in the MD-11, B737, B757/767, B777 and
the A320. The duration of the timer is not consistent across aircraft and is not documented in the
training material, but the fundamental consistency is that a change in armed altitude becomes
active after short duration. Simulator testing was required in order to document this behaviour. It
is hypothesized that this may be used to maintain controller stability.
In typical transitions, this window of opportunity is not an issue. However, if an altitude
change is made close to the time when the aircraft is able to transition to capture mode, it is
possible for the automation to respond in unexpected ways. In particular, if the altitude knob is
kept in motion, the Linger Timer cannot reset to allow capture to occur. Different aircraft respond
in differing manners to the Linger Timer, when transitioning from Flight Level Change to
Altitude Capture Mode. In the B737, if the new target altitude is above the aircraft during descent
(or below the aircraft during climb) the automation will immediately attempt to attain the new
target, however, if it is below the aircraft during descent (or above the aircraft during climb),
capture will not occur and the aircraft will travel through the target. In the B757 the aircraft
continued on its flight path while the altitude knob was in motion and did not capture. However,
when the altitude knob was stopped, the automation attempted to capture the new target altitude.
New Altitude
Driginal Altitude
2900(Linger ne Activon
B737
-- 757, 0767, B777
Figure 5.2: Altitude Capture "Linger Timer"
Figure 5.2 shows this behaviour. The aircraft starts in a Flight Level Change descent towards
a target altitude. While the altitude knob is in motion to the new altitude target above the aircraft
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the B757/767/777, the aircraft continued in a descent whereas the B737 immediately begins to
climb.
Low Altitude Linger Timer Concerns
A final concern with the linger timer is at low altitude when a Missed Approach Maneuver is
being attempted. Prior to this attempt, some procedures required placing the target altitude on the
runway. If the decision is made to do a missed approach, the target altitude is moved to above the
aircraft (to the missed approach altitude) and the aircraft is placed into a climb configuration. It is
possible, if the altitude knob lingers at a low altitude, that the aircraft could level at an
intermediate, and inappropriate altitude during this maneuver.
missed
1 pproach
Altitude Knob
Linger Point
Original Altitude
Target
Missed Rleversion to
Approach A itude Hold
Initiated
Figure 5.3: Inappropriate Reversion to Altitude Hold
Figure 5.3 shows this scenario. The aircraft starts the approach with the altitude target on the
airfield and then begins to execute a missed approach. As the altitude target is reset, it lingers at
some intermediate altitude resulting in an altitude capture and a transition to Altitude Hold.
5.1.3 MD-1I Changes in Vertical Rate
As will be discussed in Section 5.3.2, the MD-ll responds to changes in the vertical rate
target by suppressing the capture of a new altitude: motion of the pitch wheel during altitude
capture reverts to Vertical Speed for short duration. This may be due to capture controller
limitations, rather than a specific design goal.
5.2 Representation Issues
A review was conducted of existing flight automation systems which suggested that the
evolutionary development of autoflight systems has resulted in a large and complex structure of
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operating modes which do not appear to have a simple, consistent, underlying global model
(Vakil, 1996). Research was done through public information sources, such as aircraft manuals,
focused interviews with line pilots and check airmen and direct contact with avionics
manufacturers (American Airlines 1997; American Airlines 1994; Boeing 1989; Honeywell
1992). No consistent global model of autoflight systems could be identified for the B727, B737,
B757, B767, B747-400, A320, A300, MD-l1 and F-100. Avionics manufacturers who were
contacted were not able to supply a functional model or logic/control diagram. The
documentation presented to the FAA is a detailed specification of the implementation of the
automation, but not an overall model (FAA, 1996)
The Hybrid Automation Representation captures both the continuous behaviour defined by
closed loop control and discrete behaviour defined as transitions between active controllers, but in
a hybrid manner. The structure of the model is also based on the de facto standard of separation
between closed loop control and transitions between modes which appears to be prevalent among
the systems reviews. The HAR is not expected to be an appropriate model to provide to pilots, but
more as a design tool during development.
Norman (1989) discusses the relationship between the user model, the design model, and the
system image, shown in Figure 5.4. The design model is the designer's conceptual model
developed during the creation of the system. The user's model is a mental representation created
by the user through interaction with the actual system. The system image is the instantiation of the
actual physical object and includes the documentation, instructions, labels and so on. All
communication between the designer and the user occurs through the system image. An unclear
system image-one not including some elements of the design model-will result in an incorrect
user model. It is hypothesized that there is no articulated system model in autoflight systems,
which leads to difficulty in the creation of the user's model.
In addition, if the design model is not captured in the system image, successive designers will
be relegated to the position of generating their own mental representation and become equivalent
to users. This relationship implies that the lack of a consistent global representation is a concern
not only for the users of the system, the pilots, but also for the designers. The issue is that only the
system image, and the underlying implementation details are available to ascertain the purpose of
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design decisions and to document the instantiation of design goals. This documentation, termed
"rationale capture" (Leveson, 1998), becomes much more difficult without a representation which
can be used by designers.
oeDesign Modsel'
Mododl
Designer User
System
System
Image
Figure 5.4: System Image versus Design Model and User's Model (adapted from
Norman, 1988)
The lack of a global representation follows from the incremental development of aircraft
systems. While original systems may have had a straightforward representation, the consistency
of these representations may have been degraded as changes and additions to automation were
made by parties unaware of the original representation and consistencies. Part of the goal of
capturing the rationale of the system is to make explicit and to widely distribute the underlying
consistencies and goals of a system so that they may be maintained. Work has been done
(Lehman, 1980) which tracks the development of systems, namely computer operating systems
(Brooks, 1975) and telephone switching software (Lehman, 1996). This work has shown that over
time systems grow away from a straightforward model and begin to become less consistent. As
this occurs, the effort required to add additional capabilities onto the system increases. Without a
clear model of the system, each change will increase the entropy of the overall system and
increase the cost, time and complexity of successive changes as the design becomes more
complicated.
From the standpoint of systems engineering design, this incrementally developed complexity
is a costly problem. From the standpoint of a pilot, it is potentially a much more serious issue as it
may undermine the ability to effectively monitor automation.
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5.2.1 Concerns with Mental Models
In the absence of a simple, consistent and communicable model of flight automation, pilots
appear to create their own models of the flight automation (Norman, 1988). These ad-hoc mental
models have several shortcomings. The most obvious is that the models may not accurately
reflect the actual systems. The basis of these models is grounded in both training material
provided to the pilots and flight experience. The existing training material is based on a
proceduralized, operational model with little causality or connection to the structure of the
underlying system. In some cases it has also been shown to be incomplete. Compared to other
automation systems, clear mental models of time-critical flight systems are of particular
importance. In current aircraft automation, the pilot is given final control and full responsibility.
This implies that the pilot must understand, at some level, all automation behaviour in order to
intervene effectively and appropriately in emergency situations. It may be the case that a limiting
factor on aircraft automation design should be the level of complexity that a pilot can maintain
and readily access as a mental model.
Experientially Developed Models
It is hypothesized that pilots develop mental models based on experience interacting with the
system. It is expected that the actual mental models used by the pilots are more sophisticated than
those put forward during training and are a function of their individual pilot backgrounds. Since
these models are created independently by individual pilots, specific ad-hoc models may not be
accurate. In addition, the fact that ad-hoc models are created during nominal operations (where
the vast majority of pilot experience occurs), they may not hold (or may even be a liability) in
emergency situations.
Javaux (1999) has put forward a mechanism based on spreading activation networks which
accounts for the development of mental models during nominal conditions. Frequential
Simplification and Inferential Simplification are mechanisms by which the details of a
sophisticated transition between modes can be reduced to a less comprehensive prototypical state.
Frequential simplification occurs when a sophisticated interaction is simplified during nominal
operation by having many of the conditional elements satisfied. Inferential simplification creates
an analytical basis for the incorrect application of consistency, when a pattern which appears in
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some portion of the automation is incorrectly applied to another segment. It is difficult to
distinguish which of these mechanisms is in effect, since they are related phenomena. Two
examples are presented where the simplified model of aircraft automation is suspected to have
been a contributory factor in an aircraft incident.
At the accident which occurred at Nagoya on an Airbus 300, the crew
inadvertently put the aircraft into a go-around mode. The autopilot on the aircraft
can be disengaged by forcing forward on the yoke with sufficient force. However,
the automation is not completely disengaged and maintains control over the trim of
the horizontal stabilizer. The autopilot is programmed to trim the horizontal
stabilizer to the flight path of the engaged mode. In the case of the go-around
mode, the autopilot trims the horizontal stabilizer to a nose up configuration to
allow the aircraft to climb. The crew, believing that they had disengaged go-
around, pushed the aircraft nose down to continue the approach. When the crew
decided to abort the approach, the aircraft pitched up violently due to the
combination of horizontal stabilizer trim and elevator input, stalled and crashed.
In advanced Boeing aircraft, in general, transitions between modes can be initiated
by pressing buttons on the Mode Control Panel which select the new mode:
pressing the ALT HLD button initiates the Altitude Hold mode. However, the
Approach Mode cannot be transitioned out of without switching off the autopilot
entirely. Attempting to engage a new mode via the Mode Control Panel is ignored.
While this prevents the accidental engagement of a spurious mode during a critical
flight segment, the accidental engagement of Approach can lead to serious
confusion since the automation will suddenly appear to be nonresponsive to
switching modes. (Vakil, 1998)
Cognitive scientists have shown that humans' understanding of the world consists of
identifying and explaining patterns (Richards, 1998). These patterns range from consistencies in
the behaviour of tools to seeing images in clouds. In situations where no causal basis for an
underlying pattern has been presented, humans will grasp onto any apparent pattern in an attempt
to explain behaviour. In the absence of some basis on which to identify and take advantage of
patterns in automation, incorrect mental models may arise.
5.2.2 Rare modes
A closely related issue is pilot interaction with modes which are rarely used or modes which
are used regularly but for short duration. These modes may not be used sufficiently to populate
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whatever mental representation the pilot is using. In the case of modes of limited duration, it is
unlikely that there is time to consider or model the effects of inputs to the system, simply because
little time exists to provide these inputs (Palmer, 1996).
In a larger sense, this problem exists in many aspects of aviation. Much of standard and
recurrent training deals with situations which are rare: engine fires, tire blowouts, go-arounds etc.
These are dealt with by creating and reinforcing procedural behaviours during simulator training.
Similar training and effort is not spent reinforcing models of the automation itself.
Using Mode Transition Matrices to Identify Rare Modes and Transitions
Mode transition matrices can be used to help in organizing and identifying which modes and
which transitions suffer from an insufficient experiential basis. Since the mental representations
used by pilots appear to be experientially based, the most benefit may be gained by tailoring the
automation training to individuals. This may be possible through access to pilot-specific data
from data recorders.
The mode transition matrices discussed in Section 3.3 included all possible transitions
between modes. These can be termed "Allowable Transition Matrices." In some cases, it may be
useful to examine the converse of the allowable-transition matrix. By doing so, the criteria for not
allowing access to specific behaviours can be examined. This may be useful in situations where a
mode change could lead to a dangerous aircraft configuration. The information in mode transition
matrices can also be used to organize information from a modal system. Examples include
allowable mode transition matrices, frequency-based transition matrices, relative frequency
based, and rarely-used transition matrices. In addition, specific attributes can be highlighted with
the mode transition representation, such as the nature of conditional statements or the available
feedback.
Table 5.1 is a mode transition matrix adapted from work by Degani (1994) observing mode
transitions in operational, revenue-earning flights of a Boeing 757. In this matrix, the cells are
populated with the absolute frequency of observed transitions. In contrast with earlier examples,
the aircraft autoflight modes include both vertical and lateral behaviours, so that a single mode is
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defined as the behaviour of the system in both axes. Mode transitions which were observed with a
frequency of less than 2% are not included on the diagram.
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Table 5.1: Observed Autoflight Transition Matrix showing Absolute Percentage of
Transitions
There are several insights to be gained from the matrix. The first is that certain modes were
only observed to transition to a single other mode. For example VNAV-Heading Hold was only
observed to transition to VNAV-Heading Select. This does not imply that there is only allowable
transition from VNAV-Heading Hold, but does highlight how the modes are used operationally.
Since the matrix is based on a finite set of data, all possible transitions were unlikely to be
observed. However, by looking at the frequency data, the nature of the mode transition matrix can
be seen to be dependent on the operating policies and training characteristics of the particular
airline. If data across airlines can be examined, a nominal usage pattern of mode transitions may
be apparent.
Other modes have no observed exit transitions at all. The Flight Level Change-Localizer and
Glide Slope-Localizer Modes are terminal modes, as can be seen from the empty row in the
transition matrix. While there are allowable transitions from these modes (usually to Go Around
Mode) they were not observed. Large blank areas can be observed in the matrix, corresponding to
sets of transitions which were not observed. In many instances, this is due to certain modes being
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highly specialized and so of limited usage. An example is Takeoff-Heading Hold which only used
during takeoff and climbout and not later in flight.
Columns and rows which are highly populated represent the modes in which the aircraft
automation spends the bulk of its time. In this data VNAV-LNAV has a large number of
transitions both in and out. In particular, note the most frequent transition between VNAV-
Heading Select and VNAV-LNAV. This is hypothesized to be due to vector-based air traffic
control transitioning to flying a predetermined flightplan.
Unused Mode Transition Matrices
Another potential use of mode transition matrices is to highlight the set of mode transitions
which are used infrequently by examining the difference between a normalized allowable matrix
and a frequency matrix. The difference of these two matrices will be a measure of the infrequency
of transitions: those which can occur, but do not appear during normal operation.
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Figure 5.5: Partial List of Observed and Allowed Transitions
The left matrix in Figure 5.6 shows a subset of the modes observed in Table 5.1 and indicates
the transitions which were observed. The matrix on the right show those modes which are
allowable. The difference between these two matrices is shown in Figure 5.6. The transitions
which are marked in black indicate transitions which are allowed, but which were not observed in
operation. These mode transitions are of concern because they indicate non-nominal situations
with which a pilot may have little experience. If these transitions are determined to no longer be
necessary, this information can be used to guide the simplification of subsequent generations of
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automation systems. It may also be the case that the transitions are necessary (such as transitions
to a Go Around Mode), but are operationally infrequent. Additional training can be brought to
bear on these transitions.
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Figure 5.6: Partial List of Infrequently or Unused Transition Matrix
5.2.3 Lack of Consistency and Predictability
Consistency in autoflight systems refers to how accurately a pattern in interaction or
behaviour can be applied to other areas of the automation. An example of a pattern is that pressing
the Altitude Hold button while in a Vertical Speed ascent results in the aircraft immediately
leveling off and holding the current altitude. If this pattern can be applied in all ascents, or even
more generally to all altitude changes, the system has a high level of consistency. In practice, the
B737 ignores the Altitude Hold button being pressed while in the glide slope is being actively
tracked, undermining the consistency of the system.
Consistency is an issue for the underlying structure of the automation, which can be identified
with the Hybrid Automation Representation, but also for the training material. If consistencies are
not communicated to pilots, or provide an insufficiently complete representation of the
automation to allow the consistency to be apparent, the pilots may not be capable of exploiting the
consistency as a means of complexity management.
Identifying Consistency Using the Hybrid Automation Representation
The Hybrid Automation Representation can help in identifying consistent behaviours, and
exceptions where inconsistency appears. In particular, the conditions which are used to fully
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specify a transition, and the new target values which are used after the transitions are appropriate
and useful to examine for consistency. Figure 5.7 shows a simple example of how the Hybrid
Automation Representation can be used to examine the autoflight system for inconsistency. In
this diagram, a number of modes are shown along with their transitions to the Altitude Capture
and ultimately Altitude Hold mode. The majority of these modes can transition to capture
immediately after the Altitude Hold button is pressed, or after the intended altitude is approached
during a climb or descent.
Figure 5.7: Transitions to Altitude Capture and Altitude Hold Modes
mode
control
panel
Three sets of transitions can be seen in this figure. The first is an automatic transition which
occurs between modes which are designed to be used in conjunction with Altitude Capture,
namely Vertical Speed, FLCH Climb, and FLCH Descent. Each of these modes automatically
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transition to Altitude Capture when the aircraft approaches the selected altitude and while the
"Linger Timer" (highlighted in grey) discussed in Section 5.1 is inactive.
A transition can also occur immediately if the ALT button is pressed by the pilot. The second
set of transitions are similar, but do not, based on the available documentation, appear to depend
on the "Linger Timer." The transition between VNAV or Glide Slope Arm and Altitude Capture
can also occur based on the pilot manually pressing the ALT button.
The final type of transaction is from the Glide Slope Track mode. No transition can be made
to from Glide Slope Track to Altitude Capture. Once the aircraft has acquired the Glide Slope and
is tracking it, neither approaching the selected altitude nor pressing the ALT button will result in a
transition to Altitude Capture. This behaviour is inconsistent with the other transitions.
The diagram shown in Figure 5.7 appears to be a contrived example, in that it shows the
inconsistency in a simplistic and immediate manner. However, this example is based on a single
column in a Mode Transition Matrix. Each column consists of all of the possible transitions to a
mode, similar to how each row consists of each transition from a mode. By examining individual
columns and rows, consistency between modes can be made apparent.
Consistency can also be examined directly in the mode transition diagram, but it can be more
difficult to identify. Figure 5.8 shows the diagram representing the Flight Level Change
Behaviour of the Boeing B737. The inconsistency which can be noted here is that the Linger
Timer is a condition in only certain cases. The transition from FLCH Climb/Descent to Altitude
Capture is dependent on the state of the timer, but other transitions are not.
Predictability
As autoflight systems have become more capable, there has been a shift to pilots becoming
supervisors and managers of automation. This shift towards supervisory flight automation has
caused the ability to accurately predict the future state of the automation to become critical in
monitoring system conformance. The task of monitoring a system consists of noting and
diagnosing differences between the observed behaviour of the system and the behaviour that was
expected.
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Figure 5.8: Linger Timer Consistency in B737 During Flight Level Change
The concept of predictability is defined as a measure of how well an operator can anticipate
what the system will do at some point in the future. In essence, this is a measure of the
complement of how often a system will "surprise" an operator by acting in an unanticipated
manner. This concept correlates to consistency: systems which are highly consistent are expected
to have a higher level of predictability than those which are not. A preliminary experiment was
run to examine the difference in accuracy of prediction between subjects who were using a system
with a consistent model (a Reverse Polish Notation calculator) and one which had a less
consistent model (a standard "Four Function" calculator). It was found that a consistent model
had a statistically more predictable behaviour. The full details of this experiment have been
published (Vakil, 1997) and are shown in Appendix B.
The Boeing B737 has an example of poor predictability in the behaviour of the autoflight
system to a change in MCP altitude during a Vertical Speed descent. The response of the aircraft
to a change in the altitude target is difficult to predict because it is dependent on the rate at which
the altitude knob is moved. Figure 5.9 shows the Hybrid Automation Representation of this
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segment of the autoflight system. Consider a scenario where the aircraft is descending from
FL330 in Vertical Speed at -4000 fpm, the MCP altitude is set at FL290 and the aircraft currently
at FL310. If the altitude knob is moved quickly to FL350, the aircraft will end up in an open
descent with the MCP altitude above it during descent. If the altitude knob is moved very slowly
to FL350, the aircraft will capture the current altitude (near FL310) and level off. If the altitude
knob is moved at an intermediate, but slow, rate or if the pilot pauses near the current altitude
while moving the knob, the aircraft will transition to Altitude Capture and then revert to Vertical
Speed with the immediate vertical rate as the target. This will result in a more shallow open
descent.
Figure 5.9: B737 Altitude Capture Mode Transition Diagram
These three behaviours can be seen in the Mode Transition Diagram of the B737 Altitude
Capture. If the altitude knob is moved quickly, the transition to the Altitude Capture mode will be
suppressed by the Linger Timer (discussed in detail later), which does not allow propagation of
changes to the altitude target to occur quickly. If the altitude knob is moved very slowly, the
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condition of the time to the selected altitude will be satisfied when the MCP altitude is near the
current altitude of the aircraft. A transition will occur to the Altitude Capture mode and then to the
Altitude Hold mode. Finally, in the intermediate case, the transition will occur to the Altitude
Capture mode, but continued motion will result in a transition back to the Vertical Speed mode
with the instantaneous vertical rate becoming the new target. Figure 5.10 shows the trajectory of
the aircraft in each of these cases.
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Figure 5.10: Vertical Trajectory of B737 After Change in Altitude Target
Shift Towards Supervisory Systems
In the case of manual control systems, even those which have been hydraulically or
mechanically amplified, the possible behaviours of the system are well understood. Pulling back
on the yoke will cause the nose of the aircraft to pitch up. The mapping between the control input
and the aircraft response it may become part of a repertoire of skills, rather than knowledge or
rules. The understanding required to predict the behaviour of the aircraft in the presence of control
inputs and the larger environment includes an understanding of aerodynamics and practice with
manual piloting skills. The physics of the situation define the capabilities of the system.
In systems which utilize automation for aircraft control, monitoring requires the ability to
track the evolution of the state of the automation in addition to the state of the aircraft dynamics.
Since automation can directly control the behaviour of the aircraft, the state of the automation
needs to be understood in order to predict the future aircraft state and to detect when it is
inconsistent with what was intended or expected. The mental model required for this task is a
superset of that required for manual piloting, since it must include some representation of the
automation itself in order to monitor conformance. Rasmussen (1986) discusses the capability
necessary in order to effectively interact at a knowledge-based level. At this level of
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understanding, the pilot must have a model of the automation which can be evaluated in order to
predict future aircraft states. Multiple possible outcomes are generated based on this predictive
analysis and the most likely of these outcomes is selected. A key element of this process is an
accurate and complete model of the automation to be used by the pilot. It is precisely this
information which appears to be lacking in flight crew operations manuals and other training and
documentation.
5.2.4 Discrepancy Between Pilots' and Designers' Representations
The lack of a global model of the automation may result in discrepancies between the
representation of the automation used by pilots and those used by engineers. These discrepancies
may arise due to the different manners in which pilots and engineers interact with automation.
Pilots typically have an operational viewpoint and consider the automation within the context of
procedures and air traffic control. Their parsing of the automation appears to be based on the
functionality and the immediate interface as shown on the right side of Figure 5.11. Each segment
of the autoflight system is considered to be a separate system: fly-by-wire system, stability
augmentation, autopilots and autothrottle, and the flight management system. By contrast,
engineers parse the autoflight system into control loops based on the closed loop control being
provided. These control loops are defined by the kinematics and dynamics of the aircraft.
Engineers are also less likely to have operational insights into the usage of the automation.These
differences may contribute to the likelihood of incidents occurring, particularly if each party has
differing expectations of the automation based on their viewpoint. Consistencies in one viewpoint
may not be consistencies in the other.
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Figure 5.11: Hypothetical Differing Representations of Autoflight Systems
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Differing Expectations
The observed behaviour of automation may be judged by pilots to be inappropriate if it does
not fit with the operational task being performed. This can either be due to the behaviour simply
being poorly designed, or can occur when the automation behaviour is consistent with an
engineering model rather than with the pilots' operational representation of the task.
One example is the 1994 incident in Orly, France, where the A310 to pitched up to acquire an
altitude target late in an approach. The automation was designed to attempt to capture the current
programmed altitude in the event of a speed violation. In this incident, the crew had programmed
a target altitude at the Missed Approach Altitude, during final approach (as per operational
guidelines). This target altitude was above the current altitude of the descending aircraft. When
the flaps were inadvertently lowered at too high a speed, the AutoFlight System detected an
overspeed and pitched the aircraft up in an attempt to capture the Missed Approach Altitude
(Sparaco, 1994). In response to this incident, Airbus issued an advisory bulletin warning pilots to
follow posted flap limit speeds carefully (Sparaco, 1994b).
The engineering representation of how to deal with overspeed events appears to be to switch
to a speed-protected mode and fly towards the Flight Control Unit (FCU) altitude. There is an
implicit assumption in place that the aircraft always flies towards the FCU altitude. Operationally,
this assumption breaks down during approach, when the target altitude is placed at the initial
missed approach altitude, above the descending aircraft. It is important to note that this behaviour
appears to be consistent across multiple Airbus aircraft, including the A310, A320, A330, and
A340.
The engineering representation of this system is shown in Figure 5.12. In this figure, the
transition conditions from the Vertical Speed mode to the speed-protected Level Change (Climb)
mode are shown to be an under- or overspeed condition when the altitude on the FCU is above the
aircraft. Similarly, the transition conditions to the Level Change (Descent) mode are shown to be
under- or overspeed condition when the altitude on the Flight Control Unit (FCU) is below the
aircraft. This behaviour is shown in the top of Figure 5.12 as the white path of the aircraft. When
130
;U Altitude
Flap Overspeed
Figure 5.12: Engineering Representation of A310 Envelope Protection
the overspeed condition occurred, the aircraft went into a climb mode to acquire the FCU
Altitude.
By contrast, a Hybrid Automation Representation of the behavior expected by the pilot is
shown in Figure 5.13. The finding that pilots expected this behaviour was determined during the
evaluation of the Electronic Vertical Situation display where this incident was used as an
experimental scenario (Section 6.2, Appendix E). While the structure of the model is identical,
the key difference is that the conditions required for the transition to the speed-protected Level
Change modes are expected to be based on the current vertical rate of the aircraft. If the aircraft is
climbing, it is expected that a Climb mode will become active. If the aircraft is descending, it is
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Figure 5.13: Pilot: Expected A310 Response to Overspeed during Descent
expected that a Descent mode will become active. This behaviour is shown in the bottom section
of Figure 5.13. In this diagram, after the mode change occurs due to the overspeed condition, the
aircraft continues on its descent at a reduced rate. This behaviour is may be more operationally
appropriate, since it allows the aircraft to continue in its trajectory at a reduced rate and does not
have the drastic behaviour of the engineering approach. However, this can place the aircraft into
an open descent mode while in Level Change, which is an unexpected behaviour since Level
Change flies towards the FCU target in nominal operations.
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Differing Perspective on Incident Reports
Work is currently underway into examining the different analyses that pilots and engineers
use in describing system operation by investigating incident reports (Feary, 1999). This also
serves as an indication of the different representations used by each party. Table 5.2 shows a
comparison between these two analyses. Pilot descriptions consisted of longer, system-oriented
descriptions with an operational perspective. By contrast, engineers presented shorter descriptions
from an analytical system-specific perspective. From the structural standpoint, the engineers'
report was a bullet list of individual elements as compared to the pilots' cohesive narrative.
Table 5.2: Pilot versus Engineer Perspective on Incidents (Feary, 1999)
Engineer's Response
Analysis of Narrative 310133
This incident seems to be nothing specific to the
MD-l i. It deals with cockpit distractions, not
making required callouts, and so forth. Perhaps
there was some confusion with an altitude in the
FMS versus and altitude sent in the GCP, but the
distractions are the overriding factor here.
To deal with the loss of the third set of eyes,
automation has given us the capability to monitor
the automatic flight. Essentially, we have two
computer programmers monitoring the pilot, who
is trained to follow behavior limited by very strict
rules.
The obvious method that the MD-l I was designed
for in this situation was to program the crossing
restriction in the FMS and allow PROF to make
things happen. Since the copilot took PROF out of
the loop, he changed the rules. Vertical speed will
even override the GCP altitude if it is done during
the level off. This mode requires constant attention
of both pilots, and if there are cockpit distractions,
it may not be an appropriate mode to use.
Brief Description: Aircraft descends to 10,000 ft when FMS Flightplan
has 11,000 ft constraint
Summary:
Operator failed to keep track of the level of automation engaged.
Operator did not follow SOP
What happened:
Descending with clearance to waypoint at 11,000 ft. Pilot entered
11, 000 ft constraint into the Flightplan
Aircraft descended to GCP alt = 10, 000 ft. Pilots missed 1000 ft
callout
Engineering explanation of behavior:
The behavior of the aircraft may be explained in a number of ways
1. PROF was not engaged (pilot pulled alt knob after selecting the
altitude). The avionics, correctly, controlled the aircraft to the GCP
altitude at 10,000 ft.
2. PROF was engaged, but the aircraft was long (high) on the optimum
pat and sequenced the waypoint with the 11,000 ft constraint above
11,000 ft. The aircraft continued the descent and leveled-off at the GCP
Alt
3. Failure of avionics-no evidence to corroborate this supposition
Similar research has been done outside of the aviation domain in the environment of
photocopier repair (Orr, 1999). While appearing completely unrelated, the structure of the
relationship between design engineers and repair workers is similar to that between design
engineers and pilots. In each case, the engineers use different representations of the task and
automation, and are isolated from the operational aspects of the tasks. In a similar manner to
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Pilot Response
aviation, Orr found that "war stories" were the means of information distribution by repair
workers.
Insufficient Documentation
A final note on representations is that in the web survey pilots noted multiple instances where
modes were inadequately documented or discussed in the Flight Crew Operators' Manual.
Several cases were verified, both specific to particular aircraft and common across multiple
aircraft.
In the B757/767, the transition between Takeoff and Altitude Hold at a low altitude can cause
a reversion of the speed target to the current value, rather than maintaining the active value in the
mode control panel. In addition, controlling around speed in Mach switches to controlling
indicated airspeed when the pilot switches from Flight Level Change to Vertical Navigation.
Neither of these conditions is outlines in the documentation. In the A320, Localizer Capture
reverts to Heading Select whenever the heading knob is moved. In the B777, there is no indication
in the manuals why a transition is effected from VNAV-Path to VNAV-Speed.
This is a serious issue, as it undermines the ability of pilots to build a complete mental model
of the automation. In addition, it can seriously undermine the pilots trust in the documentation and
cause them to revert to creating purely experiential mental models-and utilizing those
experiential models at the expense of reading documentation.
5.3 Feedback and Lack of Observability
In the absence of appropriate and observable feedback, the pilot may not be able to anticipate
the future behaviour of the automation. One of the issues which has been examined during this
research has been an analysis of the "observability" of the automation. Observability is based
upon the control definition and measures how well automation state can be measured from
available feedback and indicators. From the viewpoint of mode transitions, this measures whether
mode changes and behaviour changes are made apparent to the pilot. In some cases, mode
changes may be made silently, though the behaviour of the aircraft may change. Alternately, the
current active mode may not be apparent to the crew. An example of an incident which appears to
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have had poor feedback and lack of observability as a contributory factor is the crash of an A320
at Strasbourg, France.
On January 20, 1992, an A320 aircraft crashed during a non-precision approach
into airport. The aircraft was estimated to be descending at 3300 fpm, a much
steeper rate than the approach was designed for. It is speculated that the flight
crew's intent was to descend on a flight path angle of 3.3', which safely
approximated the numerous level-off altitudes and short descent legs. Instead the
aircraft was placed the aircraft into the wrong descent mode: Vertical Speed
instead of Flight Path Angle. In Vertical Speed (VS) mode, the indication for
3300 fpm looks almost identical to a descent in Flight Path Angle (FPA) mode of
3.3'. The crew did not recognize the problem until too late and the much higher
descent rate resulted in Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). Similar incidents
have been reported in A320s at both San Diego and Gatwick. (FAA, 1996;
Sparaco, 1995)
Autopilot modes and target are selected on the Flight Control Unit (FCU) located in the center
console on the glare-shield, between the captain and the flight officer. Knobs are used to selected
targets: the pilot sets the desired state value and then pulls on the knob to command the mode
governing that state. To toggle Vertical Speed or Flight Path Angle modes, pilots use a recessed
push-button. Distinguishing between Vertical Speed mode being active versus Flight Path Angle
mode was difficult. The top two figures in Figure 5.14 (Pritchett, 1995) shows the FCU in each
mode. The differences between each mode were in the identifier in the middle of the display and
the decimal between the digits, or lack thereof.
This incident appears to have been caused by automation with poor observability caused by
lack of appropriate feedback. A319s and newer A320s have been fitted with a modified target
display which shows four digits for during a V/S mode and only two during FPA mode. Air
carriers have also been given the option of retrofitting this new display into older cockpits. The
bottom two figures in Figure 5.14 shows the updated displays.
5.3.1 Observability in the Vertical Domain
The feedback in the vertical domain is limited as compared to the horizontal domain. This is
due to the lack of a vertical situation display and the increased complexity, as measured by the
number of possible targets and modes, of the vertical domain. The moving map display provides
excellent feedback in the horizontal domain, but there is no widely used analogous display in the
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Original FCU in Flight Path Angle Mode
Modified FCU in Vertical Speed Mode Modified FCU in Flight Path Angle Mode
Figure 5.14: Flight Control Unit Depiction of Active Mode (adapted from Pritchett, 1995)
vertical domain. The graphical feedback for the vertical domain is limited to some elements on
the map display showing descent and climb initiation and completions.
The disparity in feedback is inconsistent with the complexity of each of these flight domains.
The horizontal flight of the aircraft can be use either a track or a heading as a target and control to
them by use of roll. Vertical is controlled by both pitch and thrust, with multiple potential target
states: vertical speed, altitude, path, airspeed, thrust, pitch, angle of attack, flight path angle and
others. The ASRS review, shown in Figure 1.3, highlights a preponderance of incidents in the
vertical domain. In addition, examining the results of the web survey in Table 4.4, Table 4.5, and
Table 4.6 shows that the majority of problematic mode transitions identified by pilots to be in the
vertical domain. Overall, 70% of the transitions which were identified in the survey were in the
vertical segment of flight.
Horizontal Channel Feedback
The primary feedback display for the horizontal channel is the Electronic Horizontal Situation
Indicator (Map or Navigation Display) (EHSI) shown in Figure 5.15, which gives a full tactical
and strategic view of the current and planned path of the aircraft. The position of the aircraft is
shown by a white triangle in the bottom center of the display. Though the colours are not
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Original FCU in Vertical Speed Mode
distinguishable in this document, the aircraft is shown geographically relative to the inactive
(blue) and programmed (magenta) waypoints in the vicinity. Programmed waypoints are those
which have been entered as endpoints in segments of the FMS path (magenta line). The next
active waypoint (LAPEL), the one that is actively being flown to, is shown in white. The current
aircraft heading is shown on the compass arc on the top of the display.The second frame shows
the same scene a few minutes later, after the descent to LAPEL has begun.
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Figure 5.15: Map Mode Display
By displaying the area in front of the aircraft, this display allows pilots to quickly ascertain
how the aircraft has been programmed and anticipate what it is expected to do. In particular, any
deviation from the programmed path can quickly be seen by the aircraft symbol flying away from
the magnenta line.
Vertical Channel Feedback
The primary source of vertical channel feedback is the textual display in the Flight Mode
Annunciator, in the top middle of the Primary Flight Display (PFD) shown in Figure 5.16. In this
figure, the aircraft is tracking the ILS glide slope. To the right of the Attitude Determination
Indicator, the magenta diamond shows the aircraft deviation above or below the glide slope,
indicating, in addition to textually, that the current mode is Glide Slope Tracking. To the right of
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Figure 5.16: Primary Flight Display
the altitude tape, the vertical path indicator shows the current descent rate of the aircraft,
independent of active mode.
A few graphical elements related to the vertical path are displayed also on the Map Mode
Display. The first frame in Figure 5.15 shows a Top of Descent marker about 3 nmi in front of the
aircraft. During the descent, an Altitude Intercept Arc (as seen in the second frame) indicates
where the aircraft is expected to reach its commanded altitude. The programmed VNAV path is
implied by the Top of Descent point, but this actual path is only displayed as a series of text based
altitude and speed restrictions on the flight management system. The various feedback
mechanisms available for the vertical channel do not provide immediate graphical feedback.
The fundamental advantage in observability that the current horizontal channel has over the
vertical channel is that the context of the horizontal channel is shown. The position of the aircraft,
relative to other waypoint and elements is shown in a clear manner. The vertical channel shows
the altitude of the aircraft, and tactically the vertical channel provides feedback for mode changes
about to occur by showing markers on the speed and altitude tapes. Figure 5.16 shows a red low
speed marker on the speed tape. However, the vertical channel does not show strategic
relationships of the aircraft to targets and conditions which can effect the trajectory.
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Feedback Mechanism versus Channel Complexity
There is also a fundamental discrepancy in the feedback available in the vertical channel and
the horizontal channel. As shown in Table 5.3, the horizontal flight of an aircraft is limited to
using a single method to control a single target state: controlling the heading of the aircraft by
using the ailerons to for roll authority.
Table 5.3: Representative Horizontal Modes in the MD- 11
Horizontal Modes Control Allocation
Heading Roll
Track Roll
NAV Roll
ILS Localizer Tracking Roll
Though the vertical channel is functionally more complex, there is less feedback to the pilots
than in the horizontal. The vertical flight of an aircraft requires control of both the speed of the
aircraft and its vertical path, since speed and vertical path are interrelated. This leads to the
vertical flight of an aircraft having many more potential target states: vertical speed, altitude,
preprogrammed vertical flight paths, airspeed, thrust level, aircraft pitch, angle of attack and so
on. In addition, each of these targets can be controlled to by a combination of the aircraft pitch
and the thrust level. Table 5.4 shows a tally of vertical and speed based flight modes drawn from
the MD-l l Cockpit Pilot's Guide.
As an example, in a simple base mode, such as the Altitude Hold mode, the aircraft speed
would be controlled by the throttle and the vertical path (in this case, the altitude) would be
controlled by the pitch of the aircraft with the elevators. Another base mode, Flight Level Change
mode, sets the throttle at a limit value to control the vertical climb rate, and controls the speed of
the aircraft with the pitch.
5.3.2 Identifying Feedback Using the Hybrid Automation Representation
In order to effectively monitor the state of aircraft automation, pilots need to be able to predict
the future state of the automation using available indicators and feedback. The Hybrid
Automation Representation identifies the elements which are required by the pilot to track the
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Table 5.4: Representative Vertical and Speed Modes in the MD-11
Vertical and Speed Modes Speed Control Allocation Path Control Allocation
Altitude Hold Throttle Elevator
Altitude Capture Mixed
(MIMO transition)
FMS Altitude Hold Throttle Elevator
FMS Profile Descent Elevator IDLE Throttle
Vertical Speed (MCP) Throttle Elevator
Vertical Speed (FMS) Throttle Elevator
Flight Path Angle Throttle Elevator
Flight Level Change Elevator IDLE or CLIMB Throttle
Glide Slope Tracking Throttle Elevator
Flare Throttle Elevator
Go Around Elevator CLIMB Throttle
Low Speed Protection Elevator Throttle
High Speed Protection Elevator Throttle
progress of automation state. These elements consist of the feedback to ascertain the state of each
of the possible automatic conditions leading to the transition, the notification of a mode
transitions and the target values of the new mode.
Altitude
Hold
Figure 5.17:
V/S Switch
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The feedback to the pilot that a transition has occurred is explicitly identified in the
nomenclature as part of the transition between modes. Figure 5.17 shows that the feedback
provided during a manual transition from Altitude Hold to Vertical Speed is show by the switch
lighting and on the Flight Mode Annunciator.
The second important element of feedback is identifying the criteria upon which automatic
transitions will occur. Though this is not identified explicitly, it is necessary to identify when
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transitions will occur in order to accurately monitor the automation. An example is that in
Figure 5.18, it is necessary for a pilot to be able to identify when an overspeed condition will
occur, likely through checking the airspeed on Primary Flight Display. An additional element
which needs to be identified is the target values which are specified after a mode change. In
Figure 5.17, the new target value for the Vertical Speed mode is a vertical speed of zero feet per
minute. In Figure 5.18 the new target values for the Flight Level Change are a speed of Vmax and
an idle thrust setting.
Vertical Flight Level
Speed Overspeed Flight Mode Change
Condition Annunciator I .
Vertical Speed
Speed 'd'* Thrust
Figure 5.18: Observability of Conditions and New Target Values
In examining actual autoflight systems, the conditions which need to be monitored are much
more diverse, and appear on multiple displays in multiple locations. Figure 5.19 shows the
altitude capture subsection of the MD- 11 autoflight system. In this mode transition diagram, two
conditions are highlighted where feedback is not provided. The transition from Altitude Capture
back to Vertical Speed mode is predicated on the Altitude Select Knob being moved by the pilot
and the previous mode being Vertical Speed. This transition is based on the autoflight system
reverting to the previous mode, whether it was Vertical Speed, Flight Path Angle, or Level
Change, if the Altitude Select Knob is moved. However, annunciation of the previous mode is not
made available to the pilot.
Another example element of feedback which is missing is the state of the Linger Timer (in
aircraft including the MD-11), which is not made apparent to the crew even though it can
suppress an altitude capture from occurring. The Pitch Wheel is used in the MD-Il to specify the
climb/descent rate while in Vertical Speed or Flight Path Angle mode. After the Pitch Wheel is
rotated there is a pause of two seconds during which altitude capture cannot occur. This behaviour
is mentioned in the MD-Il Cockpit Pilot's Guide, albeit in a positive light:
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Lack of Observability in MD-Il Altitude Capture
Rotation of the pitch wheel enables the pilot to exit altitude capture for 2 seconds
whereupon if altitude capture conditions are satisfied, the aircraft reenters altitude
capture. Otherwise vertical speed remains selected. (Honeywell, 1992)
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This condition can be seen in Figure 5.19 on the transition between Vertical Speed and
Altitude Capture. The Linger Timer behaviour, shown in the bottom diagram, is to engage for 2
seconds on the condition of a change in the Pitch Wheel. While this timer is active, the "Linger
Timer Inactive" condition is not met in the Vertical Speed to Altitude Capture transition. As
shown in Figure 5.19, there is no feedback as to the engagement, disengagement, and current state
of the linger timer. This behaviour of the autoflight system has been implicated as a contributory
factor in an incident:
On July 13, 1996 an MD-11 experienced an in-flight upset near Westerly, Rhode
Island. One passenger received serious injuries, and one passenger and two flight
attendants received minor injuries. During this incident, the first officer adjusted
the pitch thumbwheel seven times as the autopilot was attempting to level the
airplane after descending. Boeing DPD engineers informed the Safety Board that,
when the autopilot is engaged, movement of the pitch thumbwheel interrupts the
autopilot's altitude capture mode. Once the pitch thumbwheel is released, there is a
2-second delay before the autopilot can resume the level-off. Therefore, the
American Airlines flight crewmember's repeated use of the pitch thumbwheel
during the level-off process prevented the autopilot from capturing the assigned
altitude. The Safety Board learned that American Airlines operations and training
personnel were not aware of this 2-second delay and that it was not addressed in
the manufacturer's operations or training material. (National Transportation Safety
Board 1999)
Capture
Suppressed
Figure 5.20: MD-11 Inflight Upset
Figure 5.20 shows this incident graphically. During the descent, the crewmember's repeated
using of the thumbwheel suppressed the capture for several 2 second incidents. These are shown
graphically as the red segments during the capture maneuver. The capture was suppressed while
the aircraft crossed over the target altitude, resulting in an open descent. The captain reacted by
using the yoke to manually pitch the aircraft steeply to recapture the assigned altitude. The
injuries with sustained during the recapture maneuver.
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5.4 Case Study: Altitude Transitions
Many of the examples in this chapter are based on the behaviour of transitions to and from the
Altitude Capture Mode from Vertical Speed and Flight Level Change. As discussed earlier, this is
due to the transition needing to reconfigure the aircraft in a short amount of time, typically using
Multi-Input, Multi-Output control for a smooth, low acceleration ride. As part of this thesis a set
of probes was made of the behaviour of these transitions, both through a detailed examination of
available literature and through simulator testing. The results showed that the transitions to and
from Altitude Capture are inconsistent across aircraft, and in some cases inconsistent within a
specific aircraft. The synopses of these results will be presented in this section.
5.4.1 Target Change during Altitude Capture
An issue with Altitude Capture, which may be related to physical or computational
limitations, is its response to a change in the target altitude. Depending on the aircraft and the new
target altitude, the response may be to level at the initial target altitude, level at the new target
altitude, or to change modes to Vertical Speed. This behaviour was not documented in the Flight
Crew Operators' Manual and was determined through simulator testing on the B737, B757/767,
B777 and the A320.
On the B757/757 and the B777, changing the altitude target while in the Altitude Capture
mode caused the aircraft to level at the original altitude target. On the B737 and the A320, the
altitude target while in the Altitude Capture mode caused the aircraft to switch to a the Vertical
Speed or Flight Path Angle mode at the instantaneous Vertical Speed or Flight Path Angle.
Figure 5.21 shows these two behaviours. Note that the B737 and the A320 place the aircraft into a
situation where it is "flying away" from the altitude target.
ew Altitude
riginal Altitude
B737, A320
-- 757, B767, B777
Figure 5.21: Target Change during Altitude Capture
144
In most instances, this behaviour is benign. However, multiple instances were noted by pilots
in the survey in which the behaviour was problematic. In particular, while capturing the
glideslope from above, the MCP altitude is typically below the aircraft at the lowest altitude to
which the air traffic control has granted clearance, often down to the runway field. If the aircraft
transitions to Altitude Capture during this capture, the aircraft will begin to level. If the pilot
attempts to switch the altitude to comply with an updated clearance, the aircraft may revert to
Vertical Speed Mode at the instantaneous vertical speed, resulting in a very slow descent, and a
failure to capture the glideslope. This is shown graphically in Figure 5.22.
Driginal Altitude
New Approach
Glidesiope Altitude C'hange Altitude Target,
Capture Revert to Vertical Speed
Initiated
Figure 5.22: Reversion to Vertical Speed during Glide Slope Capture
5.4.2 Inconsistent Target Change during Climbs and Descents
The behaviour of the automation is particularly inconsistent when the target altitude is being
moved from below the current altitude to above during a descent, or from above the aircraft to
below, during a climb. Situations in which the aircraft is placed into a situation where it flies
"away" from the target altitude are of concern. It is hypothesized that they can lead to scenarios
where pilots expect the aircraft to automatically level at a target altitude (as per nominal
operations), but do not. While not a typical directive from the pilot, or from air traffic control, this
situation does occur, and places the aircraft into an "unprotected" descent-the aircraft will not
level before intersecting the ground.
As discussed for the B737 in Section 5.2.3, aircraft have differing responses to the rate at
which the altitude knob is moved, the initial climb/descent mode, and their response to the new
target. Summarized below are the results of scenarios run on high fidelity simulators investigating
this mode transition.
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Vertical Speed Descent
The scenario placed the aircraft at FL330 (33 000 ft) in a Vertical Speed descent at -4000 fpm
with the target altitude is set to FL290. As the aircraft passed through FL310, the target altitude
was moved to FL350 at various rates.
Table 5.5: Altitude Target Change during Vertical Speed Maneuver
Fast Altitude Knob Rotation
B737-500 MCP altitude passes through current
altitude and continued descent.
B757/767 MCP altitude passes through current
altitude and continued descent.
B777 MCP altitude passes through current
altitude and continued descent.
A320 FCU altitude passes through current
altitude and continued descent.
Medium Altitude Knob Rotation
When MCP altitude is near FL3 10,
capture was initiated, and ALT*
engaged. As knob was continued to
be turned, ALT* reverted to V/S with
an instantaneous V/S target and
continued descent.
When MCP altitude is near FL3 10,
capture was initiated, and ALT*
engaged. Aircraft did not regain V/S
mode. Captured altitude few hundred
feet below when ALT* initiated
When MCP altitude is near FL3 10,
capture was initiated, and ALT*
engaged. Aircraft did not regain V/S
mode. Captured altitude few hundred
feet below when ALT* initiated
FCU altitude passes through current
altitude and continued descent.
Slow Altitude Knob Rotation
Aircraft captures current altitude and
levels off when MCP altitude is near
FL3 10.
Aircraft captures current altitude and
levels off when MCP altitude is near
FL3 10.
Aircraft captures current altitude and
levels off when MCP altitude is near
FL3 10.
FCU altitude passes through current
altitude and continued descent.
If the altitude knob was moved quickly, as it typically would be, the B737/757/767/777 and
the A320 all responded by continuing the descent. If the altitude knob was moved slowly, where
slowly corresponded to a slower rate than the Linger Timer, the Boeing aircraft levelled when the
target altitude became close to the current altitude. The A320 continued in its descent. Each of
these aircraft were placed in a state where they were flying away from the altitude target.
The most interesting case was when the altitude knob was moved at a rate similar to the
Linger Timer-at approximately one click every second. In this case, the B737 initiated an
altitude capture and then, as the knob was moved again, reverted to Vertical Speed with an
instantaneous vertical rate. The B757/777 did not revert to Vertical Speed mode; rather they
transitioned to altitude hold few hundred feet below where the capture initiated. The A320
continued to in its descent, but it is suspected that a behaviour similar to the B737 may exist.
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Flight Level Change Descent
The scenario placed the aircraft at FL330 (33 000 ft) in a Flight Level Change descent at a
speed target of 320 kts, indicated with the target altitude is set to FL290. As the aircraft passed
through FL310, the target altitude was moved to FL350.
Table 5.6: Altitude Target Change during Flight Level Change Maneuver
Fast Altitude Knob Rotation Medium Altitude Knob Rotation Slow Altitude Knob Rotation
B737-500 Altitude passed through current When MCP altitude is near current When MCP altitude was near FL3 10
altitude; and aircraft immediately altitude, the capture initiated, and (i.e., current altitude), aircraft
spooled up engines and to capture the ALT* engaged. ALT* then reverted captured current altitude and levelled
FL350 target to V/S with an instantaneous V/S off.
target resulting in a continued
descent.
B757/767 Altitude passed through current When MCP altitude is near current When MCP altitude was near FL310
altitude; and aircraft paused, then altitude, the capture initiated, and (i.e., current altitude), aircraft
spooled up engines and to capture the ALT* engaged. Did not regain V/S captured current altitude and levelled
FL350 target mode. Captured altitude few hundred off.
feet below when ALT* initiated.
B777 Altitude passed through current When MCP altitude is near current When MCP altitude was near FL3 10
altitude; and aircraft paused, then altitude, the capture initiated, and (i.e., current altitude), aircraft
spooled up engines and to capture the ALT HOLD engaged. Did not regain captured current altitude and levelled
FL350 target V/S mode. Captured altitude few off.
hundred feet below when ALT
HOLD initiated.
A320 When FCU ALT was at current When FCU ALT was at current When FCU ALT was at current
altitude, aircraft switched from Open altitude, aircraft switched from Open altitude, aircraft switched from Open
Descent to Current V/S (-3200 fpm). Descent to Current V/S (-3200 fpm). Descent to Current V/S (-3200 fpm).
If the altitude knob was moved quickly, the B737 immediately spooled up its engines to
capture FL350 target. The B757/777 waited for the duration of the Linger Timer and then
initiated a climb. The A320 switched to a Vertical Speed descent with the instantaneous vertical
rate when the target altitude moved to above the current altitude. However, it should be noted that
earlier generation A320s transition to a Flight Level Change type of mode to capture the new
altitude target. This was changed because unintentional actions on the altitude knob could thus
cause significant change in pitch and power. Therefore it was decided always to revert to the
Vertical Speed leaving the aircraft following its current flight path, which is much less disturbing
to flight crew and passengers.
If the altitude knob was moved slowly (relative to the Linger Timer), the Boeing aircraft
switched to Altitude Capture and Hold when the target altitude corresponded to the current
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altitude. The A320 switched to a Vertical Speed descent with the instantaneous vertical rate when
the target altitude moved to above the current altitude.
Once again, the most interesting case was when the altitude knob was moved at a rate similar
to the Linger Timer. In this case, the B737 initiated an altitude capture and then, as the knob was
moved again, reverted to Vertical Speed with an instantaneous vertical rate. The B757/777 did not
revert to Vertical Speed mode; rather they transitioned to Altitude Hold a few hundred feet below
where the capture initiated. The A320 continued to in its descent, but it is suspected that a
behaviour similar to the B737 may exist.
Behaviour while Altitude Target in Dynamic
The final test was to determine the behaviour of the system while the altitude target was in
motion, during the process of entering a new target into the autoflight system. For this scenario,
the aircraft is descending from FL330 in Level Change, speed target of 320kts, and the altitude is
set at FL290. When the aircraft approached FL3 10, the altitude knob was moved to above FL350
and, without lingering at any altitude, was kept in constant motion.
Table 5.7: Behavior while Altitude Knob is in Motion.
Fast Altitude Knob Rotation
B737-500 Engines immediately started to spool up, without waiting for a stable altitude target to appear
B757/767 While altitude knob was in motion, descent continued. When altitude target stabilized, aircraft added power to
climb.
B777 While altitude knob was in motion, descent continued. When altitude target stabilized, aircraft added power to
climb.
A320 While altitude knob was in motion, descent continued. When altitude target stabilized, aircraft added power to
climb.
The odd behaviour in this case was from the B737, which did not wait for a stable altitude to
appear before initiating the climb. Further testing showed that the B737 would "chase" the
altitude target while in the Level Change mode.
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter examined three areas in autoflight systems analysis: limitations in physical
systems, the representation of the automation to the pilot, and feedback from the automation.
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Each of these topics, where appropriate, was analyzed through the used of the Hybrid Automation
Representation. A more detailed study was presented of altitude change mode transitions, which
appear to be the cause of a significant number of problems. For this study, high fidelity simulators
were used to investigate behaviours that were not documented in the Flight Crew Operators'
Manuals. Several inconsistent, and potentially surprising, behaviours were found.
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Chapter 6
Approaches to Mitigating Automation Complexity
This chapter will examine approaches to managing and mitigating the complexity of existing
automation systems. Pre-emptive approaches have three classes, corresponding to the time and
cost of implementation. The first is to apply more effective training with knowledge of the
structure of the automation as well as known aircraft problems (Weiner, 1999). The second is to
critically examine the feedback provided by the automation and enhance it to allow the system to
become more observable, especially in light of hidden conditional elements and targets.
Ultimately, however, the process by which these systems are designed must be examined. A
process is presented which is designed to create systems which may not require the same amount
of simplification by pilots.
6.1 Training and Procedure Modifications
Modifying training or instituting new procedures is by far the fastest manner in which to
modify the representations, and hence behaviour, of pilots. Several approaches are already in
active use within the industry, including publicly detailing the issues to make problems readily
accessible to line pilots, and modifying procedures in order to make up for automation design
errors or deficiencies. Changes to the process by which pilots are trained are also underway
(Weiner, 1999).
6.1.1 Public Detailing of Issues
If the behaviour of automation is found to be confusing or insufficiently documented,
especially in the aftermath of an accident or incident, flight crews of affected aircraft fleets are
notified. The notification process may be initiated by the manufacturer or by airlines directly, and
often consists of additions or modifications to the flight crew operating manuals.
An example is the 1994 incident in Orly, France, where the aircraft to pitched up to acquire an
altitude target late in an approach. The automation was designed to attempt to capture the current
programmed altitude in the event of a speed violation. In this incident, the crew had programmed
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the target altitude above them, at the Missed Approach Altitude, during final approach (as per
operational guidelines). When the flaps were inadvertently lowered at too high a speed, the
AutoFlight System detected an overspeed and pitched the aircraft up in an attempt to capture the
Missed Approach Altitude (Sparaco, 1994). In response to this incident, Airbus issued an
advisory bulletin warning pilots to follow posted flap limit speeds carefully (Sparaco, 1994b). A
more recent situation is the NTSB recommendation to include details regarding the vertical speed
behaviour of the MD- 11 more explicitly in airlines' flight crew operating manuals (NTSB, 1999).
Unfortunately, both of these examples show the weakness of this approach: the updating process
often occurs after an accident or incident has already occurred.
6.1.2 Modification of Procedures
Another near term, and relatively inexpensive, solution to automation problems is to modify
the procedures pilots use when interacting with the automation. In aviation, a procedure is a
codified behaviour consisting of a set of tasks to be performed by the pilot. Procedures are
designed to provide structure in the complex operating environment of the aircraft cockpit, and
allow responses designed to be optimal during both nominal and non-nominal operations. As an
example, the procedure to change an altitude would consist of the pilot not flying (PNF)
acknowledging the ATC request for an altitude change, dialing in the new altitude and pointing to
the altitude window. The pilot flying (PF) has to verify the new altitude target verbally before
initiating the altitude change (Midkiff, 1998).
Procedures are used to generate a known aircraft response by traversing a specific set of
transitions, and avoiding known anomalies. The MD80 mode control logic has an error where
adjusting the speed while in a Altitude Hold mode could cause the aircraft to revert to a Vertical
Speed mode. The Vertical Speed target would be the instantaneous speed when the reversion
occurred, causing a slow drift from the target altitude. To deal with this problem, pilots reset the
Altitude Hold mode after making a speed change. Immediately pressing the ALT button on the
MCP will place the system into ALT HOLD if it has inadvertently transitioned to V/S. Rather
than monitoring the system to see whether it experience the anomaly, this behaviour simplifies
the pilot response into a procedure which results in the correct behavior.
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A detailed example is the response of a major American airline to the Cali, Colombia accident
described below.
On December 20, 1995, a Boeing B757 crashed into a mountain near Cali,
Columbia. This accident was caused by a chain of relatively minor incidents. The
pilots in the aircraft were on a normal approach to the airport when they were
cleared "Direct to Romeo," which was a reference to the ROZO waypoint on the
approach path. The Flight Management System (FMS) was then used to select this
waypoint from a list of nearby waypoints. The FMS attempts to simplify looking
up waypoints by showing all common named fixes. In this case, the aircraft was
cleared to Romeo, or more accurately, the waypoint on the approach which had a
name started with an "R": ROZO. The pilots are hypothesized to have entered an
"R" and selected the top waypoint on the list and that the waypoint which was
selected was actually located near Bogota, Columbia. The aircraft entered a turn to
acquire this new waypoint. When the pilots realized that the aircraft was no longer
heading towards the airport, they initiated a turn back towards the airport, but had
already lost too much altitude and were laterally displaced an unsuitable distance
from the intended path. The aircraft failed to clear a mountain and was destroyed.
(Aviation Safety Net, 2000)
In response to this event, pilots flying the Boeing B757/767 were sent a bulletin (Boeing
757/767 Operating Manual Bulletin No. 757/767-19) which described the procedure to use during
route modification.
If a route modification involves a navaid or waypoint with duplicate names:
Both pilots must verify that the latitude/longitude of the desired waypoint on the
SELECT DESIRED WPT page is correct. Then, both pilots must verify that the
course/distance to the selected waypoint on the LEGS page are reasonable before
using the waypoint for navigation.
During approaches, verification of navaid waypoints by comparing latitude/
longitude may be impractical. Manual tuning and aural identifying of the primary
navaid by the pilot using raw data is essential to verify that the intended navaid is
selected.
NOTE: Latitude and Longitude for navaid (if available) are only shown on en-
route charts, area charts, SIDs, STARs, and profile descents where the navaid
forms an airway or route. (Emphasis in original)
Well-designed procedures which take into account automation limitations and inconsistencies
can avoid known problems and render automation more consistent and easier for pilots to
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monitor. Procedural changes can work around automation issues by requiring pilots to interact
with a non-problematic subset of the automation, or to avoid sequences of actions which can lead
to incidents. As an example (further detailed in the appendices), mid-generation MD-80 aircraft
had an automation error where modifying the vertical rate during an altitude change could result
in the aircraft flying through the MCP altitude. The behaviour was avoided if pilots re-armed the
MCP altitude each time a vertical rate change was made. The procedural fix was to augment the
altitude change procedure to include a re-arming task.
Procedures specify a particular "path" through the aircraft automation. By requiring that pilots
are only to use particular paths, the complexity of the automation may be reduced. There is simply
less active involvement with sections of the automation which are not part of proceduralized
usage. In this sense, procedures are analogous to the complexity management approach used by
pilots of reducing the possible behaviours of the system. In the extreme of this behaviour, some
airlines have removed large sections of aircraft automation behaviour from their pilots' available
repertoire.
6.1.3 Modification of Training Process
The immediate changes made to pilot behaviour through procedural changes and the
dissemination of known issues ultimately need to be represented in the initial training provided to
pilots for new aircraft (Weiner 1999). An obvious necessity is to provide trainees with the
information available to pilots in the field, namely the known problems with the automation and
the current procedures which compensate. There is also research underway on an advanced
Vertical Navigation (VNAV) trainer (Chappell 1997, Crowther 1994). This tool is designed to
show pilots the underlying complexity of the VNAV system and the implications of a particular
set of mode choices.
However, some of the issues appearing in automated aircraft may have to do with the
distinction between training pilots for operation versus understanding. This distinction appears on
Reason's (1990) knowledge hierarchy as the distinction between rule-based interaction and
knowledge-based interaction. The former, which is typified by the use of standardized
procedures, may be sufficient for nominal usage where pilots may also develop robust
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representations for these procedures. Unfortunately, this information not lend itself to
interpolation and extrapolation to non-nominal conditions.
6.1.4 Utilizing the Hybrid Automation Representation for Targeted Training
The Hybrid Automation Representation may be useful in aiding the development of pilot
operational models. As an example, the model may be useful in the identification of infrequently
used modes or mode transitions. Using such a model in conjunction with operationally derived
data from flights may allow the concentration of training on segments of automation with
insufficient usage for experiential reinforcement. In some sense, this is the basis of the majority of
simulator training, where time is spent practicing how to react to rare events, such as engine
failures, control failure, and hydraulic problems. One recommendation is to extend this training to
emphasize interaction with automation states with which limited operational interaction occurs
and have critical consequences. With access to pilot-specific data from data recorders, it is
conceivable that this could be done on an individual level. Section 5.2.2 has data from revenue
earning flights that can be used to identify modes which are rarely used. The Mode Transition
Matrix allows the examination of these rare transitions.
6.2 Feedback
A concern in modern automation is that sufficient information may not be available to the
pilot to accurately track the state of the automation. Using the parlance of control engineers, the
system is not "observable." Accurately characterizing necessary automation feedback can support
modifications that make the system more tractable. However, since such changes to aircraft are
much more rare, and expensive, than changes to training or procedures, they are likely to only be
done in extreme situations. An example of such a situation is the retrofit to the A320 to call more
explicit attention to the distinction between being in Flight Path Angle mode and Vertical Speed
mode as discussed in Section 5.3. This change was made after an accident which was contributed
to by confusion between these two modes (Hughes, 1995).
Feedback can also be used to serve to call attention to transitions or conditions which are
operationally rare. If a rare mode has been entered (such as an envelope protection mode), or a
rare condition has caused an unexpected transition, this can be made clear to the pilot. There is a
155
trade-off between how often a particular transition is made and how familiar a pilot may be with
it. By selectively drawing attention to events which are "rare," it may be possible to compensate
for an experiential liability (Tognazzini, 1992).
Feedback can also serve the more fundamental purpose of changing the nature of the system
as experienced and interacted with by the pilot. In a manner similar to procedure design, a simpler
system can be created by reducing the interaction to a smaller set of more capable behaviours.
Alternately, a system can be made easier to monitor by presenting a pilot which more useful
feedback about the state of the aircraft. Based on the vertical domain dominating problems with
mode transitions in both the ASRS review and the web survey, an Electronic Vertical Situation
Display was prototyped and evaluated (Vakil, 1996).
6.2.1 Electronic Vertical Situation Display
The Electronic Vertical Situation Display, shown in Figure 6.1, is analogous to the moving
map display, but depicting the vertical progress of the aircraft. The display has four distinct areas.
At the top of the display is the mode display window, showing the current and anticipated modes,
control allocations and target states. At the left is a scalable altitude tape. The bottom window can
either display the path distance (if in LNAV mode), or the range directly ahead of the aircraft.
Finally, the main window shows the aircraft vertically in relation to the upcoming waypoints and
mode transition points.
The current mode of the automation needs to be identified along with any of the specific
attributes of the mode such as target values and control allocation. In Figure 6.1, the current mode
is identified in the top window in green text, directly above the aircraft symbol. In this example,
the aircraft is in VNAV Path Descent (VPATH). An example of a transition criterion is the
dashed magenta line at 15 000 ft, which is the altitude dialed into the Mode Control Panel.
Anticipated modes consist of the future modes into which the automation expects the aircraft
to transition. On the EVSD, the anticipated mode is shown in the top window above the point
where it is predicted to be engaged. The anticipated targets and control allocations are depicted in
a manner similar to the current mode. In Figure 6.1, the system is predicting a speed violation and
a mode transition to the VNAV Speed Mode (VSPD). In this mode, the display shows that the
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vertical path will be controlled by the throttles to Idle, and the speed will be controlled by
elevators to 320 kts. Note that both the target states and the control allocation change when the
new mode is engaged. Another mode change is anticipated once the aircraft reaches the MCP
altitude of 14 000 ft, approximately 12 nmi ahead of the aircraft. The aircraft will switch to
VNAV Path Mode (VPATH). Once the automation switches to this mode, the altitude becomes a
target, as shown in the box underneath the VPATH text.
This display has a green "Path Predictor" line which shows the future vertical state of the
aircraft using a linear extrapolation based on the current automation state. This line shows the
behaviour of the aircraft in the context of the impending airspace and how it may differ from what
is expected by the pilot. The feedback provided is much more useful that what currently exists in
aircraft in helping to track conformances with commands.
Evaluation
The approach to EVSD evaluation was to have subject pilots act as Pilot Not Flying (PNF)
and observe a set of scenarios running on a part task simulator. Subjects were drawn from a pool
of current "glass cockpit" airline pilots. While subjects observed the scenarios, the researcher
acted as Pilot Flying (PF), interacting with the simulated aircraft automation and responding to
prerecorded Air Traffic Control directives. If during the course of the scenario the subject felt that
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some sort of mode event occurred, they pressed a button on the side stick controller and
articulated their concern. This audio data was later analyzed for timing and content. A mode event
was described to the subjects as an uncommanded mode transition occurring, an error had been
made in interfacing with the FMS, or an unsafe or nonprocedural operation had taken place.
Summary of Results
The Electronic Vertical Situation Display was found to significantly improve mode awareness
understanding and the detection of mode awareness problems in both subjective and objective
measures of subject response. The full survey used to derive subjective results is available in the
appendices. Objective results were particularly strong when the anticipation functions of the
EVSD could be used to foresee an event before it actually occurred, as shown in Figure 6.2. In
this scenario, pilot communicated with ATC when they felt the aircraft would not be able to make
the crossing restriction at MiLT. The results show that with the EVSD, pilots were able to make
this assessment sooner (lower values are better).
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Figure 6.2: Overspeed Envelope Protection during Altitude Change
Amalgamated ratings of pilot understanding of mode awareness problems over the full set of
scenarios increased when the EVSD was available. Figure 6.3 shows the results of probing pilot
understanding. These results were found to be statistically significant at the 90% level using a
Wilcoxon analysis.
In addition, subjects were much more specific when reporting problems to Air Traffic
Control. For example, rather than simply reporting that they were unable to make a crossing
restriction, subjects would also report how far past of the waypoint the altitude would be acquired.
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Several subjects also mentioned the additional utility of having a vertical image of the aircraft's
programmed flight.
Subjective results were also positive. Pilots were asked to rate the value of the EVSD on a
scale from Very Valuable to Very Detrimental. The results of this questionnaire are shown in
Figure 6.4. Subjects were volunteers for this experiment, so results may be biased by a
predisposition to new technology in the cockpit.
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A comparison between the EVSD and the current AFS is shown in Figure 6.5. These results
indicate that the subjects found the EVSD useful in a wide range of tasks. However, this is
inconsistent with the objective measures, which suggest that the EVSD tended to be less useful in
instances where another instrument provided the same information, especially when the task
involved tactical types of inner loop monitoring, as compared to strategic monitoring situations.
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Finally, subjects were asked to rate the usefulness of specific elements of the EVSD.
Figure 6.6 shows that subjects were not concerned with the control allocation, or the redundant
target information provided in the top bar of the EVSD. The interaction of the Green (Aircraft
Path) Line, the VNAV Path information and the graphical target states were cited as being useful.
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6.3 Operator Directed Process
The most comprehensive solution is to develop operator-consistent automation that is less
vulnerable to problems. The costs and development times involved make this unlikely to occur as
retrofits to existing aircraft. More likely, this solution will only be undertaken when new
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functionality in the cockpit requires redesign in future aircraft. Work has been underway to
determine if guidance can be provided a priori to designers to allow the creation of less
vulnerable systems. However, in the domain of flight automation, it appears that a process-
oriented solution is a more effective approach. This section will discuss the reasons for
recommending a process modification and will discuss a specific example, the "Operator Directed
Process."
This thesis has made an argument for the necessity of a consistent global model of the
automation to be made available to the pilot. Such a model is necessary in order to develop
training material and procedures with which to build a well-populated mental representation of
the system. This mental representation is required in order to allow the automation's conformance
with commanded goals to be monitored. The creation of this global model is the critical first step
in the process of creating tractable systems with controlled complexity. In order to cause this
change, the process by which these systems are designed must reflect the requirement that the
system be represented in a form usable by pilots.
The reason that the trained pilot is a critical element in design is that the task of flying
incorporates multiple levels of understanding, from manual skills up to deep knowledge, which
are manifested and derived from the flight environment. This environment is usually not available
or fully apparent to designers while systems are being developed. As such, the representations of
the systems may differ significantly between pilots and engineers, especially when the complexity
management techniques used by pilots come to bear. Differences in abstractions and
simplifications may undermine the ability of pilots to effectively monitor the automation for
conformance. This context and operational dependency distinguishes the field of aerospace from
many others. As such, the operational input of pilots is critical in system design.
6.3.1 Process-oriented Solutions
When this research was started, the goal was to create a set of succinct guidelines for
designers to follow. Systems which were designed in a manner consistent with these guidelines
were to be less vulnerable to human interaction issues. In practice, many of these guidelines are
already known, and available to designers: consistency, simplicity, transparency, and other basic
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elements of human-computer interfaces (Schneiderman 1987, Tognazzini 1992, Card 1983). In
aerospace, however, these terms must be considered from the viewpoint of the trained pilot, rather
than the viewpoint of a designer or naive user.
The existing development processes for flight automation were developed in an era where
computing power was at a premium and the capabilities of computing systems limited. The shift
to a new development process is justified based on the flexibility, capability and complexity
afforded by modem processors and software systems. One of the goals of the Operator Directed
Process is to constrain the complexity of these systems to a level which human operators can
internalize and understand while maintaining the necessary functionality. It should be noted that
the ODP may suggest limiting functionality for some systems if the required system is so complex
that it proves intractable to the pilot.
What is necessary is a mechanism with which to capture the most important system elements,
as found in the "engineer's" representation of the system in a form which is suitable for the
operator. This is a difficult task since is requires capturing a fundamentally complex task in a
simpler form. The Operator Directed Process is one proposed mechanism to put considerations of
the human pilot into the development cycle.
6.3.2 Operator Directed Process
Many of the problems appearing in modem aircraft appear to be related to a mismatch
between engineering and pilot models. The issues of a lack of consistency, especially among rare
modes, and lack of observability can result in inappropriate operational behaviour. One solution is
to explicitly consider the human operators early in the design process to prevent these
mismatches. This also assists in capturing the limitations that the operator may place on the
autoflight automation and to constrain system complexity early in the design process. The
fundamental principle is to increase system usability through the constraint of complexity by
articulating an operationally appropriate model of automation for use by operators. This may also
be extended to assist in certification process.
In order to support the development and certification of complex automation systems that
consider flight crew operational understanding, the use of an Operator Directed Process (ODP) is
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proposed. The Operator Directed Process is shown schematically in Figure 6.7. The major
difference in this process is that the training material is the source of the system specification
rather than vice versa. Developing training material early forces consideration fundamental issues
in human-machine interaction early in the process. This contrasts with existing development
cycles that use training material to document system design. The intent is to develop a less error-
prone and more understandable system by requiring consistency between the training material,
procedural usage, and the software, and by limiting the complexity of the system through the
articulation of a model for the operator. This enables the explicit consideration of the human
operator early in the development process.
In Figure 6.7, the ODP is shown to follow the "waterfall model" used in classic software
engineering. The waterfall model flows information and design considerations "downstream" to
be dealt with by the next stage. The major stages of this process are needs analysis and
specification, design, implementation, testing, and maintenance and upgrades. This is used as an
explanatory diagram in order to show dependencies. In practice, it is closer to Boehm's (1981)
"spiral" model which consists of a series of repeating stages of iteration, where updates are made
to an operational prototype of the final system. An iterative version of the ODP is shown in
Figure 6.8.
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The Operator Directed Process is based on earlier ideas, including User Centered Design
(Norman, 1988), Knowledge-based Interface Design (Shneiderman, 1987), and others (Card,
1983). The process is particularly appropriate to aircraft systems because of the skilled set of
operators (i.e. pilots) who may have a differing characterization of tasks than designers. Another
major factor is the manner in which procedures influence the task of flying by imposing external
structure. For example, in the case of SIDs (Standard Instrument Departures), STARs (Standard
Terminal Arrival Routes), and automated approaches, the automation is tied to the structure of the
procedure, and the task fundamentally requires the use of the automated system. With the
additional target flexibility provided by RNAV capabilities, more reliance on automation for
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standard procedures is expected. By contrast, much of the research that has been done into how
humans interact with computers has used case studies where operator skill is tied to the use of the
computer, rather than the larger task (Card, 1983; Schneiderman, 1987), and where fewer
operational impositions exist.
6.3.3 Functional Analysis
The first stage of this process is to determine the functionality that the automation system
requires. This analysis needs to be based on the existing environment in which the automation
must function and the anticipated operational and procedural usage of the automation. Several
other researchers have published work to guide this process (Boy 1998, Vicente 1999).
6.3.4 Automation Model
The key element of Operator Directed Process is the creation of an Automation Model
suitable for the pilot. It is derived based on the functional analysis and input from current design
engineers, operators, and expert users. This is a representation of the automation which can be
articulated and used operationally by the pilot and is a necessary construct for effective
monitoring. The purpose of creating this model early in the process is to use it to limit the
complexity of the automation, either by limiting the behaviours and functionality of the system, or
by consistently abstracting the system at a higher level. This model is intended to be a high level
description of the system which captures the philosophical and design goals which lead to specific
design criteria at more detailed levels.
The primary goal of the automation model is that it must be capable of describing and
explaining all the behaviours of the system that matter, and all of the derived operational
procedures. The term that matter defines the operational dependency-if it is necessary to explain
a behaviour in order to utilize the system in an operational environment (including emergency
situations), it must be captured in the automation model. In this context, an appropriate model is
likely to be one that is rooted in operational domain and acknowledges the background of the
user. The representational form of this model is dependent on the automation it is attempting to
describe. A number of possible modeling bases are presented in Table 6.1 (see also Rouse, 1986).
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Table 6.1: Possible Automation Model Representations
Control Block Diagrams
Procedural Constructs
Finite State Representations
and Variants
Analogical Descriptions
Anthropomorphic Descriptions
Linguistic Descriptions
Petri Nets
Explanatory Descriptions
Control block diagrams are useful for continuous systems where they can accurate represent
the continuous behaviour of a mode. Typically they are used by system designers.
Procedures are used extensively in Pilot Guides and provide a well-defined procedure to
accurately instruct the automation. However, they can become confusing:
"Through the FCU, an immediate climb/descent is initiated by selecting the desired altitude in
the ALT SEL window and either pulling the set knob or pressing the LVL/CH P/B to engage
the LVL CHANGE mode. Pressing the LVL/CH P/B also disengages PROFILE, however, if
PROFILE is engaged, pulling the set knob does not disengage it, rather it initiates an
immediate climb/descent to the altitude selected on the FCU. The exceptions are..."
Use and extend Finite State Machine notation, terminology and analysis techniques to gain
insight into underlying modal structure of complex systems.
Asaf Degani (1994) used state charts to represent modal systems and was able to model certain
mode transition errors. The Hybrid Automation Representation uses a Mode Transition
Matrices to accomplish similar ends.
Many systems are described by an analogy to a previously understood description. An example
might be that "This is controlled just like a B727 autoflight system". Graphical user interfaces
in modem computers use a desktop metaphor. Spreadsheets embrace and extend the ledger
book paradigm.
Automation can be designed to emulate a human agent. If successful, the operator can interact
with the automation with very little training. However, this approach is limited by language
accuracy, completeness, and ambiguity.
Used by Riley (1995, 1997) to build system functionality with a consistent language to
describe Air Traffic Control Directives. This is a wrapper around the existing automation and
its issues. There is some concern that functionality and specificity may be lost with these high
level descriptions.
Useful for capturing all permutations of interactions and for capturing details of reactive
systems.
Purely explanatory descriptions are used extensively in Pilot Guides to provide a template for
usage. For example:
"For demonstration purposes, assume level at FL330, a climb to FL370 is desired at PPOS. A
manual climb to FL370, utilitizing the PROG page to input data to the FMS is affected in the
following manner:
Write 370 or FL370 in the SP
Press LSK
Selected 370 in the ALT SEL window of the FCU"
An additional advantage of an explicit automation model is that it may serve as a stage in
development where "rationale capture" can occur. It has been argued that the development
processes which are currently used do not have a means to document the rationale behind the
design decisions (Leveson, 1998). By capturing this information, the underlying premises of the
system can be documented explicitly, aiding in maintaining consistency during subsequent
modifications and extensions to the system.
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6.3.5 Incremental Instantiation
The waterfall model of system design consists of a linear set of steps which are followed to
create a product. The waterfall model flows information and design considerations "downstream"
to be dealt with by the next stage. The major stages of this process are needs analysis and
specification, design, implementation, testing, and maintenance and upgrades. Similarly, for
software, these typically consist of the creation of functional analysis, followed by a software
specification, system instantiation and finally the development of documentation. Boehm (1983)
has shown that this development approach is inappropriate, and can be proven to be incorrect.
This is due to the unknowns in the development process, which requires the design of systems in
the absence of complete understanding of the problem to be solved, or its solution.
By contrast, the Operator Directed Process utilizes Boehm's (1983) "spiral" model. This
consists of a series of repeating stages of iteration, where updates are made to an operational
prototype of the final system. In Figure 6.8, the sections are delineated by gray boxes to indicate
that these encompass the necessarily iterative stages of design and require human-in-the-loop
testing. It is recognized that in order to effectively design, document and evaluate early revisions
of a system, it may be necessary to create and evaluate prototypes in a manner consistent with the
spiral model. The reverse arrows shown in Figure 6.8 show the manner in which "downstream"
events can impact earlier stages and result in another iterative cycle. Determining when to iterate
is dependent on the size of the system. Simple systems may be able to be validated by inspection,
whereas more sophisticated systems may require full simulations in order to determine their
effectiveness.
By explicitly requiring the creation of the Automation Model early in the design process, the
model can be examined, prototyped, and evaluated by human factors experts early in the design
cycle. By specifying the Automation Model it is also possible to gain some objective measures of
the new automation during the iterative stages. The model defines a specification for interaction
between the pilot and the automation which can be evaluated using part task or inexpensive
simulators. The automation can also be examined by training personnel to assess difficulties
which may arise during instruction. Using this early feedback, decisions to change the system
behaviour can be made while they are much less expensive (Tognazzini, 1992).
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The other important difference is that the flow of requirements is always from the automation
model to both the training representation and software specification. This is intended to prevent
software implementation problems from becoming documentation details in the reverse flow. By
generating the specifications and software from training material, an explicit constraint is
developed which can serve to guide system development. In the event that the specification
cannot be made to reflect the training material accurately for technical reasons, the model for the
operator must be amended. This change must be evaluated in the context of, and reflected in the
training material and procedural design. At this point, changes to the software specification must
be rederived.
Design Model
In order to be formulated in a manner which can constrain system complexity for the human
operator, the Automation Model is likely to be insufficiently complete to specify the entire
system. The Automation Model may be an inappropriate model, or in an unsuitable form for
design. Research is underway (Feary 1999) which examines the different representations used by
engineers and by pilots. It appears clear that a comprehensive model, such as the Hybrid
Automation Representation or related models by other researchers, fall into the previous category.
By contrast, pilots tend to have a more anthropomorphic view of the automation as an additional
crew member.
As such, the Automation Model is necessarily a subset of Design Model, which augments the
Automation Model with necessary implementation details. Typically, the Design Model will
become the basis of the full software specification and the interface control document which are
used to further augment system details. When creating the Design model, those elements of
system behaviour which require clarification are considered in the context of Automation Model.
If implementation details results in technical limitations, the solutions must be evaluated in the
context of, and may require modifications to, the Automation Model. As an example, any
modification which reduces the consistency of the Automation Model will immediately increase
the complexity and size of the model and negatively impact the training material. Having access
to the Automation Model and training material allows the evaluation of the modification in the
context of both the human operator in addition to the engineering and software rework.
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6.3.6 Training Material
One of the concerns is that any complex engineering model may not be an appropriate
representation for pilots. To overcome this issue, the ODP process derives training material based
on the automation model. This derivation assures that the proposed automation system can be
presented in a form amenable to training. The training material description of the system can then
be presented to pilots for feedback.
In designing this process, few limitations have been placed on the form or content of the
training material. Rather than attempting to prescriptively specify the form, structure, or nature of
the training material, the goal is to explicitly require the consideration of the specifics of
knowledge transfer to the pilot. Domain-specific training experts are likely to have an
understanding of the appropriate material and how it should be presented. For some applications
the presentation of a structural model of the system may be sufficient training. For others, a
detailed explanation of how the system is to be used procedurally in various operational scenarios
may be more appropriate (Sherry 1999, Leveson 1998). It is likely that cockpit automation is in
the latter grouping. As such, the development of training material will also include the
development of procedures for both nominal and non-nominal scenarios.
Training Defines System
A consideration during the design of training material is to realize that the training material
proscribes how to use automation and forces particular types of interaction (Orr, 1996). Training
is a device which is constructed to convey information to the operator. The choice of what to
include and what to exclude from this device can seriously impact the nature of interaction with
automation. In Orr's work with photocopier technicians "directive documentation" was supplied:
a service manual which is designed to instruct the technician during the development of diagnosis
and repair. Directive documentation is an outgrowth of the scientific management tradition of
rationalizing the work process (Orr, 1996) by reducing the job to a set of instructions which can
be performed with minimal knowledge. In addition, the documentation designer's projection of
what tasks they technicians are expected to perform is severely constrained. The first constraint is
in the information made available by the engineers to those designing the documentation and the
second is the policies implicit in the company about which tasks are appropriate to be done by
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technicians. The response of technicians is to attempt to understand the rationale behind the
documentation to gain more insight into the system. By doing so, experienced technicians are
capable of solving the problems that were unanticipated during the documentation design.
Extending this concern to the flight environment, the training material defines the system
which the pilots interact through the choices of information which are included and those which
are excluded. These decisions are made prior to operational usage, and may marginalize the
information useful during operation, due to documentation designers not having the appropriate
operational insights. In addition, pilots need to be capable of solving unanticipated problems
although the capability to explore and understand aviation automation is constrained by its safety
critical nature.
Procedure Design
Procedures are used to define a rigorous pattern of interaction with the automation designed to
maximize flight safety and efficiency. The fact that procedures define much of the nominal
operational usage of the aircraft automation makes them a critical segment during automation
development. In a highly proceduralized environment, such as aviation or medicine, the design of
training material and the design of procedures to maximize the utility of the system must be done
simultaneously. From a simplified standpoint, the procedures define how the automation will be
used, especially nominally, during operations operationally. As such, the procedures define a
segment of the necessary training material.
In some sense, the relationship between procedures and training is analogous to the
relationship between a forward and reverse model. These terms, coined by Norman (1988), refer
to differing ways of approaching automation. A forward model is the one typically used by
engineers: "If I'm in this state, what does the system do?" By contrast, a reverse model is required
by pilots during operation: "I want to do this, how do I get in the state to do it?" Forward models
are used in most training material, as they can lay the basis for generating answers to reverse
model queries. However, in most systems there are multiple approaches to completing a task.
Procedures are designed to specify the appropriate approach based on multiple criteria. As such,
procedures generate and populate the reverse model and answer the question of "How do I do
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this" in a more specific way: "The appropriate way to do this is..." This duality between
procedures and training makes their simultaneous development critical.
Care must be taken during procedure design because the experiential interaction will augment
and modify the mental representation of the pilot. This modification will take place through the
mechanisms described in Section 5.2, where pilots representations are simplified to fit an
experientially-based model. Since nominal operational procedures will be used regularly, their
associated mental representation will be highly accurate-or at least highly populated. If the
automation behavior during these procedures is inconsistent with more rarely used modes,
confusion may arise in non-nominal operations.
The final concern is that procedural design is typically considered an operational concern
rather than an design engineering concern. In order to maximize the usage of automation and its
understanding, operational insights must be used in the design of procedures. Without this insight,
the automation, while fully capable, may be mismatched to the procedures which are necessary in
flight. A concern is that the majority of procedures are currently designed by the end customer of
aircraft: the airlines. At this stage of development, the design of automation is complete and is
incapable of being modified in order to integrate tightly with procedural philosophies and
guidelines. However, the growth of computer power may result in flight automation which can be
modified on an airline by airline basis in order to allow tight coupling between automation,
training, and the design of procedures.
6.3.7 Certification
The current aircraft certification processes were originally designed for the mechanical and
electrical aspects of aircraft airframes. This approach has been successful, as shown by the
reduction in airframe-related incidents in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.4. Unfortunately, it does not
appear that the approach is as effective in the fields of software design or human factors, likely
due to their implicit complexity. The human factors aspects of certification have been recognized
as being inadequate:
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Current standards for type certification and operations have not kept pace with
changes in technology and increased knowledge about human performance. For
example, flightcrew workload is the major human performance consideration in
existing Part 25 regulations; other factors should be evaluated as well, including
the potential for designs to induce human error and reduce flightcrew situation
awareness. (FAA, 1996)
Currently, certification authorities do not have the means or criteria available to require
aircraft designers to create systems which address human factors issues. With the exception
(noted above) of workload issues, certification authorities do not have the means to conduct an
evaluation of human factors issues early in design. This has resulted in the evaluation of aircraft
flight decks being conducted during flight tests when a design is nearly finalized at the end of the
development cycle. At this stage, changes are both expensive and difficult to make.
After design is completed, flight testing is also able to consider human factors issue.
However, if problems are found at this stage, it is again too expensive to change the automation,
and procedures are often designed to compensate. By imposing a process-oriented solution, it
may be possible to minimize the use of procedures in fixing design vulnerabilities.
Current Software Certification Practice
The widespread use of digital avionics has resulted in the need to certify software. This is also
a difficult problem, both due to the inherent complexity involved in the creation of large software
systems and the difficulty in attempting to quantify its accuracy. The current means to certify
these larger systems has been to impose a specific process and set of documentation during
development. The document entitled "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and
Equipment Certification" (DO-178B) (RTCA, 1992) specifies a traceable process of software
development designed to prevent errors in software. The basic approach is to carefully specify the
functions required of the software and to document the stages of translation from high-level
specification down to object code. Regular code reviews are also incorporated into the process
with the premise that errors in the software will not survive the scrutiny of multiple reviewers.
Note, however, that the review is not designed to be done by the certification authority
directly. Instead, the certification authority verifies that the process has been put in active and
effective usage and relies on the process to generate accurate and error-free software. In a similar
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manner, it is suggested that the Operator Directed Process could be used as a process-based
mechanism to drive the explicit consideration of human factors issues early in system design.
A major departure of the ODP from existing development process involves the manner in
which certification is undertaken. Rather than solely certifying that the software conforms to its
specifications, as is done in DO-178B, in the Operator Directed process the final system is
compared to the original model and training material created for operators. By doing so, the levels
of interpretation and translation which have been traversed in order to design the system can be
determined to be appropriate.
Additionally certifying to a known automation model may also have advantages in identifying
the exceptional cases. Since the automation model is constrained to a simple form, exceptional
behaviours and modes are likely to be highlighted. Examples include non-nominal or rarely used
modes or automation failure modes. Examining these cases may allow certification officials to
focus on the more problematic issues, similar to the methodology described in Section 5.2 of this
thesis. Similarly, the training material can be examined for consistency with the system
instantiation.
6.3.8 Configuration Management
The concerns outlined above are focused in type certification of aircraft and components. This
refers to the certification of initial equipment from the primary manufacturer. A secondary
concern is that changes made to the system need to be approved as "Supplementary Type
Certificate" (STC). Any individual or company can apply to modify an existing type-certified
airplane through the STC process, but may not be aware of the design decisions made by the
original manufacturer. The "philosophy" of the flight deck, the operating assumptions, and other
consistencies designed into the system are not currently documented as part of the certification
process, and so cannot be considered during the STC process. As such, it is possible for approval
of a flight deck modification which is not consistent with the original manufacturer's design. This
lack of "rationale capture" is a concern in current aircraft and certification processes. The basis
for design decisions is not documented during development, nor is it required by certification.
This lack of documentation makes it difficult for inconsistencies to be discovered and evaluated
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by regulatory agencies, and for the underlying basis for design to be used when upgrades and
changes are made to these systems. If the Automation Model can be captured during initial design
and made explicit to parties who modify aircraft, it may be possible to maintain more consistent
systems through the life cycle of the systems (Littman, 1987).
6.3.9 Experimental Evaluation of ODP
While a controlled comparison of the ODP to a conventional development process was not
undertaken, an opportunity arose to take advantage of the process early in design. Usability can be
measured through multiple means, including rapid automation training and adoption rates. In
order evaluate the efficacy of the ODP in improving device performance, a planned software
development project was identified upon which to test the process. This project was chosen based
on availability and access to the planned and ongoing development effort. Full results of this
experiment, shown in Appendix G, demonstrated rapid acceptance and minimal training in the
new system and high user satisfaction. While this does not constitute a controlled experiment
comparing the ODP with a conventional development process, the results are still compelling.
Additionally, several lessons were learned during this experiment. The first was that the
automation model was the critical element in the process. Training material was not as critical as
expected, at least with a small system, and documentation was left until the final stages of design.
It was also found that a designer model, which was an augmentation to the automation model was
required in order to deal with each possible situation and behaviour the system was capable of
undertaking. The automation model or training material proved to be insufficient for
implementation or even specification.
The waterfall model of development, shown in Figure 6.7 was found to model the
development process much more poorly than the iterative model shown in Figure 6.8. The spiral
iterative model lent itself to both incremental software development and incremental evaluation.
Each of these were required to allow regular human in the loop testing during design and
development. This process was necessary at each incremental system update during development
and so is explicitly identified in the process shown in Figure 6.8.
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6.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has considered approaches that have been, and can be, used to manage the
complexity of aircraft automation systems. This breaks down into three approaches. The first is to
change training and procedures in order to modify pilot behaviour in situations which are known
to be problematic. These changes can be effected very quickly and inexpensively, and can be
based on the approaches already used by pilots to control complexity. Several procedural changes
were presented, and some approaches for training changes were considered.
The second approach was to examine and augment the feedback and interface in the cockpit.
This can allow the system to become more observable and tractable, thereby reducing the
likelihood of errors caused by confusion as to the behaviour of the automation. An evaluation of
mode awareness problems resulted in the design and evaluation of the Electronic Vertical
Situation Display. The results of the evaluation were that the EVSD had a significant impact in
mode awareness problems where the vertical feedback required augmentation. Obviously the cost
and retraining required by the addition of new displays is significantly higher than for procedural
modifications.
The third approach was to consider a new development process for automation with which
humans interact. The Operator Directed Process was put forward as an approach which allowed
the explicit consideration of the human operator early in the development process. This
consideration of human operators can serve to limit system complexity by acknowledging human
capabilities. It is hypothesized that this could lead to improvements in safety through more
accurate certification, and increased usability through reduced training time, improved
performance and predictability.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
There are three primary conclusions to this work. The first is that is has been shown that
systems are growing more complex and are doing so in the absence of a consistent global model.
Furthermore, as these systems grow, humans may become the limiting factor as the operators
become less able to deal with the burgeoning complexity. The third is that humans' limitations
should be acknowledged early in the design, through mechanisms such as the Operator Directed
Process, to guide development. However, it remains to be seen if an approach of this sort will be
adopted.
The development of aircraft automation is a testament to the engineering and designers
capability of making highly complex systems. This thesis has considered the development of
aircraft autoflight systems evolution from multiple perspectives. This evolutionary growth of
these systems has been documented along multiple axis: number of displays, number of modes,
size of software and others. In most situations, this complexity is only an issue during design and
maintenance rather than during operation. However, if the software is to be interacted with in a
life- and time-critical situation, such as in aerospace, a mechanism needs to be put in place in
order to constrain the complexity of the resultant system. Without such a mechanism, the software
will grow in complexity to the point where it becomes a liability for operational use.
The approaches that can be used to manage complexity are all based, at some level, on making
assumptions based on a consistent set of behaviours. Unfortunately, it does not appear that there is
a consistent global model of automation to exploit in order to allow reductions in system
complexity. The lack of such a model may result in the complexity management techniques
affecting a loss of understanding of the system. As such, it is felt that the unconstrained growth of
these systems may be contributing to the autoflight system safety concerns that are emerging in
modem aircraft.
As a related note, those issues which are appearing in aircraft may be the leading edge of
problems in other environments. In some sense, aircraft are among the best places for these
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automation issues to appear, since the industry has access to the resources to deal with the
problems through training and system redesign. The heavy regulation in aerospace also allows the
imposition of new procedures to work around problem. Contrast this with the automobile industry
where the training of operators (i.e., drivers) is negligible. In addition, the regulation of the
behaviour of the individual driver is largely non-existent. The only mechanism which can be used
by automobile manufacturers is to publicize recall notifications and wait for owners to voluntarily
have the systems fixed. Unless some of these automation issues are dealt with in scenarios where
significant resources can be brought to bear, they are unlikely to be fixed in situations where
resources are more constrained. It is important to consider these issues now, before a wider
population becomes subjected to these problems of complexity.
One of the goals of this thesis was to examine the complexity of autoflight systems and, in
particular, of transitions between modes. The fact that no consistent global model of autoflight
systems was found resulted in the creation of the Hybrid Automation Representation (HAR). The
HAR serves to segment the system in a manner that appears to be somewhat consistent with the
viewpoints of both the pilots and the engineers. However, the underlying concern, the lack of a
consistent global model, still exists-the necessity of creating the HAR underscores this issue. In
addition, the HAR is an inappropriate representation for pilots. It is based on the existing
automation architecture and becomes ungainly when attempting to describe complex interactions.
Within the framework of the Hybrid Automation Representation, it was shown that
cyclomatic complexity could be extended to apply to autoflight mode transitions. This allowed
the analysis of transitions using cyclomatic complexity. A survey of pilots showed that there was
a relationship between the cyclomatic complexity and those mode transitions which they felt to be
most complex. While not exhaustive or conclusive, the results from the survey shows two
relevant relationships. The first is that mode transitions which were identified by pilots had a
higher cyclomatic complexity than the average of a large set of modes. In addition, pairwise
comparison results demonstrated that pilots found that mode transitions with higher cyclomatic
complexity were more complicated that those with lower cyclomatic complexity.
Based on these results, designs which have higher cyclomatic complexity-more transitions
and sections-are hypothesized to be more difficult to monitor and have behaviour which is less
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predictable. This implies that pilots may need to be the constraint on the size and complexity of
autoflight systems. One of the future areas that may be explored as a continuation of this work is
to determine which elements of system design are most critical for pilots' understanding and
ability to monitor. If the ability to monitor decreases precipitously after a certain number of
modes, there may be hard limit on the number of modes which can be used in autoflight systems.
If the number of transitions, or number of a specific type, is found to be a limiting factor,
designers can use that information to develop more tractable systems.
This is not meant to imply the cyclomatic complexity or mode count can or should be used as
the sole means to characterize the complexity of systems. Other measures may also exist which
are more appropriate. Rather they are tools which can be used to call attention to transitions which
may cause confusion. There are certainly other characteristics, including feedback, mental
models, and training, which can serve to alleviate or exacerbate the perceived complexity of
autoflight systems. In fact, there is a critical need to continue research to investigate other
elements which contribute to the perceived complexity of systems.
As a leading indicator for supervisory automation, it appears that aerospace is currently
nearing a point where the system will become too complex for humans to effectively monitor and
utilize. This needs to be dealt with before the next generation of aircraft is designed. It is
anticipated that considering the human early in the development cycle will become increasingly
critical as autoflight systems gain in complexity and autonomy. The Operator Directed Process
has been explored in this work as one approach to allow early consideration of the operator. This
process showed promise in a preliminary utilization. Unfortunately, approaches which consider
the human early in the process have not been widely adopted. It remains to be seen if the
problems which have been appearing will spur this adoption, or whether it may be required
through a regulatory body.
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Appendix A
Known Accidents / Incidents and Automation Concerns
Table A. 1 is a partial list of incidents and accidents which are suspected to have automation as
a contributory factor. Accidents are defined as occurrences associated with the operation of
aircraft that result in: a person being fatally or seriously injured; the aircraft sustaining damage or
structural failure that adversely affects the structural strength performance, or flight
characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require major repair or replacement of the
affected component; the aircraft becoming missing or completely inaccessible. Incidents are
occurrences, other than accidents, associated with the operation of aircraft that affect or could
affect the safety of operation (FAA, 1996).
While the table lists the multiple aircraft types which are affected by this concern, the majority
of incidents are in more recent aircraft with advanced cockpit automation. Multiple airframe and,
though less apparent avionics manufacturers appear in the set of accidents. The Airbus A320 and
the Boeing B757/767 are among the latest generation of aircraft and figure prominently in
Table A. 1. Incidents involving automation also appear to be more numerous in recent years. This
can be partially attributed to the growing population of modern aircraft in service while older
aircraft become retired.
It has also been conjectured that the causal factors underlying the human errors have changed.
An example of previously observed error is a stall accidents, such as those on the B707, suspected
to have been caused in part by poor handling characteristics. Recent incidents appear to have the
automation contributing to the error. As an example, consider the A320 accident at Bangalore
where the inappropriate use of an automation segment led to a loss of airspeed and ultimately the
crash.
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Table A.1:
Date
Examples
Interfaces
Location
of Incidents and Accidents (adapted from the FAA Report on The
Between Flightcrews and Modem Flight Deck Systems)
Aircraft
Type
Operator Description
7/31/73 Boston DC-9-31 Delta Air Flightcrew was preoccupied with questionable information
Lines presented by the flight director. Fatal crash.
2/28/84 New York DC- 10-30 Scandinavian Malfunctioning autothrottle; airplane overran runway, minor
Airlines injuries
2/19/85 San Francisco B747SP China Autopilot masked approaching onset of loss of control after
Airlines loss of power on one engine. Airplane went into unusual
attitude high speed dive, but was successfully recovered.
6/26/88 Habsheim A320 Air France Low, slow flyover at air show. Possible overconfidence in
the envelope protection features of the A320. Fatal crash.
7/3/88 Gatwick A320 unknown Intended for 3 degree flight path; inadvertently in vertical
speed mode, almost landed 3 miles short.
6/8/89 Boston B767 unknown Airplane overshot the localizer; confusion led to vertical
speed mode commanding an 1 800 fpm rate of descent. Go-
around from about 500 feet.
2/14/90 Bangalore A320 Indian Inappropriate use of open descent mode. Fatal crash.
Airlines
6/90 San Diego A320 unknown Pilot mistakenly set vertical speed of 3 000 fpm instead of
3.0* flight path. Error was caught after serious altitude
deviation.
2/11/91 Moscow A310 Interflug Pilot intervention in autopilot coupled go-around resulted in
airplane badly out of trim and several extreme pitch
oscillations before regaining control.
1/20/92 Strasbourg A320 Air Inter Flightcrew inadvertently selected 3 300 fpm descent rate
instead of 3.3* flight path. Fatal crash.
9/13/93 Tahiti B747-400 Air France The flightcrew lost directional control of the airplane as the
speed decreased and the airplane went off the right side of
the runway due to autothrottle confusion
9/14/93 Warsaw A320 Lufthansa After touchdown, the air/ground logic delayed deployment
of ground spoilers and reversers. Airplane overran runway.
Two fatalities.
4/26/94 Nagoya A300-600 China Flightcrew inadvertently activated the go-around which led
Airlines to a stall. Fatal crash.
6/21/94 Manchester B757-200 Britannia Altitude capture mode activated shortly after takeoff,
airspeed dropped toward V 2 before flightcrew pitched the
nose down to recover.
6/30/94 Toulouse A330 Airbus Unexpected mode transition to altitude acquire mode during
a simulated engine failure. Fatal crash.
9/24/94 Paris - Orly A310-300 Tarom Overshoot of flap placard speed during approach caused a
mode transition to flight level change. Airplane stalled, but
was recovered.
12/20/95 Cali B757-200 American Confusing database information led to incorrect waypoint
Airlines target with a collision course with a mountain. Fatal crash.
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Appendix B
Predictability and Measures of Modal Structures
One of the key concerns for the design of future aircraft automation systems and retrofits/
modifications to existing systems is to establish a metric to evaluate designs. Previous research
has focused on identification of the elements of automation (mode structure, consistency,
command languages and others) which may lead to faulty human-automation interactions. These
approaches require the complex system to have underlying structure in an available and
communicable form. The incremental development of automation in aircraft has created a system
with limited structure. This section will present a more easily testable "end-to-end" metric which
can be used independent of structural knowledge. The concept of predictability is presented as a
candidate metric of the complexity of automation and is defined as a measure of how well an
operator can anticipate what the system will do at some point in the future. In essence, this is a
measure of the complement of how often a system will "surprise" an operator by acting in an
unanticipated manner.
B.1 Existing Measures
Various metrics were drawn from the human factors community, the psychology community
and the software design community to evaluate of complex automated systems. A great deal of
research has centered on the operator's internal representation (mental model) of the automation
(Morris 1987, Johnson-Laird 1988). Unfortunately, this representation tends to be dynamic,
implicit and uncertain, leading to difficulty in extracting the model in a systematic and
reproducible manner for examination. More recent work has examined the automation to
understand how mode structure and consistency affect complexity (Sarter 1994). These
techniques examine the number of inconsistencies in the underlying structure of the automation to
measure system complexity. Lexical analysis of command languages (Riley 1995) has been
completed on various complex systems. The required number of nouns, verbs, modifiers and
lexical combination mechanisms could be used as a metric of system complexity. Rouse has used
hierarchical decomposition to measure the size of layers and number of branches in well
structured systems (Rouse, 1986). These metrics could be used as an a priori measure of system
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complexity. Finally, graphical measures of software complexity based on McCabe's measure
have been used to determine the number of non-reducible flowchart elements (McCabe, 1976).
There are two problems common to the metrics discussed above. The first is that many of
these metrics measure system complexity independent of the operator interface. Since this
interface can have a detrimental or a beneficial effect on operator performance, and, hence, on
perceived complexity, it must somehow be included in a candidate metric. The second problem is
that many of the metrics depend on knowledge of the underlying model of the automation, and on
the model being well structured. In the particular case of aircraft automation, a global model is
never presented to the operator through the training material, so any candidate metric of its
complexity must be insensitive to this absence.
B.2 Predictability
In contrast predictability may provide a more easily testable "end-to-end" metric which can be
used independent of the knowledge of the underlying structure. The concept of predictability is
defined as a measure of how well an operator can anticipate what the system will do at some point
in the future. In essence, this is a measure of the complement of how often a system will
"surprise" an operator by acting in an unanticipated manner. This metric is completely
independent of an underlying structure to the automation, and may be applicable when this
structure does not exist or is not available.
There are two distinct components postulated to contribute to the predictability of a system -
one related to the operator and one to the automation itself. The former is determined by how well
the operator can predict the output of the automation given the observable information. This
component is directly related to the training, competency and experience of the operator.
The latter, automation behaviour, determines how predictable the system would be with an
operator capable of perfectly interpreting the sensors and acting on them in an optimal manner. In
one sense, this is a measure of the intrinsic observability of the underlying system when it is
filtered through the interface of the automation, an idea related to Norman's "Gulf of Evaluation"
(Norman 1989). Behaviour of the automation which is non-observable, or ambiguous, may reduce
predictability even with a perfect operator.
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In addition, it is hoped that predictability could be used in the capacity of both an a priori and
a posteriori design evaluation. In an a priori evaluation, predictability will enable designers to
determine the predictability of paper designs and assess the impact of design decisions on specific
elements of the automation. Once the design has been implemented, predictability will provide a
means of measurement of the new or existing system to determine problematic regions and to
provide insight for operator training.
B.2.1 Experimental Evaluation of Predictability
In order to evaluate this metric, a small, manageable experiment was performed comparing
the predictability of two standard types of calculators. The first type was a "Four Function" (FF)
calculator. These are the standard and ubiquitous calculators that have the four simple operators
- x, /), and an equals (=) key, and accept calculations in the "in-fix" form: "3 + 5 =."
Unfortunately, these calculators also have some "implicit" functionality and are designed to
assume arguments in situations where the user does not explicitly state them, thereby ideally
anticipating and correcting for user error. This behaviour is hypothesized to reduce predictability.
The second type of calculator was a stack based "Reverse Polish Notation" (RPN) calculator,
used primarily in the engineering world. These require more training, but have a very consistent
set of responses to calculations in the form "3 Enter 5 +." This consistency is gained by requiring
the user to format the calculation in a very specific manner.
The experimental design consisted of having subjects predict the calculator response to an
exhaustive set of four keystroke sequences and evaluating their prediction accuracy based on the
number of correct responses predicted. Subjects consisted of graduate students in science and
engineering. To reduce the size of the experiment, a reduced set of calculator keys was used.
Extraneous keys, such as Clear Entry and the decimal marker were not introduced. To maintain
similar levels of calculation complexity, RPN calculators were limited to only two levels of stack.
In addition, the calculator was assumed to be cleared between sets of keystrokes. Subjects were
only tested on the calculator type with which they were most familiar, and were not permitted to
use a calculator to determine the response. Examples of keystroke sequences are listed in
Table B. 1. Note that many of these keystrokes are nonsensical and would not appear in regular
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calculator usage. By exhaustively testing the "keystroke-space" of each type of calculator
abnormal and rare situations were tested in addition to those with which users are familiar.
Table B. 1: Example Keystroke Sequences
Four Function RPN
===8 4XEE
X=3- 1EE6
5+3- 236E
X-8/ -5X3
B.2.2 Experimental Results
A total of 22 subjects were tested, 11 RPN users and 11 Four Function users. Even with this
small subject set, the mean correct response rate was found to be higher for RPN users (89.8%)
than for Four Function users (80.7%) at a 95% confidence level. To ascertain whether
mathematical aptitude was a factor in the difference, subject math SAT scores were analyzed. No
significant differences were found.
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Figure B.1: Four Function Calculator Response Profile
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Figure B.2: RPN Calculator Response Profile
More interesting than the simple accuracy of subject responses was the element of regularity
in errors that were made. Specific keystroke sequences caused difficulty for a majority of
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subjects. Figure B. 1 and Figure B.2show the correct response rate of subjects to each of the
keystroke sequences posed. Note that certain sequences, namely 21, 57 and 74 in the Four
Function set and 9, 37 and 52 in the RPN set have very few correct responses. The keystroke
sequences in each of these cases are detailed in Table B.2, along with the correct answers. While
these answers are not obvious from the standpoint of using a calculator, they appear more obvious
in the context of the underlying structure of the calculator.
Table B.2: Error Prone Keystroke Sequences
Four Function RPN
-6/= [-1] 6E-E [6]
-3 X -[-3] 4X E E [4]
4X==[64] 1XE/[1]
In analyzing these errors, three separate causes were tentatively identified: implicit
arguments, operator overloading and error management.
Implicit arguments have already been identified as one of the elements of a Four Function
calculator that lead to lower predictability. Sequences such as "3 0 + =," where the calculator
would assume a second argument of "0" for a response of "30" caused common errors. Similar
situations where a first argument was neglected, "/ 2 0 =," where a zero (or sometimes a one) was
assumed to be the first argument causing a response of "0" were also problematic.
Operator overloading consisted of situations where additional operators were added at odd
times: "9 X - =." In this situation, the subtract overrides the multiplication, and causes the
calculator to assume that "9 - 0 =" was the intended calculation, leading to a result of "9."
Error management was the single largest error on the RPN calculators. Users were often not
clear what an error-inducing keystroke would do to the rest of operands already in the calculator.
In practice, the keystroke following an induced error would clear the error and be executed. No
"Clear Error" mechanism was necessary. Keystrokes such as "6 E - E," which caused an error part
way through would have the error cleared by the later keystrokes.
In summary, RPN calculators were shown to be statistically more predictable than Four
Function calculators. Attributes that lead to loss of predictability included implicit functionality
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and poorly defined behaviour: operator overload on Four Function, and error management on
RPN.
B.2.3 Mode Transition Diagram Representations
The preceding results discuss the use of predictability in an a posteriori evaluation of the
selected calculators. In addition, a mode transition diagram analysis was done of the calculators in
an attempt to capture their underlying structure and functionality. In these diagrams, individual
modes are named A-D. Associated with each mode is the state of the calculator. Transition
criteria consist of the keystrokes which are typed into the keypad. These are shown are shown on
the arrows between the modes, with particularly problematic transitions called out in grey.
Figure B.3 shows the mode transition diagram empirically derived for the Four Function
calculator. The Four Function calculator requires three elements in order to do a calculation: two
arguments and an operator. Starting in Mode A, the user is expected to enter the first argument
(ArgI). This argument is modified in Mode B until an Operator keystroke is pressed, leading to
Mode C. At this point, the calculator expects another number to define Arg2. Once Arg2 has been
entered and modified (Mode D), user presses the "=" key to finish the calculation, placing the
result in Arg1 and leaving Arg2 untouched.
Figure B.3: Four Function Calculator Mode Transition Diagram
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As shown in Figure B.4, the RPN calculator is similar in requiring two arguments and an
operator, but the ordering is different. Starting in Mode A, the user is expected to enter Argi, and
continue to modify it in Mode B. When complete, the user presses the "Enter" key and continues
to Mode C. In a similar manner, the user enters and modifies Arg2 in Mode C and D. The
Operator is only entered after both arguments have been completed, and sends the system back to
Mode C, with the answer to the calculation placed into Argi and Arg2 is deleted.
E
Er Mode A Mode B Number
No Arg1 Number Modify Arg1Operator No Ar2 No Arg2
Er No Operator No Operator
E Operator
E Operator
Mode D Mode C Operator
Arq1on Stack Ar 1on Stack
Number Modify Arg2 E No Arg2 rr
No Operator Operator
Number
Figure B.4: RPN Calculator Mode Transition Diagram
Note that the Four Function calculator diagram shown in Figure B.3 does not identify the
events that occur on transitions, but only the keystrokes which lead to particular transitions. The
transitions exhibiting implicit functionality show up as situations in which the calculator does not
have enough information from the user to make a calculation, and so assumes an implicit value of
zero (or sometimes one). Operator overloading occurs in the Mode C, where a user can overwrite
the current operator by simply entering a new one. As an example, entering "5 + - 3 =" results in a
response of "2" rather than "8."
The RPN calculator mode diagram has a significantly more linear structure, with specific
entries expected to move to the next mode. Errors occur when an unexpected input is received,
such as a number when an operator was expected. These transitions are problematic because the
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response of the calculator to this error varies between treating the keystroke as an "Enter" (Modes
B to C), or by not transitioning at all (Modes A and C).
B.2.4 Implications for Flight Automation
In order to evaluate complex systems (such as aircraft Flight Management Systems) a metric
which is capable of evaluation independent of the knowledge of the underlying structure is
needed. The calculator predictability experiment has shown that this metric may have promise in
fulfilling this need. In addition, with appropriate extensions, automation elements which can lead
to poor predictability situations may be able to be identified before a system is fully implemented.
Even more interesting is that the areas of difficulty observed with the calculator evaluation
have direct analogies in existing Flight Management Systems (FMS). In particular, multiple flight
systems in modem aircraft, including the Vertical Navigation (VNAV) system and the Mode
Control Panel (MCP) have a large number of implicit behaviours and arguments.
The VNAV system on many aircraft hides the criteria it uses for engagement of overspeed and
underspeed envelope protection modes from the operator, and generates these criteria based on
the current flight conditions. These criteria are seldom detailed in operators manuals. VNAV also
makes implicit, and often difficult to understand decisions when selecting the flight path.
The MCP has implicit limits when determining path capture criteria in transitioning from a
Vertical Speed mode to Altitude Hold. In many modem aircraft, this maneuver is designed to
maintain a 0.05G loading, to minimize passenger discomfort. In addition to being a non-intuitive
choice of criteria from an operational standpoint, the performance of this maneuver often utilizes
a mixture of simultaneous elevator and throttle control, further complicating the situation. The
MCP also has problems similar to the VNAV system relating to envelope protection modes. In
the 1994 incident in Orly, France, the MCP caused the aircraft to pitch up to acquire an implicit,
and incorrect, altitude target late in an approach. The MCP was designed to attempt to capture the
current programmed altitude in the event of a speed violation. In this incident, the crew had
programmed the target altitude above them, at the Missed Approach Altitude, during final
approach (as per operational guidelines). When the flaps were inadvertently lowered too early, the
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AutoFlight System detected an overspeed and pitched the aircraft up in an attempt to capture the
Missed Approach Altitude (Sparaco, 1994).
Error management is another weakness in current FMS. Most systems are ambiguous as to
which mode to reacquire after an envelope protection mode has been disengaged. A specific
example is that in order to maintain smooth flight near approach, once the Glide Slope has been
acquired by the aircraft AutoLand System many aircraft systems will maintain the most recently
acquired vertical speed in the event of the loss of signal. This is to prevent the aircraft from large
attitude corrections at low altitudes caused by an intermittent signal immediately after acquisition.
Unfortunately, in the event of an actual loss of signal, perhaps due to transmitter failure, the
aircraft will continue its descent with minimal additional feedback to the pilot.
B.2.5 Extensions of Predictability
In its current form predictability may be a very useful metric as a conceptual tool and for
testing of discrete event systems. However, the metric suffers from some limitations that will
have to be overcome before it can be used on more complex systems: no consequence or context
dependency, difficult to extend to continuous system, and difficulty in dealing with complex
systems.
The first limitation describes the problem that predictability does not attempt to measure how
important it is to accurately anticipate future events. Predicting where an aircraft will start a
descent is much more important at 200 ft than at 20 000 ft, as the consequences are significantly
different. The context independency of predictability makes it insensitive to the importance of
accuracy. This problem can be dealt with by using some sort of weighting criteria where an
experimenter creates the context dependency. Unfortunately, this will render the final analysis
directly dependent on the weighting and so is highly dependent on the experimenter. One way to
reduce this subjectivity would be to associate the weightings with existing operational or
procedural system elements.
The limitation of continuous space systems is more fundamental. One solution may be to
discretize the continuous state space in a manner consistent with the functional requirements of
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the task being evaluated. Alternately, varying discretizations may be tested before the final
evaluation.
Complex systems tend to break down under transition diagram analyses. A better may be to
treat the system as having discrete operator-identified modes. These modes would be treated as
very large, complex portions of the underlying modal structure. Since each operator-identified
mode is much larger and has wide ranging implications, accurate prediction of the important
implications of a operator-identified mode may be more important than simply predicting the
future individual modes. The calculator example discussed in this paper has the majority of the
information about its future behaviour stored in the current state, whereas an aircraft FMS has that
information stored partially in the current mode and partially in the state of the environment. The
experimental technique would have to be extended to capture the subjects' ability to predict both
the future operator-identified modes and the associated implications.
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Appendix C
Web-based Pilot Automation Complexity Survey
A survey was conducted to gain insight into those modes which pilots identify as complex in
current aircraft autoflight systems. The purpose of the survey was to gain insight into those mode
transitions which pilots self-identified as complex in order to examine characteristics common
across those modes. The survey was placed on the Internet and accessible through the World
Wide Web allowing pilots from around the world, and representing a varied cross-section of
aircraft types, to take part. Notification of contacts within the industry as well as pilot automation
mailing lists (notably the "Blue Coat Digest") provided access to a large quantity of subjects.
C.1 Demographic Results
A total of 105 pilots took part in the survey, with 93 valid results were generated from
multiple aircraft types, as listed in Table C. 1. Four military pilots and 89 commercial pilots
responded. Table C.2 shows that the majority of the results were from modern "glass-cockpit"
and transitional aircraft and from aircraft. Five female pilots and 84 male pilots responded; four
responses did not fill out the gender field. The average age of respondents was 43.
Table C.1:
Aircraft Type
Boeing B727
Boeing B737-100/-
Boeing B737-300/-
Boeing B737-600/
Boeing B747-400
Boeing B757/B767
Boeing B777
Airbus A300
Airbus A310
Airbus A320/330/3
Boeing MD-i l
Other
Breakdown of Responses by Aircraft Type (total n=93)
Number of Responses
1
200 3
400/-500 6
-700/-800 4
6
17
2
2
1
40 12
2
37
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Data regarding the flight hours is shown in Table C.2, and identifies the majority of
respondents being experienced aviators.
Table C.2:
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Standard Deviation
Flight Hours of Respondents (total n=93)
Total Flight Hours Hours in Current Type
10250 2039
27500 10000
150 26
5750 2064
Hours in 1999
584
2500
0
310
Hours in 1998
629
1 850
50
248
47 respondents identified themselves as having the rank of captain, 33 were first officers. A
small number (four) identified themselves as "Pilot In Command" (PIC). Additionally, eleven
respondents identified themselves as instructors. Note that these numbers do not total the number
of respondents, since individuals could have multiple positions.
C.2 Modes Identified by Respondents
Many mode transitions were identified by multiple pilots in this survey. Table C.3 show all of
the modes which were identified by respondents. Note that the majority of the identified
modes-70%-are in the vertical domain.
Table C.3:
Mode
Vertical Speed
Altitude Capture
FLCH
Altitude Hold
Heading Hold
LNAV
Approach
VNAV Path
Go Around
VNAV Path Desce
VNAV
ANY
Glideslope Capture
Transitions Identified by Respondents
Number of Time Identified
33
31
29
24
22
22
20
16
13
nt 12
10
7
7
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Table C.3:
Mode
VNAV Descent
Glideslope Track
VNAV Speed
VNAV Speed Desc
Localizer Track
Holding Fix
Localizer Capture
VNAV Climb
Autopilot OFF
Autopilot ON
CWS Climb
Runway
Speed
VOR Track
Transitions Identified by Respondents
Number of Time Identified
5
4
4
ent 4
3
2
2
2
1
1
Another manner in which to examine the data is to identify which modes appear most often as
the starting mode in a transition. This is an indication of which modes are most difficult to leave,
but is biased towards those modes which are used most commonly. As shown in Table C.4,
vertical modes dominated the starting modes.
Table C.4:
Starting Mode
FLCH
Vertical Speed
Altitude Hold
Heading Hold
VNAV Path
Approach
LNAV
VNAV
Altitude Capture
Go Around
VNAV Path Desce
ANY
VNAV Climb
Starting Modes Identified by Respondents
Number of Times Identified
20
18
17
17
13
11
7
7
6
5
nt 3
2
2
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Starting Modes Identified by Respondents
Starting Mode
VNAV Descent
Autopilot OFF
CWS Climb
Glideslope Capture
Glideslope Track
Holding Fix
Localizer Capture
Runway
Speed
VNAV Speed Descent
Number of Times Identified
Conversely, Table C.5 shows those modes in which transitions end. Not surprisingly, Altitude
Capture is identified the most often, since it is the mode through which one typically exists Flight
Level Change or Vertical Speed before transitions to Altitude Hold.
Table C.5: Ending Modes Identified by Respondents
Ending Mode
Altitude Capture
LNAV
Vertical Speed
Approach
FLCH
VNAV Path Descent
Go Around
Altitude Hold
Glideslope Capture
ANY
Heading Hold
VNAV Speed
Glideslope Track
Localizer Track
VNAV
VNAV Descent
VNAV Path
Number of Times Identified
25
15
15
9
9
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
3
3
3
3
3
Table C.4:
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Table C.5: Ending Modes Identified by Respondents
Ending Mode Number of Times Identified
VNAV Speed Descent 3
Autopilot ON 1
Holding Fix 1
Localizer Capture I
VOR Track 1
Finally, Table C.6 shows which transitions appeared with the greatest frequency in the survey.
Each of these were identified explicitly by pilots, or derived from their narrative.
Table C.6: Most Frequently Identified Transitions
Transition
FLCH -> Altitude Capture
Heading Hold -> LNAV
Vertical Speed -> Altitude Capture
Altitude Capture -> Vertical Speed
Approach -> Go Around
VNAV Path -> VNAV Path Descent
VNAV Path -> VNAV Speed
Altitude Hold -> Approach
Altitude Hold -> FLCH
Altitude Hold -> Vertical Speed
Approach -> ANY
Heading Hold -> Approach
LNAV -> Heading Hold
Vertical Speed -> FLCH
VNAV Path Descent -> VNAV Speed Descent
Altitude Hold -> Glideslope Capture
Altitude Hold -> Glideslope Track
FLCH -> Altitude Hold
FLCH -> Vertical Speed
Go Around -> LNAV
LNAV -> Approach
Vertical Speed -> Altitude Hold
Vertical Speed -> Vertical Speed
VNAV -> Altitude Capture
VNAV -> Altitude Hold
Number
12
10
7
6
6
5
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
Transition
FLCH -> FLCH
FLCH -> Glideslope Capture
FLCH -> VNAV
FLCH -> VNAV Path
Glideslope Capture -> Altitude Capture
Glideslope Track -> Go Around
Go Around -> ANY
Go Around -> FLCH
Go Around -> Go Around
Heading Hold -> Heading Hold
Heading Hold -> Localizer Capture
Heading Hold -> Localizer Track
Heading Hold -> VOR Track
Holding Fix -> LNAV
LNAV -> LNAV
LNAV -> Localizer Track
Localizer Capture -> Heading Hold
Runway -> LNAV
Speed -> ANY
Vertical Speed -> Glideslope Capture
Vertical Speed -> Glideslope Track
Vertical Speed -> VNAV Descent
Vertical Speed -> VNAV Path Descent
VNAV -> FLCH
VNAV -> Localizer Track
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Number
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Most Frequently Identified Transitions
Transition
Altitude Hold -> Holding Fix
Altitude Hold -> VNAV
Altitude Hold -> VNAV Descent
Altitude Hold -> VNAV Path Descent
ANY -> Altitude Capture
ANY -> VNAV Path Descent
Approach -> Approach
Approach -> Glideslope Capture
Autopilot OFF -> Autopilot ON
CWS Climb -> Altitude Capture
Number
I
1
1
1
1
Transition
VNAV -> VNAV
VNAV Climb -> Altitude Hold
VNAV Climb -> VNAV Path
VNAV Descent -> Vertical Speed
VNAV Descent -> VNAV Path
VNAV Path -> Altitude Capture
VNAV Path -> Glideslope Capture
VNAV Path -> Vertical Speed
VNAV Path -> VNAV Descent
VNAV Speed Descent -> VNAV Path Descent
C.2.1 Transition Analysis
The fully detailed analyses on each pilot identified transitions is shown in Table C.7,
Table C.8 and Table C.9. Table C. 10 and Table C. 11 show the "typical" transitions culled from
the B737-300 and B757 manuals for comparison.
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Table C.6:
Number
1
1
1
1
1
Table C.7: B737-3/4/5/6/7/800 Analyzed Transitions
Transition Report Cyclomatic Conditions Branches Terminal FCOM Description
complexity States reference
VNAV Path to VNAV 3 6 3 2 1 4.10.9 1. Aircraft departs planned descent
Speed (via ALT INV)
FLCH to VNAV Path
(speed reverts to
FMS)
Heading Select to
Approach
VNAV Path to V/S
V/S to FLCH
(overspeed)
ALT ACQ to V/S
VNAV Path to VNAV
Speed (via hdg sel)
ALT ACQ to V/S
Go Around to V/S
Speed reset to
instantaneous value
during ALT ACQ
V/S to FLCH
(overspeed)
VNAV to ALT
HOLD / Path
9 4
9 4
11
2
2
36
13 4
21 4
21 6
85 4
97 6
97 4
25
2
2
3
3
3
2
profile 2. All FMC Alt constraints
removed 3. HDG SEL engaged
0 2 4.10.5 1. Press FLCH button, new speed
is entered 2. Change speed target
manually
0 2 lookup in 1. Correct capture of LOC when in
-400 range 2. Incorrect capture based on
>90deg from approach vector
0 3 ???? 1. Press V/S button 2. Change Alt
in MCP 3. Select "Capture" on
FMC Descent Page (suspect
subject is confusing V/S and
VNAV Path)
0 2 4.20.21 1. Press FLCH button 2.
Overspeed envelope protection
0 2 4.10.7 1. Press V/S button 2. While in
ALT CAP, move Alt knob > 100ft
2 1 4.10.9 1. Aircraft departs planned descent
profile 2. All FMC Alt constraints
removed 3. HDG SEL engaged
0 1 4.10.7 1. Press V/S button 2. While in
ALT CAP, move Alt knob > 100ft
2 1 4.20.17 This is odd. Whenever we
transition into ALT ACQ, the
speed is captured at the
instantaneous value, which can be
problematic during a Go Around.
1. ALT ACQ engaged 2. Change
speed target manually
0 2 4.20.21 1. Press FLCH button 2.
Overspeed envelope protection
4.20.5 An inconsistency: when in VNAV
SPD climb, intersecting MCP
reverts to ALT HOLD, but in
Descent, goes to VNAV Path? (not
in manual)
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Table C.8: B757/767 Analyzed Transitions
Transition Report Cyclomatic Conditions Branches Terminal FCOM Description
complexity States reference
VNAV to ALT 43 7 4 0 3 07.10.05 1. Press ALT HOLD
HOLD
Speed in Mach to 43
Speed in IAS
TO to ALT HOLD (at 49
low alt): ALT CAP
resets Speed Target to
current value
VNAV Path to VNAV 51
Speed
TO to ALT HOLD (at 51
low alt): ALT CAP
resets Speed Target to
current value
A/P off to A/P on (A/
T armed to active)
VNAV Path to G/S 61
capture
VNAV PATH to ALT 71
CAP: ALT CAP
Speed Target resets
Speed Target
Speed in Mach to 71
Speed in IAS
CLMB/DES to ALT 79
CAP: ALT CAP
Speed Target resets
Speed Target
6
6
6
6
53 10
5
6
6
5
4
4
0 1
3
3
6 3
1
2
1
2
1
2
switch 2. Intercept MCP
target altitude 3. Pass
TOD with MCP alt >
cruise alt
07.10.02 1. Descent through 300
KIAS 2. Push IAS/Mach
switch (if in range) 3.
Switch to FLCH from
VNAV
07.10.02 1. Speed reset manually
2. Press FLCH while in
FLCH, reset to current
speed 3. Speed reset
when ALT CAP engaged
NONE 1. Manual Speed
intervention 2. Exceed
commanded speed 3.
Change crossing
restrictions to
unachievable value
07.10.02 1. Speed reset manually
2. Press FLCH while in
FLCH, reset to current
speed 3. Speed reset
when ALT CAP engaged
Engaged when AT modes
selected: EPR/SPD/
VNAV/FLCH/GA
07.10.05 Capture requires FMC
Alt below capture Alt,
MCP Alt below capture
alt, APP armed, LOC
captured
07.10.02 1. Speed reset manually
2. Press FLCH while in
FLCH, reset to current
speed 3. Speed reset
when ALT CAP engaged
07.10.02 1. Descent through 300
KIAS 2. Push IAS/Mach
switch (if in range) 3.
Switch to FLCH from
VNAV
07.10.02 1. Speed reset manually
2. Press FLCH while in
FLCH, reset to current
speed 3. Speed reset
when ALT CAP engaged
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B757/767 Analyzed Transitions
Transition Report Cyclomatic Conditions Branches Terminal FCOM Description
complexity States reference
TO to ALT HOLD (at 79
low alt): ALT CAP
resets Speed Target to
current value
VNAV to ALT 99
HOLD
G/A to APP 10
VNAV PATH to ALT 71
CAP: ALT CAP
Speed Target resets
Speed Target
Speed in Mach to
Speed in IAS
CLMB/DES to ALT
CAP: ALT CAP
Speed Target resets
Speed Target
TO to ALT HOLD (at
low alt): ALT CAP
resets Speed Target to
current value
VNAV to ALT
HOLD
6 3 1 2 07.10.02 1. Speed reset manually
7
1 5
6
4
4
3
71 6
79 6
79 6
99 7
0 3
0
1
2. Press FLCH while in
FLCH, reset to current
speed 3. Speed reset
when ALT CAP engaged
07.10.05 1. Press ALT HOLD
switch 2. Intercept MCP
target altitude 3. Pass
TOD with MCP alt >
cruise alt
None1
2
1
2
2
0 3
Disconnect A/P, cycle
both FD, reconnect A/P,
rearm APP
07.10.02 1. Speed reset manually
2. Press FLCH while in
FLCH, reset to current
speed 3. Speed reset
when ALT CAP engaged
07.10.02 1. Descent through 300
KIAS 2. Push IAS/Mach
switch (if in range) 3.
Switch to FLCH from
VNAV
07.10.02 1. Speed reset manually
2. Press FLCH while in
FLCH, reset to current
speed 3. Speed reset
when ALT CAP engaged
07.10.02 1. Speed reset manually
2. Press FLCH while in
FLCH, reset to current
speed 3. Speed reset
when ALT CAP engaged
07.10.05 1. Press ALT HOLD
switch 2. Intercept MCP
target altitude 3. Pass
TOD with MCP alt >
cruise alt
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Table C.8:
Table C.9: A320 Analyzed Transitions
Transition Report Cyclomatic Conditions Branches Terminal FCOM Description
complexity States reference
LNAV to Heading 39 6 3 1 2 None End of stored flight plan,
Hold route discontinuity leads
to heading hold, CC from
B757
ALT* to V/S 45 4 2 0 2 14-6 1. Press V/S button 2.
Move Alt knob
V/S to Open Climb 45 5 3 0 2 14-6 1. Press LVL CHG 2.
Underspeed condition
and FCU alt is above
aircraft
ALT* to V/S 77 4 2 0 2 14-6 1. Press V/S button 2.
Move Alt knob
ALT* to V/S 87 4 2 0 2 14-6 1. Press V/S button 2.
Move Alt knob
LOC CAP to Heading 87 14 7 5 2 14-8 RA>400ft A (1. Pressing
Select LOC 2. Pressing APPR 3.
HDG selected 4.
Disengage A/P 5. G/A
engaged) 6. Moving
Heading knob
ALT* to V/S 89 4 2 0 2 14-6 1. Press V/S button 2.
Move Alt knob
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Table C.10: B737-300 Typical Transitions
Transition To Cyclomatic Conditions Branches Terminal Description
From complexity States
LNAV LNAV 10 5 4 1
Heading Hold
VNAV off VNAV on 6
VNAV on
SPD/VNAV
Idle/VNAV
Manual
Throttle
Manual
Throttle
FLCH
LNAV
LNAV
V/S
LNAV
VNAV
VNAV
VNAV
VNAV
VNAV
Speed
VNAV off
Idle/VNAV
Throttle Hold/
VNAV
Speed
EPR
Alt Hold
Heading
Select
Heading Hold
Alt Hold
Localizer
V/S
Alt Hold
Speed
EPR
G/S
Speed
Go Around Go Around
Off ARM
3
2
2
2
3
3
5
2
2
5
3
2
9
2
2
3
6
4
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
4
2
3
2
discontinuity, end of later offset, last
waypt, waypt b/w runway and extended
ctrline, intercept leg/course to proc.
>400ft RA, MCP alt > current, press
button
press button
Cross t/d
headwind
Speed Switch AND A/T armed
EPR Switch AND A/T armed
1. Intercept MCP altitude 2. Press ALT
HOLD
Switch
Heading Hold Switch
1. Intercept MCP altitude 2. Press ALT
HOLD
Capture and LOC armed
Push switch
1. Press ALT HOLD switch 2. Intercept
MCP target altitude 3. Pass TOD with
MCP alt > cruise alt
press button
press button
Capture and G/S Cap armed
1. Speed reset manually 2. Press FLCH
while in FLCH, reset to current speed
G/S Cap or flap extension
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Table C. 11: B757 Typical Transitions
Transition To Cyclomatic Conditions Branches Terminal Description
From complexity States
Alt Hold V/S 4 2 1 1 Press V/S, Rotate knob while at MCP alt
Speed N1 5 3 1 1 Press NI while FLCH or VNAV engaged
NI Speed 5 3 1 1 Press Speed while FLCH or VNAV
engaged
VNAV Alt Hold 9 4 2 3 1. Press ALT HOLD switch 2. Intercept
MCP target altitude 3. Pass TOD with
MCP alt > cruise alt
VNAV V/S 6 3 2 1 Press Switch, or extend flaps, or Localizer
off
VNAV G/S 3 2 0 1 Capture Glide Slope and G/S Armed
V/S FLCH 4 2 1 1 Switch, or Overspeed
LNAV Hdg Sel 2 1 0 1 switch
LNAV Heading 2 1 0 1 Switch
Select
LNAV Localizer 3 2 0 1 Capture and LOC armed
G/A Armed G/A 2 1 0 1 TOGA switch
G/A eng Off 2 1 0 1 Touchdown (squat switch)
G/A Eng Alt Acq 2 1 0 1 Stabilize Trim ok for single A/P
Speed Speed 7 3 2 2 1. Speed reset manually 2. Press FLCH
while in FLCH, reset to current speed 3.
Speed reset when ALT CAP engaged
Alt Hold V/S 4 2 1 1 Press V/S, Rotate knob while at MCP alt
Speed NI 5 3 1 1 Press N 1 while FLCH or VNAV engaged
NI Speed 5 3 1 1 Press Speed while FLCH or VNAV
engaged
VNAV Alt Hold 9 4 2 3 1. Press ALT HOLD switch 2. Intercept
MCP target altitude 3. Pass TOD with
MCP alt > cruise alt
VNAV V/S 6 3 2 1 Press Switch, or extend flaps, or Localizer
off
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Appendix D
Web-based Pilot Automation Complexity Questionnaire
Mi sahsetts- lastlhute, of Yechnology,
Survey on Complexity
IT Ain
4PICAT Autoflight Systems
Figure D.1:
The International Center for Air Transportation (ICAT) at MIT is involved in an effort to understand complexity in
commercial aircraft. We are trying to understand those factors which make autoflight systems complex. The
input of commerical pilots with advanced autoflight system experience is very important in this process. Your
participation in this survey will make a valuable contribution, since we need the input of current glass cockpit
pilots to identify the areas of current designs which can be improved upon in future aircraft. It should take
approximately 20-30 minutes to complete this survey. Speed is not, however, a goal for the experiment
Information conceming your aviation background will help us to more accurately assess some of the variables
that affect the performance of the pilots. All information that you provide will remain completely
anonymous.
If you are curious about the researcher behind this work, I am a doctoral student in Aeronautics & Astronautics
at MIT, and a student pilot, particularly interested in aviation & aerospace human-interface and safety issues.
Results from this experiment will contribute to the work of my thesis, which is supervised by Professor R. John
Hansman and supported by NASA Langley Research Center. Please feel free to contact me if you have
questions. Thank you, and enjoy the experiment.
Sanjay Vakil
Graduate Research Assistant
International Centre for Air Transportation
MIT Room 35-217,
Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
phone: (617) 253-0993 fax: (617) 253-4196
sanjcbmit.edu
Web-based Survey, Page 1
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Background on Mode Transitions
Based on a review of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), we found situations where the autoflight
system caught the pilot unaware or had some sort of unexpected behaviour. Many of these situations involved
mode transitions. A mode transition occurs any time that the aircraft switches from one mode to another, such
as between Vertical Speed mode and Altitude Hold mode.
The next sections will describe the characteristics of mode transitions which are hypothesized to contribute to
complexity. These consist of multiple transition types, multiple paths along which a transition can occur, and
conditions which must be met before a transition will occur. Each of these is detailed in the next section.
The images on the next several pages are quite large, in order to let you see the details of the primary flight
display. Please expand your web browser to its largest dimensions in order to view the images.
[continueI
Figure D.2: Web-based Survey, Page 2
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Types of Transitions
* Manual transition: caused by a pilot pressing a switch.
Example: Boeing B777 in a Vertical Speed descent. When the HOLD button is pressed, the aircraft immediately
switches to the Altitude Hold mode and holds the current altitude.
Wriical Speed Descent Press HOLD button lansilon to ALTHOLD atcurrent alitude
* Automatic transition: occurs when the aircraft switches modes without direct pilot intervention
Example: Transition to Altitude Hold when an aircraft intercepts the altitude shown in the altitude window. During a
Vertical Speed manuever in a B737, the aircraft will transition to Altitude Hold mode when this interception occurs
artci eed Descent Aproach Attude In Aude window tuasiton toALT OLDatAjlitude UPndowAlide
* Armed transition: occurs when the autoflight system has been authorized or armed to make a transition.
Example of this is the transition from a Glide Slope Armed mode to a Glide Slope Tracking mode. The autoflight
system will not switch directly into the tracking mode unless it was previously armed by the pilot.
Figure D.3:
(ide Hope is Armed for Capture Glide Sope Capiue occurs
Web-based Survey, Page 3
(ide Slope Mode becomes Acive
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Multiple Paths
Some transitions have multiple ways to occurs: different paths. The transition between Vertical Speed and Altitude Hold
can occur along two different paths. Either the HOLD button can be pressed by the pilot, resulting in an immediate
leveloff, or the aircraft can approach and leveloff at the altitude in the altitude window. Each path also has different final
states:
" The automatic transition captures the value in the altitude window.
* Pressing the HOLD button results in the aircraft leveling off at a different altitude than the one shown in the altitude
window
Inlation to ALT HOLD at
Altitude VAndowAlflude
Wricalt eed Descent
Press HOLD button Tansition toALTHOLD at curent alitude
Figure D.4: Web-based Survey, Page 4
216
Conditions
For a transition to occur, a set of conditions must be met associated with each path. These conditions are shown in the
figure along each path.
* Single Condition Example: Pressing the Heading Select button.
Pr ess HDG SEL Button Transliln to HDG SEL Mode
* Multiple Condition Example: Transition from Vertical Speed to the VNAV mode on the B757. Requires the VNAV
button to be pressed, the aircraft to be above 400 ft RA, and the altitude in the altitude window to be above the
current altitude.
Stat in ALT HOLD Mode
Press VNAV Button edie
- Above 400 ft RA
- Alikide Windowis
Above Aircaft
ltansilon to VNAV SPD Mode
The difference between manual and automatic transitions are the criteria which must be met before the switch occurs. In
manual transitions, there must be at least one manual condition, such as a button press. In automatic transitions, all of the
conditions are satisfied without manual intervention.
Figure D.5: Web-based Survey, Page 5
Start in LNAV Mode
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Background Information
Age: F Sex: Male Q Female 0
Total Flight Time:I
What aircraft are you currently flying, or have you recently flown?
Aircraft Type Flight Hours (Approximate) Position
Current |
Previous |
Estimated Flight Hours in 1998:|
Estimated Flight Hours in 1999:1
Continue
Figure D.6: Web-based Survey, Page 6
Most Difficult Mode Transitions
In the aircraft you currently fly, please identify what you consider to be the 3 most difficult mode transitions. Try
to answer these questions as if you were instructing another pilot, new to this aircraft, about its difficult modes.
Please be sure to list all conditions which must be fulfilled for the transition to occur. Please, include what the
aircraft does after the transition: what new heading/speed/descent rate/altitude become active.
Also, there will be buttons at the bottom of each page to allow you to review the information on Transition
Types, Multiple Paths, and Conditions at any point. Each button will jump you to the information page an then
allow you to continue the survey where you left off.
(Continue
Figure D.7: Web-based Survey, Page 7
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First Mode Transition
Transition from Mode A to: Mode B
Type of transition (check all that apply):
Manual E] Automatic F Armed [
Estimate the number of different paths possible in this transition: Select estimated number of Paths A
Describe the transition in as much detail as possible.
Think about explaining this to another crew member.
If possible, include the necessary conditions, possible paths, and outcomes for the transition:
Enter transition description here.
What makes this transition difficult?
Enter what makes the transition difficult here.
Review Transition T s
Figure D.8: Web-based Survey, Page 8-10
[ Review Multiple Paths Review Conditions Continue
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Figure D.9:
Comparing Mode Transistions
We are interested in how complicated you feel difficult transitions are. In this final section, you will be asked to
compare the mode transitions that you listed previously against each other. Please rate the following 10
comparisons between pairs of mode transitions.
Mode A to Mode Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode C to
B is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode D
o o 0 0 0
Mode A to Mode Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode E to
B is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode F
o o o o o
LVL CHG or Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode A toFLCH to ALT Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode BHOLD is
o 0 0 0 0
LNAV to Heading Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode A to
Select is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode B
o o o o o
Mode C to Mode Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode E to
D is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode F
o 0 0 0 0
Mode C to Mode Much Less Less Equally More Much More than LVL CHG or
D is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated FLCH to ALTHOLD
LNAV to Heading Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode C to
Select is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode D
Mode E to Much Less Less Equally More Much More than LNAV to
Mode F is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Heading Select
LVL CHG or Much Less Less Equally More Much More than Mode E toFLCH t LT Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Mode F
LNAV to Heading Much Less Less Equally More Much More than LVL CHGCmlctdor FILCH to ALTSelect is Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated Complicated HOLD
Web-based Survey, Page 11
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Thank you for participating in this survey. If you enjoyed taking part, and are interested in taking part in other
aviation experiments, please send mail to sanjomit.edu so that you can be contacted in the future.
Similarly, if you are interested in the results, send mail and an electronic copy of the report will be sent out when
it has been completed.
Figure D.10: Web-based Survey, Page 12
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Appendix E
Electronic Vertical Situation Display
A concern in modern automation is that sufficient information may not be available to the
pilot to accurately track the state of the automation. Using the terminology of control engineers,
the system is not "observable." Accurately characterizing necessary automation feedback can
support modifications that make the system more tractable. However, since such changes to
aircraft are much more rare, and expensive, than changes to training or procedures, they are likely
to only be done in extreme situations. This chapter will discuss the results of a study performed to
gauge the impact of a new display, designed to show the vertical situation of the aircraft, in a set
of automation-incident related situations.
E.1 Motivation for Vertical Domain Research
The fundamental motivation for this research is to reduce the number of aircraft incidents
related to mode awareness problems. Toward this end, incidents in which mode awareness issues
are suspected to have been a contributing factor have been examined. The review of the reports
contained within the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database along with a set of
focused interviews with flight crews and an examination of the feedback mechanisms in modern
AutoFlight Systems were used to ascertain the areas of interest. The background research has
identified the lack of feedback and a high degree of automation complexity in the vertical channel
as a possible source of mode awareness problems. Based on this information it was hypothesized
that adding feedback to the vertical channel would mitigate some of the reported and suspected
mode awareness problems.
E.2 Electronic Vertical Situation Display
Background research highlighted the vertical channel as an area in need of improved
feedback. Based on this hypothesis, a set of crew information requirements was developed. This
set of requirements was incorporated into an Electronic Vertical Situation Display (EVSD) to
mitigate some of the identified problems. The EVSD is envisioned to provide an analog to the
Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator, which is currently available in glass cockpits. The
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display is designed to show the programmed vertical path of the aircraft and the modes associated
with that path.
The information requirements for the EVSD were created based on operator requirements and
on known mode awareness problems. The information requirements have four major components:
the current mode, any anticipated modes, transitions into anticipated modes, and the
consequences of the current state of aircraft automation. The four requirements also provide
answers to the most commonly asked questions asked in glass cockpits: "What is it doing?,"
"Why did it do that?," and "What will it do next?" (Wiener, 1989).
E.3 EVSD Format
Figure E. 1 shows the prototype EVSD. The display has four distinct areas. At the top of the
display is the mode display window, showing the current and anticipated modes, control
allocations and target states. At the left is a scalable altitude tape. The bottom window can either
display the path distance (if in LNAV mode), or the range directly ahead of the aircraft. Finally,
the main window shows the aircraft vertically in relation to the upcoming waypoints and mode
transition points.
Figure E.1:
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Current Modetrol
E.3.1 Current Mode
The current mode of the automation needs to be identified along with any of the specific
attributes of the mode such as target state values and control allocation. In Figure E. 1, the current
mode is identified in the top window in green text, directly above the aircraft symbol. Underneath
are the control allocations and the target states for the active mode. In this example, the aircraft is
in VNAV Path Descent (VPATH) with the vertical path controlled by elevator (E) and the speed
controlled by throttle (T). An example of a transition criterion is the dashed magenta line at
15 000 ft, which is the altitude dialed into the Mode Control Panel.
E.3.2 Anticipated Modes
Anticipated modes consist of the future modes into which the automation expects the aircraft
to transition. Based on some extrapolation of the current aircraft and automation state, the system
needs to be able to anticipate future mode transitions and the associated future modes. This
determination may be straightforward for many preprogrammed macro modes, but it may be
inaccurate for uncommanded mode changes. For example, the highly accurate prediction of
entering an envelope protection mode downstream is difficult.
On the EVSD, the anticipated mode is shown in the top window above the point where it is
predicted to be engaged. The anticipated target state and control allocations are depicted in a
manner similar to the current mode. In Figure E. 1, the system is predicting a speed violation and a
mode transition to the VNAV Speed Mode (VSPD). In this mode, the display shows that the
vertical path will be controlled by the throttles to Idle, and the speed will be controlled by
elevators to 320 kts. Note that both the target states and the control allocation change when the
new mode is engaged.
Another mode change is anticipated once the aircraft reaches the MCP altitude of 14 000 ft,
approximately 12 nmi ahead of the aircraft. The aircraft will switch to VNAV Path Mode
(VPATH). Once the automation switches to this mode, the altitude becomes a target state, as
shown in the box underneath the VPATH text.
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E.3.3 Mode Transitions and Consequences
Anticipation of the consequences of the current state of the automation is necessary. A
predictive profile based on the current automation state should display the locations of anticipated
mode transitions and their consequences on the flight path. Determining the location of these
transitions requires making assumptions about both the intentions of the pilots and factors
external to the aircraft, such as weather and air temperature. Closely related to this is the ability to
anticipate mode changes. Since there may not be warning of certain types of mode changes,
especially those which are selected by the crew, this may not be possible in all situations.
Mode transition alerting has several elements. The first is the text of the anticipated mode
translating across the top window, arriving at the current mode slot when engaged. The second is
an Aircraft Path Line, commonly referred to as the "green line" which shows the path that the
aircraft will travel based on the current state of the automation. In Figure E. 1, the green line is
shown deviating from the solid magenta line as the automation anticipates the aircraft being
unable to maintain the commanded descent rate. In this case, an elbow in the path also highlights
where the transition is calculated to occur. The consequences of a mode change are based on an
extrapolation of the current state of the aircraft automation. A predictive profile based on the
current automation state is shown to display the locations of anticipated mode transitions and their
consequences on the flight path.
The green line also has a set of circles which highlight where the aircraft is going to undergo a
mode transition. Green circles depict when the aircraft is going to undergo a programmed mode
transition, such as leveling at a commanded altitude as seen in Figure E.1 near the 12 nmi point.
These circles align with the green bars in front of programmed modes shown in the upper
window. Yellow circles depict uncommanded or automatic mode changes that occur due to speed
violations. In Figure E. I the yellow circle at the bend of the elbow highlights the transition at the
3 nmi point to the VNAV Speed Mode (VSPD). These circles also align with the yellow bars in
front of automatic modes in the upper window.
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E.3.4 Additional Symbology
A solid magenta line connecting waypoint crossing restrictions is a graphical display of the
current vertical path programmed into the FMS. Shown in the main section of the EVSD screen
are the waypoints programmed into the FMS. In a manner consistent with the EHSI, programmed
waypoints are magenta, and the active waypoint (the one the aircraft is flying to) is white. Non-
programmed waypoints are not shown.
Altitude crossings are shown by the altitude of the waypoint symbol. Waypoints without
restrictions are placed on the ground, or on the bottom edge of the screen if the ground is not
visible. Dashed lines descend to the path scale on the bottom of the display to allow the distance
to future waypoints to be easily determined. The horizontal scale is defined by the path distance
between each waypoint.
VFU
Figure E.2: EVSD in VNAV Descent
The example shown in the Figure E.2 is a Vertical Navigation macro mode (VNAV) descent.
The aircraft is shown on the first segment of a descent profile using the VNAV mode to maintain
an altitude of 12 000 ft. Near the TLG waypoint, the aircraft is anticipated to remain in the VNAV
macro mode, but to change the target state at the Top of Descent point (a transition criterion) to a
path-based descent. The Aircraft Path Line highlights another mode change that will occur near
PQT at 10 000 ft as the aircraft intersects the preprogrammed MCP altitude transition criterion
and switches out of VNAV and into an Altitude Hold mode.
Figure E.3 shows an aircraft close to approach with the additional symbology required near
landing. The dashed white line is an indication of the location of the ILS glide slope. At the end of
the glide slope is the runway, shown at the correct altitude and length. The difference between
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Figure E.3: EVSD Near Approach
waypoints with and without an altitude restriction is also apparent. WAXEN has an altitude
restriction associated with it, and is shown at that altitude of 3000 ft. Since there is no altitude
restriction associated with the REVER waypoint, it is placed at ground level. Finally, the very
bottom of the main window in the Figure E.2 has terrain information. While this capability was
not used in the experimental evaluation, it has been prototyped on the EVSD.
E.4 EVSD Evaluation
The approach to EVSD evaluation was to have subject pilots act as Pilot Not Flying (PNF)
and observe a set of scenarios running on a part task simulator. Subjects were drawn from a pool
of current "glass cockpit" airline pilots. While subjects observed the scenarios, the researcher.
acted as Pilot Flying (PF), interacting with the simulated aircraft automation and responding to
prerecorded Air Traffic Control directives. Both the subject and the researcher were located in
from of identical displays to simulate the set of instruments available to the captain (subject) and
first officer (researcher) in an actual cockpit. Both displays were electronically slaved together to
show identical information at all phases of the experiment. If during the course of the scenario the
subject felt that some sort of mode event occurred, they pressed a button on the side stick
controller and articulated their concern. This audio data was later analyzed for timing and content.
A mode event was described to the subjects as: an uncommanded mode transition occurring, an
error had been made in interfacing with the FMS, or an unsafe or nonprocedural operation had
taken place.
This evaluation methodology is very similar to the SAGAT situational awareness technique
(Endsley, 1995) with some implementation differences. In contrast with SAGAT evaluations,
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where the subjects actively interact with the simulator, the EVSD evaluation scenarios were
completely passive for the subjects. The only interaction was for the subjects to articulate
concerns at any point during the evaluation that they felt necessary. During experimental design it
was found that simply monitoring the displays was an unrealistic representation of the workload
in actual cockpit operations. To correct this, subjects were given an unrelated side task to monitor.
E.4.1 Measures
Both objective and subjective measures were used during display evaluation. The objective
measures were based on the elapsed time between the mode event and the pilot response or, when
relevant, the net altitude deviation the aircraft from the intended path. The latter indication was
used when the altitude deviation of the aircraft was the relevant factor in the incident. For
subjective measures, after each scenario subjects were asked questions which addressed the cause
of the mode transition, the consequences of the new mode state and the cues used by the subject to
determine that an incorrect automation state was reached.
These questionnaires were rated to determine the level of the subject's understanding of the
problem. Each rating corresponded with differing levels of comprehension. In order to determine
in a objective manner whether pilots understood the underlying cause of the incident, each
scenario had a key element that was deemed to be indicative of understanding. Finally, after the
experiment was completed, subjects filled out a survey comparing the EVSD enhanced
AutoFlight system to the regular AutoFlight System.
E.4.2 Scenarios and Objective Results
A total of eight subjects participated in this experimental evaluation. The subject ranged in
ages from 39 to 53 with a mean age of 47. First officers comprised 62.5% of the subjects; the
remaining 37.5% were captains. 37.5% were initially trained as civil pilots, while the remainder
were initially trained by the military. Subjects had between 4000 and 15870 hours of civilian
flight experience with a mean of 8646 hours. Between 200 and 5000 of these hours were in glass
cockpits, with a mean of 2263 hours. Estimated flight hours in 1995 ranged between 250 and 800
with a mean of 533 hours.
229
The bulk of the scenarios have results based on objective timing information. Two of the
scenarios (Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-precision Approach and the Altitude Capture
Failure during Altitude Change) use the net altitude deviation as a more relevant measure, as it is
of greater merit. In this context, negative altitude deviations refer to pilots reporting the incident
before they reached the point at which an altitude deviation would occur. Similarly, negative
times refer to pilots anticipating the incident and reporting it before it would occur, with the
absolute value of the time indicating the anticipation time.
Glide Slope Transmitter Failure during Approach
This scenario simulated the loss of the ground based glide slope transmitter during an
autoflight system flown Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach. A few seconds after the
glide slope is captured, the ground based transmitter fails. This failure results in a loss of signal to
the aircraft system, causing a mode reversion to Vertical Speed mode with the current
(instantaneous) vertical speed as the target criterion. The vertical speed is such that the aircraft
will land short of the runway. Figure E.4 shows that by using the EVSD, subjects noticed and
reacted to this mode event 17.2 seconds sooner than without at a confidence level of 80%.
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Figure E.4: Glide Slope Transmitter Failure during Approach
Figure E.4 shows that by using the EVSD, subjects noticed and reacted to this mode event
17.2 seconds sooner than without at a confidence level of 80%. This is interesting in that the only
changes on the EVSD during this scenario are the shift in the green line and the flashing and
alteration of the text displayed in the mode header
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Overspeed Envelope Protection during Altitude Change
A late ATC directive leads to a high vertical descent rate, which engages the envelope
protection of the aircraft. After initially trying a Flight Level Change mode descent, it becomes
clear that a high speed Vertical Speed mode descent will be necessary. During this steep descent
in vertical speed mode, the envelope protection limits of the aircraft are surpassed. The aircraft
transitions to High Speed Protect mode and AFS control allocation shifts from speed-on-thrust to
speed-on-pitch to prevent the aircraft from overspeeding further. Finally, due to insufficient
descent rate, the aircraft overflies the altitude crossing.
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Figure E.5: Overspeed Envelope Protection during Altitude Change
Figure E.5 shows that the anticipation capabilities of the EVSD allowed pilots to predict the
overspeed situation 40.3 seconds sooner than they did without the display, at a confidence level of
95%. Negative times refer to the pilots anticipating the incident. It was clear during this
experiment that the anticipation capability was directly responsible for the improvement as
subject directly referenced the EVSD when calling ATC to report that they would be unable to
make the crossing. Several subjects commented on the fact that the information was easily
available in the graphical format. In addition, several subjects mentioned additional quantitative
information available on the display, such as the distance to the overspeed condition, the altitude
at which the overspeed would occur, and the distance by which the altitude restriction would not
be met.
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Altitude Capture Failure during Altitude Change
During a Flight Level Change Descent, the aircraft fails to level-off at the MCP altitude.
Instead of capturing the programmed altitude, the aircraft, the aircraft continues its descent at the
commanded vertical speed target as seen in the figure. Since the MCP altitude is now above the
aircraft, the vehicle enters an open descent.
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Figure E.6: Altitude Capture Failure during Altitude Change
As seen in Figure E.6, subjects were observed to deviate from the target altitude by 45.8 feet
less with the EVSD than without, but this value had little statistical significance. In this scenario,
the EVSD did not appear to help or hinder this type of inner loop monitoring in a significant
manner. It was observed that subjects tended to watch the altitude tape on the Primary Flight
Display rather than the EVSD. This seems to imply that the EVSD may not be useful in situations
where the information necessary to detect a mode event is explicitly available on a standard piece
of cockpit automation. Alternately, the fact that pilot are trained to use specific display when
dealing with high importance tasks which have dedicated feedback mechanisms may have
overridden any use of the EVSD. Due to an anomaly in the simulation, one of the subjects was not
tested in this particular scenario.
VNAV Path to VNAV Speed Transition due to High Winds
During a VNAV flight profile, unanticipated wind conditions cause the aircraft to switch to an
envelope protection VNAV SPD mode in order to prevent the aircraft from varying too far from
the speed target. The automation is designed to switch to VNAV Speed mode that when the speed
in VNAV Path mode reaches the critical value of commanded speed ± 10 kts. In VNAV Speed
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mode, the vertical path is sacrificed to maintain the speed target, causing the aircraft to overfly the
next altitude restriction.
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Figure E.7: VNAV Path to VNAV Speed Transition due to High Winds
Figure E.7 shows that subjects reacted to this mode change 4.7 seconds faster with the EVSD
than without. However, this value is not statistically significant with the small number of subjects
tested. This result was unexpected since the same anticipation capabilities that were used
effectively in two other scenarios were available to the subjects. In fact, only one pilot appeared
(Subject 7) to use the anticipation capabilities by directly referencing the EVSD when calling
ATC to report that the aircraft would be unable to make the crossing. It is hypothesized that a lack
of experience with the VNAV system may have been a contributing factor. Due to a simulator
anomaly, the timing results for subject 4 were rendered invalid and so were not included in the
analysis.
Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-Precision Approach
In this scenario, the Pilot Flying misdials the MCP altitude and misses an intermediate
waypoint. During the non-precision approach, the researcher acting as Pilot Flying deals with
slowing the aircraft by dialing the correct speed targets, and guiding the aircraft through each
altitude restriction. During one such descent, an intermediate altitude target between the Final
Approach Fix and the Missed Approach Point is inadvertently omitted by the Pilot Flying
(researcher) causing an altitude deviation.
Altitude deviation in this scenario was measured by how far below the correct altitude the
aircraft was when the subject recognized that a mistake had been made by the Pilot Flying. In this
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Figure E.8: Target Error by Pilot Flying during Non-Precision Approach
context, a negative number represents that the subject realized the error before an altitude
deviation occurred, a positive number represents an actual altitude deviation.
As seen in Figure E.8, using the EVSD, subjects were found to deviate from the target altitude
by 117.1 feet more than without, but this value has little statistical significance in light of the
sample size. It was also observed that subjects watched the Pilot Flying dial the incorrect value in
the MCP rather than observing the mistake elsewhere. One pilot commented on the fact that the
EVSD was not the correct display to use to catch this error, and that good Cockpit Resource
Management should prevent this type of mistake from occurring.
Underspeed during Altitude Change due to ATC Directive
Overconstraining ATC directives cause the aircraft to lose speed to the point where the low
speed envelope protection function of the aircraft is engaged. After switching the aircraft into
Vertical Speed mode, and dialing in the target speed, it becomes clear that the last ATC
amendment results in a target that exceeds the climb performance capability of the aircraft, as
shown in the figure. The lower climb rate in the envelope protection mode prevents the aircraft
from making its crossing restriction, and from maintaining the vertical speed target.
Altitude deviation in this scenario was measured by how far below the correct altitude the
aircraft was when the subject recognized that a mistake had been made by the Pilot Flying. In this
context, a negative number represents that the subject realized the error before an altitude
deviation occurred, a positive number represents an actual altitude deviation.
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Figure E.9: Underspeed during Altitude Change due to ATC Directive
Figure E.9 shows that the anticipation functionality of the EVSD allowed pilots to predict the
underspeed situation 60.6 seconds sooner with the EVSD than without, at a confidence level of
95%. Negative times refer to the pilots anticipating the incident before it actually occurs. In
addition to catching the error, several subjects recorded the distance by which the crossing
restriction would be missed and additional related information, such as the altitude at which the
envelope protection mode would be engaged, the location at which the low speed mode would be
engaged, and so on.
Unexpected Climb during Approach due to Flap Overspeed
In this scenario, the aircraft attempts to climb to the Missed Approach Altitude due to a flap
overspeed condition caused by Pilot Flying error. While lowering the flaps a few seconds too
early, the PF engages the High Speed mode of the AFS. Since the MCP is dialed to the Missed
Approach Altitude (above the current altitude), the aircraft adds suddenly pitches up and adds
power in an attempt to capture the higher altitude. This particular problem emulates an event that
occurred on an A310 in Orly, France in September 1994.
Figure E.10 shows that the subjects reacted to the sudden climb 0.8 seconds slower with the
EVSD than without, but the confidence level of this value is low. This value is also within the
noise level of human reaction time. In this scenario subjects responded by viewing the pitch up of
the aircraft in the PFD and immediately calling in a go-around condition to ATC. Once this was
completed, subjects considered what caused the situation and examined the EVSD when it was
available.
235
1With EVSD W~ithout EVSD
14
^1 0
8
22L
Subject I Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Mean
Figure E. 10: Unexpected Climb during Approach due to Flap Overspeed
E.4.3 Subjective Results
In addition to the scenario specific results, each subject was asked to fill out a survey to assess
the usefulness of the EVSD in various situations and to determine the usefulness of specific
elements of the EVSD.
Subjective Value of the EVSD
Subjects were asked to rate the value of the EVSD on a scale from Very Valuable to Very
Detrimental. The results of this questionnaire are shown in Figure E. 11. All of the subjects felt
that the display was at least somewhat valuable. Subjects were volunteers for this experiment, so
that these results may be biased by having subjects which were predisposed to new technology in
the cockpit.
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Figure E. 11: Subjective Questionnaire: How Valuable was the EVSD
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Comparison of EVSD with Current AutoFlight System
Subjects were also asked to compare the EVSD to the current AFS for a variety of tasks on a
scale from Significantly Better to Significantly Worse as shown in Figure E. 12. These results
show that the subjects found the EVSD useful in a wide range of tasks, from inner loop target
monitoring to augmenting overall situation awareness. This is not consistent with the objective
results, which seem to point to more effective usage in situations where there was a strategic
advantage to the information on the EVSD. The display tended to be less useful in instances
where another instrument provided the same information, especially when the task involved
tactical types of inner loop monitoring.
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Figure E.12: Subjective Questionnaire: Comparison between the EVSD and Current Vertical
Feedback Mechanisms
Subjective Value of Elements of EVSD
Finally, subjects were asked to rate the usefulness of specific elements of the EVSD on a scale
from Very Valuable to Very Detrimental. Each of these were scales with five levels, with the
middle value being neutral. In addition, subjects were asked additional comments on the EVSD
and features they felt were missing or required. The results of this questionnaire are outlined on
Figure E.13. Once again, for each question, the percentage of subjects responding in that category
is shown. Figure E. 13 shows that subjects were not concerned with the control allocation, or the
redundant target state information provided in the top bar of the EVSD. The interaction of the
Green (Aircraft Path) Line, the VNAV Path information and the graphical target states were cited
as being even more useful than the individual elements.
Subjects were also given the opportunity to comment on features that they felt were missing
on the prototype EVSD. 75% of the subjects were interested in seeing terrain information on the
display and another 25% were interested in seeing vertical weather information. It should be
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Figure E.13: Subjective Questionnaire: Value of Specific EVSD Elements
noted that terrain information drawn from a database has been incorporated into the current
EVSD design (as seen in Figure E.2), but the feature was not considered mature and stable
enough to incorporate into this experimental evaluation.
E.5 Conclusions
Automation mode awareness problems have been reported by operators of many air transport
aircraft. An examination of current generation AutoFlight Systems and a review of the ASRS
database highlighted a lack of feedback in the vertical channel of aircraft automation. It was
hypothesized that many of the incidents involving mode awareness problems could be mitigated
by increased feedback in the vertical channel through an Electronic Vertical Situation Display.
An EVSD was prototyped which had four major display features: the current mode,
anticipated modes, transitions into anticipated modes, and the consequences of the current state of
aircraft automation. To evaluate the utility of the display, an experimental set of test scenarios
was developed based on a representative set of known mode awareness problems from the ASRS
review. Commercial airline pilots with glass cockpit experience were used as subjects in the
experimental evaluation of the EVSD.
The Electronic Vertical Situation Display was found to significantly improve mode awareness
understanding and the detection of mode awareness problems in both subjective and objective
measures of subject response. Objective results were particularly strong when the anticipation
functions of the EVSD could be used to foresee an event before it actually occurred.
Amalgamated ratings of pilot understanding of mode awareness problems over the full set of
scenarios increased in a statistically significant manner when the EVSD was available. In
addition, subjects were much more specific when reporting problems to Air Traffic Control. For
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example, rather than simply reporting that they were unable to make a crossing restriction,
subjects would also report how far past of the waypoint the altitude would be acquired. Several
subjects also mentioned the additional utility of having a vertical image of the aircraft's
programmed flight.
The subjective survey results showed all of the subjects finding the display at least Somewhat
Valuable. Display elements of the EVSD were also rated individually, with no elements being
rated as detrimental and certain elements, such as the Aircraft Path Line and the vertical depiction
of the VNAV trajectory being rated as Very Valuable by at least half the subjects. When subjects
were asked to compare the EVSD with the mode feedback available in the cockpit available, they
felt that overall situational awareness was improved, as was altitude monitoring and envelope
protection monitoring.
Based on the positive results of this preliminary study, further evaluation of the EVSD
concept appears warranted. Several issues remain to be addressed before a vertical display can be
incorporated into current glass cockpits. For example an EVSD implementation must be designed
to be compatible with specific AutoFlight Systems. Specific mode symbologies and names,
scaling concerns, and colour conventions must be addressed, along with issues of retrofitting this
display to current aircraft. This also entails finding an appropriate location for the EVSD in the
valuable real estate of the modern cockpit.
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Appendix F
Electronic Vertical Situation Display Questionnaire
F.1 Subjective Questionnaire
1. How valuable was the Electronic Vertical Situation Display:
Very Somewhat
Valuable Valuable
Neutral Somewhat Very
Detrimental Detrimental
2. How does the EVSD compare with the current AutoFlight System for:
Overall Vertical Situation
Awareness
Altitude Deviation Monitoring
Envelope Protection Monitoring
Autoflight System Monitoring
Target Monitoring
Significantly Somewhat Same Somewhat Significantly
Better Better Worse Worse
Significantly Somewhat Same Somewhat Significantly
Better Better Worse Worse
Significantly Somewhat Same Somewhat Significantly
Better Better Worse Worse
Significantly Somewhat Same Somewhat Significantly
Better Better Worse Worse
Significantly Somewhat
Better Better
Same Somewhat Significantly
Worse Worse
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Why?
3. What do you consider the
BEST feature of the EVSD:
WORST feature of the EVSD:
feature that is MISSING on the EVSD:
4. Please rate the value of each of the following features of the EVSD:
Green Line
VNAV path information
Current Mode Information
Anticipated Mode Information
Graphical Target States
(MCP line / G/S line)
Text Target States
(in top window)
Control Allocation
Very Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Very
Valuable Valuable Detrimental Detrimental
Very Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Very
Valuable Valuable Detrimental Detrimental
Very Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Very
Valuable Valuable Detrimental Detrimental
Very Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Very
Valuable Valuable Detrimental Detrimental
Very Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Very
Valuable Valuable Detrimental Detrimental
Very Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Very
Valuable Valuable Detrimental Detrimental
Very
Valuable
Somewhat
Valuable
Neutral Somewhat Very
Detrimental Detrimental
5. Any additional comments or suggestions?
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F.2 Briefing for Experiment
The experimental methodology is to fly a series of "mini-scenarios", each consisting of a short
(about 5 minute) session of observation of the autoflight system maneuvering via the standard
methods (EHSI display, ADI, MCP). Instead of actively controlling the aircraft, the subject,
acting as pilot-not-flying will allow the researcher (acting as the First Officer and pilot flying) to
react to all ATC commands and maintain tactical control of the aircraft. The subject is encouraged
to ask for scale changes on the displays and other passive observations.
If at anytime during the scenario, the subject feels that they should query the Pilot Flying about
the behaviour of the aircraft, or of any concerns about the performance of the PF, the subject
should articulate this concern via the "Press to Talk" button. Situations in which the button should
be used include, but are not limited to:
Inability to meet ATC directive, clearances or procedures.
Any sort of unsafe condition.
Any perceived fault with the aircraft.
Essentially, the subject CANNOT hit the button too often. Any situation which is of concern
should be articulated.
In addition, the subject has another task, which is to keep a load centered. The display for this
load is in the top left hand side of the screen. The side stick controller should be moved left to
right to center the load. An error value based on the duration of the misbalancing and the degree
of misbalancing will be recorded.
F.2.1 Training Session
Flight Level Change - climb, descent
Control Altitude
Note Targets
Note Control Allocation
Vertical Speed - climb, descent
Control Altitude
Note Targets
Note Control Allocation
High Speed - climb, descent
Control Altitude
Note Targets
Note Control Allocation
Note mode change circle
Approach Mode
Arming
extrapolation vector
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F.2.2 The Simulator:
The Aeronautical System Laboratory's Advanced Part Task Simulator is a medium fidelity
simulation of aircraft operations, with particular attention paid to displays and autopilot logic.
However, since it does not emulate any single aircraft (it is a mixture of the B757/767/747-400
with a B737 MCP and some display conventions from the MD- 11), a few of the characteristics it
exhibits must be noted and understood.
1. The VNAV function consists of two modes, VNAV PATH (where the a/c tries to follow a
specific path at the target speed) and VNAV SPD (the a/c tries to maintain a target speed during
vertical maneuvers). The transition from VNAV PATH to VNAV SPD occurs when due to an
unforeseen AFS target conflict, the a/c speed exceeds the target speed by 10 kts. This should be
considered a legitimate reason to use the press to talk button.
2. Envelope protection boundaries are shown on the speed tape on the ADI. The red marker
indicate Vmin and Vmax. If these boundaries are exceeded, the a/c autopilot will automatically
switch to either a LOSPD or HISPD mode to maintain the Vmin or Vmax speed until it captures
the target altitude.
3. The Altitude Capture Logic on the simulator flies a.05g arc when close to the target altitude. It
sometime overshoots slightly. During this capture, the a/c will be in the ALT HLD mode.
4. The localizer capture/tracking logic is somewhat coarse: it overshoots the localizer several
times before tracking down it tightly.
5. Some of the scenarios do not have anything worth reporting. These are inserted to keep the task
interesting and make sure that the task does not become too easy. If the subject feels that the
scenario did not have any problems, he or she should simply state so on the questionnaire.
6. A great deal of effort has been put into the fidelity of the simulation. Correct cues will be
available from the MCP, the EVSD (if it is currently visible), the ADI, the CDU and the EHSI.
The throttle (when on manual), flap and landing gear are all functionally operational and may be
used for additional information.
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F.3 EVSD Conventions
FMS/active waypoint
MCP/Glide Slope
active/predicted
caution
terrain
Scaling
x-axis: path
range
distance in nautical miles along FMS path (LNAV mode engaged)
distance in nautical miles straight ahead of a/c (HDG mode engaged)
y-axis: altitude in feet above mean sea level
Windows/Header
MODE ID
VERTICAL
SPEED
name and x-axis location of active or armed mode
VPTH vnav path
VSPD vnav speed
HOLD altitude hold
FLCH flight level change
V/S vertical speed
LAND autoland/glide slope track
HISPD hi speed envelope protection mode
LOSPD low speed envelope protection mode
name and x-axis location of vertical target and means of control
nnnnn altitude target (e.g. 28000)
+/- nnnn vertical speed target (e.g. -2500)
PATH FMS-computed vnav path
G/S glide slope
FLARE flare segment of autoland
MCT, CLB, IDLE thrust limits
Postfix displays the control mechanism used:
E control by elevator/pitch
T control by thrust
name and x-axis location of speed target and means of control
nnn indicated airspeed target (e.g. 250)
.nn mach target (e.g. .80)
Vmin/Vmax min/max flight envelope speeds
Postfix displays the control mechanism used:
E control by elevator/pitch
T control by thrust
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magenta
white
green
amber
brown
F.4 Background Information
Information concerning your aviation background will help us to more accurately assess some of
the variables that affect the performance of the pilots. All information that you provide will
remain completely anonymous.
Personal Data / Miscellaneous Information
1. Age: Sex: Male () Female ()
2. How were you initially trained to fly?
3. Civil Experience:
Total Civil Pilot Flight Time: ___
Pilot Ratings Held:
Civil ( ) Military ( )
Fixed Wing: ATP ( ) Commercial Pilot (
Rotary Wing: ATP ( ) Commercial Pilot (
) F.E. Written ( )
) Other
Electronic (Glass) Cockpit Equipped Transport Aircraft Flying Experience
Aircraft Type Flight Hours (Approximate)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Estimated Flight Hours in 1994:
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Position
F.5 Pilot Understanding Questionnaire
Scenario Number: Pilot Number:
Why did you use the "press to talk" button?
What caused the event? Why did it happen?
What cues did you use to determine that the event occurred?
What would have eventually happened if you had not stopped the scenario?
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Appendix G
Evaluation of the Operator Directed Process
Usability can be measured through multiple means, including rapid automation training and
adoption rates. In order evaluate the efficacy of the ODP in improving device performance, a
planned software development project was identified upon which to test the process. This project
was chosen based on availability and access to the planned and ongoing development effort.
G.1 Background
In order to investigate implementing of the Operator Directed Process, an early instantiation
of the ODP was used in the development of an automation tool to assist physicians. This tool
supported portable electronic documentation, and was first used in a billing scenario. Given the
similarities between the nature of the hospital operational environment and the flight
environment, this study appears to validate the Operator Directed Process for both fields. In
addition, this proved to be an excellent opportunity to field test the process within the limited
resources of a small company. The details of the development of this tool, and experimental
results from a preliminary pilot study will be presented.
The medical domain has similarities to the flight domain in terms of the relationship between
operators and automation. Beyond the obvious life-critical characteristics, they are similar in
other respects. Both pilots and physicians follow procedures in order to complete many tasks,
each also has a set of highly refined manual skills as well as rule- and knowledge-based
understanding, each group is highly trained in a specialized tasks, both augment capabilities
through automation, and each group has members which are reluctant to use new technology.
The test product which was developed was an "Electronic Billing Card." It was designed to
replace the existing system consisting of paper cards. These cards are the sole repository of billing
information generated by physicians in some hospitals. As such, they represent a single point
failure in the payment system for physicians. Replacing them with an electronic version could
result in large cost savings to both the physicians and the hospital by reducing the number of cards
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and charges which are lost, accelerating the process by which charges are reported, and other
mechanisms.
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Figure G. 1: Paper Billing Card
Billing cards are typically available at nurses' stations throughout the hospital. To create a
card for a new patient, a doctor has to visit the nurses' station and "stamp up" a card. The process
of stamping up places patient demographic information onto the card, as see on the top right
section of Figure G.1. Each day that a physician sees a patient, a billing code is placed into the
appropriate box on the card. When a physician has completed a card and wishes to turn it in, the
entire stack is submitted to the billing office. An example is shown in Figure G.1. This card is for
Alex Watkins (patient ID 237-52-16), who was first seen on June 13 by Dr. John Goodbelly. On
that date, the physician performed a code A (an "Admission Visit, Initial (Level 3)") with codes F,
G, G, and G on subsequent days.
G.2 Functional Analysis
The functional analysis of the current billing process was examined through observation and
focused interviews with physicians. This analysis showed a primary use for the billing cards as
well as several secondary ones. The distinction between primary and secondary uses and their
grouping was corroborated by active physicians. Some additional capabilities, not available
through the current system, were also identified through this analysis and served to accelerate
adoption into the operational environment.
250
Primary Function of Billing Card
The primary goal of the billing card is to allow the recording of billable information in a
structured form that is easily submitted to the next stage in the billing process. This requirement
implies that the cards must be portable and highly available for use at any time during a
physician's rounds. The availability and portability are an issue, since physicians find it difficult
to remember and transcribe billing information after a service has been rendered. By allowing the
capture of this information at the "point of care," revenues can be maximized.
Table G. 1: Primary Functions Required of Electronic Billing System
Primary Functions
Allow structured billing
High portability
Wide availability
The format of the cards is designed to minimize the amount of writing by the physician by
creating a very structured environment for the capture of information. This structure is imposed
by the form required by the United States Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), which
organize billable events into organized groups. On the bottom of the card shown in Figure G. 1 are
the short hand codes for these individual billable events.
Secondary Functions of Billing Card
In addition to its stated primary function, billing cards are used as a longer term record of
billings and interactions with patients. By examining a billing card, in conjunction with clinical
charts, a physician can gain a better understanding of their own interaction with a patient. Some
physicians also jot specific notes about patients such as lab results, critical elements of the patient
history and others pieces of information on the blank reverse surface of the card. The conjunction
of these minimal notes and the diagnostic and billing codes on the front of the card create a record
of the patient which is always available to physician. This is in contrast to the full clinical record
which is stored in a less accessible single location and serves as a repository of the interactions
and notes of all physicians with a patient. These aspects of the card's use prevents physicians
from handing them in to the billing office on a daily basis, since physicians are unwilling to
relinquish the information maintained on each card.
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Secondary Functions Required of Electronic Billing System
Secondary Functions
Record of billing and interactions
Secondary notes
Active list of patients
Billing cards are also used as an "active list" of patients. Each card is a physical placeholder
for recently seen patients. These cards can be organized in various manner to streamline the path
of a physician on their rounds, or to keep track of specific patients.
Supplementary Functions of Billing Card
By moving the billing capture from paper cards to an electronic device, additional functions
can be used to assist physicians and to streamline the billing process. The first is that by
maintaining information from multiple patients on a single electronic device, it is possible to
dynamically sort the list of patients. Many physicians currently maintain their stack of cards in
order of admission date, patient name, or patient location. The electronic version can
automatically provide this function.
As mentioned earlier, the paper cards are the only repository of billing information. To
provide some insurance over losing cards, physicians have taken to photocopying the cards, or
using specialized cards with carbon paper to retain receipts of the data before submission to the
billing office. Since the electronic device is still a single source of captured billing information, a
necessary function is to archive this information. This is even more critical for an electronic
device both since it has more failure modes than paper cards and because the granularity of the
loss is much coarser. Rather than losing a single card, worth hundreds of dollars, the loss of an
electronic device may result in the loss of charges worth thousands of dollars.
Table G.3: Supplementary Functions Required of Electronic Billing System
Supplementary Functions
Sorted list of patients
Archival of billing information
Maintain updated guidelines
252
Table G.2:
In order to evaluate the value of the final supplementary function, listed in Table G.3, it is
necessary to understand the guidelines used to determine the correct billing code. Guidelines,
specified by Health Care Financing Administration, enumerate the services which must be
provided-and documented on the clinical chart-by a physician in order to warrant charging
using specific billing code. These guidelines are very detailed, and complete characterization
requires data from multiple documents. In addition, the guidelines change on an annual basis. The
importance of accurate billing has recently become particularly important due to efforts by the US
Federal government to reduce instances of inaccurate or excessive charges. Mistakes can be
accompanied by large fines to the physicians ($10 000 per item) and even larger fines to hospitals
and organizations. From 1997-1999, the hospital at the University of Pennsylvania was assessed
with a fine of $30 million, Thomas Jefferson University hospital $12 million, and University of
Pittsburgh Hospital $17 million.
This financial liability introduced an additional function into the electronic billing card, which
was to provide an up-to-date set of guidelines to physicians to minimize incorrect billing.
Currently, hospitals and physician groups create shortened versions of these guidelines to allow
accurate billing. These guidelines are distributed to physicians via seminars, pamphlets, and
"quick reference cards," and end up stored in physicians' memories. A required function of the
electronic billing card is to enable this same information to be made available at the point of care
directly on the electronic device.
G.3 Automation Model
The fundamental automation model which was designed for the electronic billing card was to
create software which emulated an "enhanced" stack of billing cards. The stack of cards is a
metaphor which is understood by physicians and allows for easy manipulation of patient billing
data. Each individual card is also modelled on the visual structure of the paper cards, though
modified in order to fit within the size limitations of the electronic device. This is a very simple
model of automation for the device.
The environment for the device also needs to be modelled. As discussed earlier, physicians
currently have to visit the nurses' station in order to create new cards and populate them with
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demographic information. These stations are located on each floor of the hospital. This process
was recognized as an instantiation of an existing procedure used to structure the physician
workflow. The electronic billing card was designed to coexist and follow the same procedure: the
larger environment in which the electronic billing card system exists consists of synchronization
stations located at each nurses' station. In an analogous manner to the current system, physicians
visit these stations to populate patient cards with demographic information. This serves to
minimize the shift in work flow of the physicians. When physicians synchronize the electronic
billing cards to gain demographics, a sophisticated back-end infrastructure completes several
additional tasks: submitting new codes to the billing office, updating guidelines as necessary, and
archiving the data on the electronic device.
Billing Card Interface
The image on the right of Figure G.2 shows a single electronic card associated with a patient.
This screen allows immediate access to the patient's name, location, and diagnosis. Beneath the
demographics are boxes in which codes can be entered. The form of the code entry boxes mimic
the organizational structure seen on the bottom of the original paper billing card, shown in
Figure G. 1. Either a code can be selected directly, or it can be "constructed" using the hierarchy
of category and level. The enhancements which have been provided to this model fall within the
bounds of this metaphor. The first is the ability to sort patients based on differing criteria. The left
image in Figure G.2 shows an example of multiple of the list of multiple patients. The header of
each column is shown as underlined if it is being used to sort the list of patients.
Patients (21)
Lee, Danielle
Marx, Fritz
Mason, Jessica
McCracken, Tony
Moore, Christine
Polk, Buck
Riordan, Cathy
Smith, James
Thompson, Chloe
Add Patient )
Figure G.2: List of]
Sun 1/24/99
Loc. Seen
White 10
White 9
Ellison 8 X
White 7 X
White 7 X
Bigelow 7 X
White 7 X
atients and Patient Card
Dx1 W Al :92214434
Dx2 = (blank) Bigelow 7
s-19 5-2a 5-21 TODAY
Category: w Follow-up
Follow-up: Level 3
Clear Code: w F3 (99233)
Done (Info (Notes (Guidelines
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P
Select Patient
The bottom of the screen contains buttons to continue to less common information, such as
the complete demographics and the notes regarding the patient, shown in Figure G.3. This
information was spread across multiple screens and organized based on feedback from physicians
to place the most critical information immediately available and to push less used information
onto secondary screens.
Acct. Number: 592214434
Location: Bigelow 7
Sex: M
Referring MD: Dr. M. Davis
Status: EW
DOB: 9/20/59
Admit Date: 5/16/99
Discharge Date: None
DX1: Al
Done DX2: (blank)
Figure G.3:
S2 1999
iabetes
Done) (Date )w 5tock Phrases
Additional Screens of Data
Billing compliance guidelines made available directly on the device, organized by the billing
codes with which they were associated. The stack of cards now has an additional database which
contains up-to-date guidelines which are immediately accessible by the physicians. Figure G.4
shows an image of the billing guideline screen.
Figure G.4:
I Code: -,vA
Usual time ~ 30 minutes.
Document following 3:
H7X-> CC
HPI (4+ elems.)
ROS (2-9 system)
1 of 3: Past, Family,
Social hx.
EXAM--> 2-7 organ systems.
A&P--> 2of3:
Minimal # dx's./
mgmt. options;
Back) Choose This Code
Compliance guidelines
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G.4 Training Material and Procedure Design
In this prototypical instantiation of the Operator Directed Process, formal training material
was not created before software development. Instead, "storyboards" were created of each screen
by a "Subject Matter Expert"-an engineer who worked closely with the physicians to understand
the requirements and translate them into a form suitable for use on the organizer. These
storyboards, shown in Figure G.5, are a visual layout of the screens and describe the underlying
behaviour of each of the elements as viewed by the operator.
"Dr. Friendly" Screen Flow
Phase I Implementation
5 May 1998, MDB / SSH
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Dee 3509? n rM2-4813
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Aw019918 DWOY22?99
Rat V: D Jam c
Dc 98uey Skwft
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0 0
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-eo 0
o 0
00 E 00
Coe:C2 (99263)I
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Figure G.5: Example Storyboard
Code: C2(99263)
RSoeIVI all 3 Mey Co von At
- CteeCa9NS--
0 0
0 0
00 B 00
The storyboards were void of underlying implementation details. Each storyboard described a
standard set of interactions, or procedures, which a physician would have with the automation.
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Storyboards became a system description suitable for the basis of training and of procedural
design. Specific paths through the storyboard represented procedures describing usage. This
capacity was not anticipated, or anticipated as being a requirement, before application of the ODP
and served to refine the model. The procedures defined were also placed into the training manuals
in a series of "How Do I?" questions, shown in Table G.4.
Table G.4: "How Do I?" Procedural Guidance
Start the Electronic Billing Card?
- press the far right button, accented in gold
Turn the screen backlight feature on/off?
- press and hold the green power button for a few seconds
Sort the list of patients?
- tap the column heading you wish to sort on
- a second tap reverses the order
- a very useful ordering is to first sort by Location, then by Seen
to create a list of unseen patients sorted by their location
View patients past the bottom of the screen?
- use the hardware scroll buttons to view additional patients
- alternately, use the scrollbar to view additional patients
Enter today's code for a patient?
- select the patient from the Select Patient Screen
- select the appropriate Category and Level
- alternately, select the Code directly
- tap the Done button to return to the Select Patient Screen
Enter or change a diagnosis?
- select the patient from the Select Patient Screen
- select the appropriate diagnosis
- or choose (blank) to have no diagnosis
- tap the Done button to return to the Select Patient Screen
View a Guideline?
- select a patient from the Patient List
- tap Guidelines button
- select the appropriate Guideline
- tap the Done button to return to the Billing Card Screen
- tap the Done button to return to the Select Patient Screen
In addition, training sessions were carried out concurrently with development. At appropriate
stages of design the prototypes were shown to physicians and administrators. These physicians
were given demonstrations and often proffered immediate feedback. The model that was
presented to the physicians during these sessions was identical to the automation model, that of a
"smart" stack of billing cards.
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During some of these sessions, the operational concern of "multiple codes" was raised by
physicians. This capability was later added to the system, and that process is described later in
Section G.5.
As part of the preliminary evaluation, a complete set of documentation for the project was
developed. During this development, minor errors and inconsistencies were found in the system.
Rather than reflecting these errors in the documentation, the system itself was modified.
Anecdotally, it appeared that very few physicians had the patience or desire to pore over the small
training manual. Instead, using the knowledge gained during the personal training session, they
explored the system directly.
G.5 Iterative Design and Software Development
The development of the prototypes was highly iterative. Once a set of specifications has been
established, multiple generations of prototypes are created with growing degrees of functionality.
Each prototype is evaluated to determine if the new capabilities are fit within the metaphor and
are useful to the operator. In the case of the electronic billing card, a total of six iterative design
cycles have been completed, and the project is currently in the midst of the seventh.
The first stage of design consisted of sketches of the layout and function of the product on
paper. This sketch was used to establish the hierarchy and interaction between various screens and
establish the scope of the project. The next generation design was created using a Rapid
Application Development (RAD) tool which generated screens and a simple database. Using this
tool allowed some early usability testing to be done with physicians and to determine problems
with the product. What was noted during this evaluation is that the speed with which the unit
switched between screens was used by users as a measure of its responsiveness. At this stage,
many of the more complex operations (such as actually entering a code) were not available.
At this point a more robust development environment, since the limitations of the RAD tool
had been reached. A full prototype was created based on a storyboard document which described
each screen and its behaviour in detail. This prototype had the majority of the capabilities
required to fully demonstrate the billing card product in isolation. The next several revisions
modified the underlying architecture and databases of the billing card system in order to allow the
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product to be more flexible, configurable, and maintainable, but did not change its overall form or
user experience.
Identification of Additional Functionality Requirement: Multiple Codes
The exception to this monotonic refinement was the creation of a new feature which was
found to be required by the physicians: "multiple codes," the ability to bill for more than one code
per day. On the paper card, this was accomplished by writing the letter code very small, so that
multiple codes could be entered in the same box. It was decided that this would be an
inappropriate solution for the electronic device, since the size of readable text is limited by the
resolution and size of the screen.
A second design and development effort ensued in which a second round of storyboards were
created on paper by the Subject Matter Expert. It was found that the evaluation of the
implementation was dependent on accurately recreating its dynamic behaviour. As such,
physician evaluation was done after the storyboards were prototyped on the device. The final
solution was to retain the large format boxes and link boxes together if they were associated with
the same day. In Figure G.2, the "Today" code box has one code, and is can have another entered
in the box labelled "New." This feature required a re-evaluation and extension to the underlying
automation model and a modification to the training material in order to be added to the system.
Resolution of Edge Conditions
One additional anecdotal point should also be made. During the development of the system it
was found that "edge" conditions were regularly found by programmers, where the behaviour of
the system was not fully defined by the storyboard documentation or training material. As an
example, consider the situation where a physician is selects a code box to modify, then uses the
left/right arrows to view another code, thereby sliding the active box off screen. Should the
physician be able to modify a non-visible box? Should the box reappear if modification is
attempted? Should the physician be prevented from moving the active box off screen at all? These
edge conditions were submitted to the Subject Matter Expert for resolution, and if necessary, back
to the physicians. By doing so, non-nominal behaviours at the edges of the system were consistent
with nominal behaviour.
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Update to System During Study
During the operational evaluation, it was also found that physicians required the additional
function of being able to remove patients from the devices. This capability had, in fact, been
specified in early storyboard models of the systems, but was left out of the prototype due to time
constraints and in recognition of the duration of the study. During the study, this capability was
added to the prototype and immediately distributed to physicians to allow it to be evaluated. The
modification to the system was recognized as a consistent extension to the model of the system
and adopted by physicians.
G.6 Evaluation
A preliminary evaluation of the billing card system was undertaken at Massachusetts General
Hospital with the goal of determine physician acceptance. Other electronic tools which have been
introduced into the medical community have been stymied by a lack of physician adoption.
During this evaluation, 11 physicians were chosen by the hospital administration to use the
electronic billing card. The physicians ranged from computer experts to those who had not used
electronic devices at all and spanned a total of 8 medical disciplines. The duration of the study
was two weeks.
Objective measures were taken of physician usage of the device. These measures attempted to
understand which screen were used the most often, where physicians had difficulties in
manipulating controls, and to gain insight into overall usage patterns. Physicians were also asked
to complete a questionnaire to measure their acceptance of the product and to determine which
aspects required more effort. Physicians were compensated for their time by being given the
handheld organizer. To allow the development of trust in the system, physicians were allowed and
encouraged to maintain both paper and electronic copies of charges.
G.6.1 Objective Results
As part of the study, physician interaction with the electronic billing card was automatically
monitored. Interaction events consisted of viewing a particular screen on the device, using a
stylus to tap the screen, viewing guidelines, and so on, associated with this particular application.
Other programs being used on the device were not recorded. A given session with the device
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would result in dozens, if not hundreds of events. Each event was individually tagged for
identification and was stored with both the time of the interaction (one second granularity) and
any data associated with the interaction. The goal of this data collection was to measure the
regularity of physician interaction and the rapidity of device adoption.
Figure G.6 shows the results of the automatic monitoring, grouped into daily segments during
the fifteen day trial. Examining the data with one second accuracy was not insightful for overall
usage patterns, but was helpful in identifying detailed physician interaction problems. The data
shows that physicians' interaction pattern were heterogeneous, with some interacting on a daily
basis, and other rarely. The data does not show a gradual adoption curve, but rather immediate
usage. Instead, physicians appear to interact in a "bursty" manner. There are also long durations
during which some physicians did not interact with the device. Specifically, days 2, 3, 9, and 10
fell on the weekend, resulting in limited physician interaction. The use of the device on successive
days does not appear to have been influenced by this period of inactivity.
G.6.2 Survey Results
The survey was divided into three major sections. The goal of the first section was to gauge
physicians' acceptance and high-level impressions of the product and the handheld computer
platform. The next section made an explicit comparison between the billing card system and the
existing paper-based system. The final section mentioned specific attributes of the system and
asked about their importance to the billing task. The full survey is available in the appendices.
Acceptance Responses
The first set of questions was designed to elicit high-level responses from the participating
physicians.
One of the major concerns with introducing new applications into the medical environment is
the amount of training which will be required. Physicians are reluctant to waste even a small
fraction of their time learning new non-clinical technologies. The billing card system was
designed to be extremely easy to use through use of the Operator Directed Process. That ease of
use was reflected in a single ten-minute training session being unanimously considered adequate.
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Figure G.6: Physician Interactions with Electronic Billing Card
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Did you find the electronic billing card training adequate
This result was also reflected in the next question, which showed that 90% of physicians found
the system easy to use.
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Figure G.8: Did you find the electronic billing card simple, intuitive, and easy to use
Comparison to Paper-based System
The second section of survey attempted to compare the VIRTMED Billing Card system with
the existing paper-based system.
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Figure G.9: Would you want to use the electronic billing card on a permanent basis
The first issue was whether physicians wanted to use the system on a permanent basis. 90% of
the responding physicians found that this was likely or definite after only having used the product
for the short duration of the study. No physicians were opposed to using the system.
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The next set of questions explicitly compared specific attributes of the existing paper system
to those of billing card system. Physicians found that the electronic system was superior in both
"Availability/Convenience" and in "Satisfying Compliance Guidelines." The "Overall Ease of
Use" was also considered superior. The perceived "Accuracy of Billing Codes" was not found to
be detrimental. "Tracking of Patient Progress/Viewing Patient Demographics" was found to be
somewhat inferior to the paper-based version by 18% of physicians, which is not unremarkable
since this was not designed as a primary function of the tool. The questions were included to gain
insight into directions for future products.
Specific Attributes
The final section of the survey asked physicians to comment on specific attributes of the
electronic billing system in terms of their perceived value.
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Figure G. 11: Please rate the value of each of the following features of the electronic billing card
Physicians found the "Automatic Archiving/Backup of Billing Information" and "Immediate
Billing Processing" of billing information to be of paramount importance. In addition, the
availability of a "Sorted Patient List" and control over the "Rounding Order" were found to be
valuable.
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G.6.3 Analysis of Operator Directed Process Evaluation
The rapid acceptance and minimal training required of the electronic billing card system is a
single datapoint in the evaluation of the Operator Directed Process. Based on the subjective
results, the physicians were able to be trained in the use of the system extremely quickly and were
able to utilize it effectively for the duration of the evaluation. While this does not constitute a
controlled experiment comparing the ODP with a conventional development process, the results
are still compelling.
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